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INTRODUCTION
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have historically relied on models of media regulation that were shaped by the distinct
physical and economic characteristics of the communications media governed
by the Communications Act of 1934.1 Originally, person-to-person communications were available only through wire-based technologies, which were character-

1. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 171, 178 n.23, 286–90 (2002).
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ized by the high fixed costs that have traditionally been associated with natural
monopolies. As a result, such communications were governed by the “Telephone Model,” which incorporates the system of common carriage obligations
and rate regulation that has represented the traditional regulatory response to
natural monopoly. Mass communications, by contrast, originally employed the
electromagnetic spectrum as its sole means of transmission. As a result, regulatory authorities relied on what they perceived to be the unique physical qualities
of spectrum-based communications in developing the system of administrative
licensing, content restrictions, and affirmative programming obligations associated with the “Broadcast Model” of regulation.2
This technologically balkanized approach to regulation remained coherent
only so long as each type of communications was available solely through a
distinct means of transmission. The emergence of cable television, however,
began to cause this tidy regulatory division to unravel because it allowed mass
programming to reach consumers via wire-based technologies previously dedicated to person-to-person communications. The arrival of wireless telephony
completed the collapse of this scheme by making it possible to receive person-toperson communications over the spectrum. Furthermore, the impending shift of
all networks to packet switched technologies promises to cause all of the
distinctions based on the means of conveyance and the type of speech conveyed
to collapse entirely. Indeed, the FCC has spent much of the last half-century
struggling with the policy implications of technological convergence.
At the same time that Congress and the FCC were developing their technologyspecific approach to telecommunications policy, the courts were engaging in the
parallel process of developing a technology-specific approach to the First
Amendment. Expanding on the sentiment reflected in Justice Robert Jackson’s
declaration in Kovacs v. Cooper3 that each means of communications represents
a “law unto itself,”4 the Supreme Court suggested that the First Amendment
might apply differently to each communications medium.5 Although one might
2. See infra notes 60–67, 80–89, 104–07 and accompanying text (detailing the relevant regulatory
provisions governing broadcasting). A third model focuses on the problems associated with vertical
integration in media-related industries. Unlike the Telephone and Broadcast Models, the problems that
represented the focus of this regulatory approach were not unique to any particular transmission
technology. On the contrary, regulators have long expressed concern about vertical integration when
regulating the structure of both the broadcast and telephone industries. See generally United States v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941). The most distinctive feature of
this model, however, is the increasing reliance on access requirements as a remedy to the problems of
vertical integration. Because these access requirements were primarily developed in the context of cable
regulation, it seems appropriate to refer to this approach as the “Cable Model.” 47 U.S.C. §§ 532, 534,
548(c)(2)(B) (2000).
3. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
4. Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. E.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 367, 377 (1984) (“[W]e have recognized that
‘differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969))); S.E. Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
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have expected a plethora of technology-specific First Amendment standards to
emerge, in actuality the Court restricted itself to two. The first, most strongly
associated with newspapers and other forms of print, accords an almost prohibitive degree of protection against governmental interference.6 The second, developed in the context of broadcasting, has been more permissive of governmental
regulation. In a series of decisions highlighted by NBC v. United States7 and
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,8 the Court announced that the physical
scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum justified according broadcasters a
lesser degree of First Amendment protection. The Court has relied on this
so-called scarcity doctrine to uphold a wide range of structural and content
regulations. The Court’s subsequent decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation9
held that the unique pervasiveness and accessibility of broadcasting provided a
further basis for subjecting broadcast regulations to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny.10 The scheme that has emerged has been aptly dubbed a
“virtual celebration of public regulation”11 that has largely obscured the extent
to which the current regulatory approach to broadcasting represents a constitutional anomaly. Had the Court failed to recognize these two grounds for upholding
more intrusive regulation of broadcasting, it is almost certain that the principal
features of the broadcasting model would not have withstood constitutional scrutiny.12
The possibility of variable First Amendment standards has had a dramatic
impact on other media as well. Until courts resolved whether a new form of
communications was more like broadcasting or more like traditional media
(such as print), private parties and regulators could do little more than speculate
about the constitutional propriety of any particular regulatory provision. The
Supreme Court’s continuing struggle with the proper First Amendment standard
to be applied to cable television nearly fifty years after its emergence underscores the significance of the costs associated with such uncertainty.13

Amendment purposes by standards suited to it. . . .”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)
(“[E]ach medium of expression . . . may present its own problems.”); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (same); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have
long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.”);
Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 220 (1975) (same). Many courts cite Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952), for the proposition that “[e]ach method tends to present its
own peculiar problems.” As then-Chief Judge Harry Edwards has pointed out, such citations ignore that
in the next sentence the Burstyn Court emphasized, “[b]ut the basic principles of freedom of speech and
the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary.” Id.; see also Action for Children’s Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 673 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the same phrase).
6. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
7. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
8. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
9. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. Id. at 748.
11. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 71 (1991).
12. For a detailed review of these decisions, see infra notes 35–36, 41–59, 68–72, 90–98 and
accompanying text.
13. The unsettled nature of the First Amendment standard to be applied to cable is well illustrated by
the composition of recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Playboy Entm’t Group v. FCC, 529 U.S.
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Similar problems have threatened to impede the ongoing transition to digital
television technologies. As the conversion of the music industry from analogformat vinyl albums to digital-format compact discs demonstrates, digital technologies allow for far more efficient storage and transmission of information.
They also allow content to be copied without any material signal degradation.
As a result, the conversion to digital technology promises to revolutionize the
quantity, quality, and variety of television services available to the typical
American consumer. Although many do not realize it, the conversion to digital
television is already well underway. FCC regulations required that all television
stations supplement their current analog signal with a digital signal by May 1,
2002.14 The governing statute also calls for all stations to cease transmitting
analog signals altogether and to broadcast solely in digital by December 31,
2006.15 Although compliance has been less than perfect,16 it is clear that digital
television is in the process of becoming a reality.
Despite the ongoing deployment of digital television, little progress has been
made in determining whether and how digital broadcasting should be regulated.
The first concrete step was the appointment of the President’s Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters (commonly
known as the “Gore Commission”), which issued its Final Report in December
1998.17 The FCC has initiated regulatory proceedings based largely on the
Report’s recommendations,18 but as of yet, none of those proceedings has
reached completion. Moreover, FCC resolution of the regulatory scheme to be
applied to digital television will represent only the first round in what is almost

803 (2000) (5-4 decision); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 1890 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II] (5-4
decision); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (fragmented
decision producing six largely mutually inconsistent opinions). As Justice Thomas eloquently put it:
Our First Amendment distinctions between media . . . placed cable in a doctrinal wasteland in
which regulators and cable operators alike could not be sure whether cable was entitled to the
substantial First Amendment protections afforded the print media or was subject to the more
onerous obligations shouldered by the broadcast media.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 813–14 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
14. Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming,
Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1283 ¶ 82 (2002).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2000). The Act does contain an escape clause that will permit stations
to retain both channels if 85% of the households in their broadcast area have not purchased digital
receivers by that time. Id. § 309(j)(14)(B)(iii).
16. See FCC, Remedial Steps for Failure to Comply with Digital Television Constr. Schedule, Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 9962 (2002).
17. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS,
CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE (1998) [hereinafter GORE COMMISSION REPORT].
18. See Children’s Television Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 22946 (2000); Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of
Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21663 (1999); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AS THEY TRANSITION TO DIGITAL TELEVISION
(2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/
2001/stwek106.doc.
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certain to be a somewhat protracted legal battle. Under the technology-specific
approach to the First Amendment, the constitutionality of digital television
regulations cannot finally be resolved until the courts address the constitutional
standard that will be applied to this medium. Until that occurs, lingering
questions about the proper scope of regulation threaten the reliance interests of
broadcasters, programmers, and viewers alike in ways that can forestall the
realization of the new technology’s potential benefits. Similar uncertainty is
likely to surround the deployment of other spectrum-based technologies that are
waiting in the wings, such as third-generation wireless (3G), which promises to
bring the power of the Internet into handheld devices, and an associated series
of fixed wireless technologies.19
In addition to these instrumental considerations, the Court’s technologyspecific approach to the First Amendment suffers from certain debilitating
conceptual, technological, and doctrinal shortcomings, only some of which have
been recognized by commentators. In particular, I argue that courts and policymakers have yet to recognize the manner in which the scarcity doctrine sustains
and is sustained by the overriding culture of regulation that surrounds broadcasting. Put simply, because the amount of spectrum available at any moment is
itself a product of regulation, any reliance on spectrum scarcity in effect allows
regulation to serve as the constitutional justification for other regulations.20
The impending arrival of a wide range of new broadcast technologies, such as
digital transmission, improved filtering, program storage, video-on-demand,
spread spectrum, and packet switching, promises to alter the underlying constitutional analysis in fundamental ways.21 Finally, courts and commentators have
largely overlooked how the Supreme Court has been distancing itself from the
key decisions that serve as the foundation for the technology-specific approach
to the First Amendment. Although the Court has stopped short of repudiating
these precedents outright, it appears increasingly reluctant to extend these
principles to other media or to continue applying them to broadcasting itself.22
Given the ongoing collapse of the rationales for treating media differently
under the First Amendment, supporters of the Broadcast Model have begun to
turn to alternative justifications for upholding its constitutionality. Most notably,
a group of scholars led by Cass Sunstein23 and Owen Fiss24 have drawn on the

19. The emerging fixed wireless technologies include multipoint distribution services (MDS),
instructional television fixed services (ITFS), and Interactive Video Data Services (IVDS).
20. See infra subsection II.A.2.
21. See infra sections II.B, III.C.
22. See infra sections II.C, III.B.
23. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (paperback ed. 1995)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
(1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION]; Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public
Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499 (2000).
24. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996) [hereinafter FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED]; OWEN
M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) [hereinafter FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH]; Owen M. Fiss, The
Censorship of Television, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1215 (1999).
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language in Red Lion, opining that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount,”25 to elaborate a new,
largely instrumental basis rooted in the principles of civic republicanism for
upholding the constitutionality of the existing regime of broadcast regulation.26
At some points, their theories offer a sweeping reconceptualization of the First
Amendment regarding all media rather than an attempt to rationalize regulatory
intervention concerning broadcasting in particular.27 In other words, their solution to the impending collapse of the distinction between broadcasting and other
media is not to fight it, but rather to argue that such a reunification should center
on the broadcast precedents rather than the precedents following the print
tradition. The more recent statements of their theories retreat from this notion
and instead suggest that the unique role that television plays in the public
discourse justifies differential treatment under the Constitution.28
These myriad developments suggest the need for a critical reexamination of
the historical and contemporary justifications underlying the Court’s technologyspecific approach to the First Amendment. Part I describes three distinguishing
features of the Broadcast Model and analyzes the largely overlooked fact that
were it not for the different constitutional standard applied to broadcast regulation, each would represent an archetypical violation of conventional First

25. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
26. For other proposals invoking democratic principles to justify the existing regime of broadcast
regulation, see Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1718–25 (1997); Jonathan Weinberg,
Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1193–1203 (1993); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of
Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the Political Components of
Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 176–93 (1995) (arguing that democratic principles do not justify the type
of content-based regulation traditionally associated with the Broadcast Model, but provide support for
structural regulation); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum:
Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 863–64 (same).
Other scholars have employed similar arguments as support for proposals to reform our copyright
system. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and
a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). For my response, see Christopher S. Yoo,
Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000).
27. See FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 18, 149–50; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE
SPEECH, supra note 23, at 107–14.
28. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 1217; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 527–31. Because this Article is
organized around the primary rationales upon which the FCC and the courts relied, I omit discussion of
other theories that attempt to justify upholding the Broadcast Model of regulation. Most notably, I do
not discuss attempts to reconceptualize broadcast regulation as a quid pro quo for using the spectrum
free of charge. For examples of such attempts, see Reed Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal
Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for Children’s Educational Television, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 17 (1996); Logan, supra note 26, at 1725–45; Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro
Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 686, 687–90 (1998); Phil Weiser,
Promoting Informed Deliberation and a First Amendment Doctrine for a Digital Age: Toward a New
Regulatory Regime for Broadcast Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE MEDIA 11, 14–18
(Simone Chambers & Anne Costain eds., 2000). In omitting discussion of these arguments, I do not
mean to suggest that I believe that they are unimportant. On the contrary, it is my hope that I will have
the opportunity to address these theories in my subsequent work.
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Amendment principles. It then reviews the precedents to determine the justifications upon which the FCC and courts have relied to uphold these features. From that,
only two rationales emerge: (1) the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum
and (2) the uniquely pervasive and accessible nature of the broadcast medium.
Each of the succeeding Parts examines one of the two rationales for the
technology-specific approach to the First Amendment identified in Part I. Part II
evaluates the scarcity doctrine from an analytical, technological, and doctrinal
standpoint. The analytical discussion begins with a review of the economic
analysis first offered by Ronald Coase29 that has become one of the most
established critiques of scarcity. I then offer a novel conceptual criticism that
focuses on the tendency of the scarcity doctrine to permit regulation to serve as
the constitutional justification for more regulation. The basic problem stems
from the Supreme Court’s increasing willingness, as demonstrated in two recent
cases, to blindly accept other forms of regulation as part of the constitutional
baseline when evaluating the constitutionality of any particular restriction. As a
result, the scarcity doctrine largely ignores that scarcity is primarily the product
of other regulatory decisions made by Congress and the FCC. Thus, relying on
scarcity effectively allows regulation to serve as the constitutional justification
for additional regulation. This effect transforms the technology-specific First
Amendment from a transitional ambiguity into a theory that allows the overriding culture of regulation to become self-reinforcing.
The other contribution of Part II is to evaluate whether recent technological
and doctrinal developments have undermined scarcity as a constitutional justification. With respect to technology, I conclude that the arrival of a wide range of
new television technologies promises to render the scarcity doctrine an empirical nullity—if it has not done so already. With respect to recent judicial
decisions, I suggest that the scarcity doctrine may not have as much vitality as
many believe. Although the doctrine has never been explicitly repudiated, a
close reading of subsequent decisions reveals that the Court has severely limited
its scope. Not only has the Supreme Court consistently refused to extend it to
other media, what has gone largely unrecognized is that the Court’s most recent
broadcast cases have exhibited an extreme reluctance to rely on the scarcity
doctrine even with respect to broadcasting. Together these decisions provide
reason to believe that the Court may be closer to abandoning the doctrine than is
generally thought.
Part III addresses the second traditional justification for according broadcasting a lesser degree of constitutional protection than other media, which is the
unique pervasiveness and accessibility of broadcasting that formed the basis of
the Court’s decision in Pacifica. A close analysis of Pacifica’s reasoning reveals
that the opinion suffers from deep analytical flaws that place it in conflict with
the overall sweep of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. As a doctrinal
matter, moreover, a review of the most recent indecency decisions reveals that
29. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
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the courts have essentially foreclosed the possibility that Pacifica will be
extended to any other media and have raised questions about its continuing
applicability to broadcasting. A technological critique of Pacifica provides
additional reasons to question whether it can support the technology-specific
approach to the First Amendment. The emergence of the V-chip and the impending arrival of video-on-demand promise to render unconstitutional any attempts to
regulate television based on its supposed pervasiveness and accessibility.
Part IV examines the extent to which the civic republican visions of Cass
Sunstein and Owen Fiss can provide an alternative constitutional justification
for upholding the Broadcast Model. My analysis yields three core criticisms.
First, the civic republican theories fail to come to grips with the major tradition
in our First Amendment jurisprudence that holds autonomy to be an important
free speech value. Second, even if one were to acquiesce to ignoring autonomy,
the civic republican theories ultimately prove to be quite problematic from the
standpoint of implementation. Not only are they too incompletely specified to
provide any useful guidance on how to resolve free speech issues, they also fail
to engage in any serious comparative institutional analysis of the relative merits
of government intervention over private ordering. As a result, they fail to offer
any response to the long tradition of distrust of governmental regulation of
speech that characterizes the enactment history and doctrinal development of
the First Amendment. Finally, the civic republican theories do not advance any
plausible solution to certain technological obstacles to their theories. Thus, even
if one were to accept all of the arguments offered by Sunstein and Fiss, it
remains difficult, if not impossible, to see how their theories would bring about
the world that they seek.
The failure of the justifications for enforcing a technology-specific vision of
the First Amendment makes its continuing existence something of a puzzle. Part
V explores possible reasons for the adoption and persistence of the technologyspecific approach. Upon close analysis, it appears that the Broadcast Model is in
large part a reflection of the state of judicial thinking at the time the broadcast
industry emerged. Although that provides an explanation for why courts chose a
technology-specific approach in the first instance, it fails to explain the doctrine’s persistence. I then explore public choice explanations for the continuation of the doctrine. Although public choice theory offers a plausible descriptive
explanation for the persistence of the technology-specific approach to the First
Amendment, it fails to provide any normative justification for sustaining it.
I. THE PRIMARY FEATURES AND RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE BROADCAST MODEL
This Part describes the three principal regulatory features of the Broadcast
Model: (1) the licensing of broadcast stations, (2) the imposition of contentbased restrictions on certain types of programming, and (3) the imposition of
affirmative speech obligations. It also explores why courts have sustained these
features despite the apparent archetypical violation of the First Amendment
constituted by each feature. A review of the relevant precedents reveals that the
FCC and the courts have relied exclusively on two rationales to justify sustain-
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ing broadcast regulations that otherwise would not have survived constitutional
scrutiny. The first rationale is the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic
spectrum.30 The second rationale is the uniquely pervasive and accessible nature
of broadcasting upon which the Court relied in Pacifica.
A. LICENSING OF BROADCAST STATIONS

Since the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC has had
the unquestioned authority to license broadcast stations in accordance with the
“public interest, convenience, and necessity.”31 That the FCC is permitted to
license broadcast speakers represents something of a First Amendment anomaly.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that licensing of media speakers
has been regarded as the quintessential threat to the freedom of speech since the
days of Blackstone and John Milton.32 As the Court observed in City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,33 schemes that require licenses to be
periodically renewed pose problems similar to those posed by prior restraints, in
that they allow licensors to “measure their probable content or viewpoint by
speech already uttered. A speaker in this position is under no illusion regarding
the effect of the ‘licensed’ speech on the ability to continue speaking in the
future.”34 The applicability of this observation to broadcasting is evident when
one considers that during the early days of broadcast regulation, the Federal
30. The Court recently summarized its broadcast precedents as follows:
The scarcity of broadcast frequencies thus required the establishment of some regulatory
mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters. In addition, the inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who
may use the broadcast medium has been thought to require some adjustment in traditional
First Amendment analysis to permit the Government to place limited content restraints, and
impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1994) (citations omitted).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (initial grants) (2000); id. § 309(k)(1)(A) (renewals).
32. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002) (noting that “the core abuse against
which [the First Amendment] was directed was the scheme of licensing laws implemented by the
monarch and Parliament . . . in 16th- and 17[th]-century England” and attributing opposition to
licensing to Blackstone); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760
(1988) (“Indeed, a law requiring the licensing of printers has historically been declared the archetypal
censorship statute.” (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152)); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (“The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the
power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his ‘Appeal for
the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.’ . . . While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication
cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading
purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931) (acknowledging that the struggle against “the legislative power of the licenser” has
animated attempts to protect the freedom of the press since the days of Blackstone); Respublica v. Oswald, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325, 328 n.* (1788) (noting that the impermissibility of “any attempt to fetter the press by
the institution of a licenser” had been settled since the reign of William the Third and had been recognized by
Blackstone). See generally Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control
of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985) (discussing the history of the English licensing statute).
33. 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
34. Id. at 759–60 (citation omitted); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988)
(“[W]hen a State enacts a statute requiring periodic licensing of speakers, at least when the law is
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Radio Commission (FRC) initially required stations to seek renewal every six
months. The ever-present threat of nonrenewal allowed the FRC to exercise
direct control over the content of broadcast programming.35 The subsequent
lengthening of the license term mitigates, but does not eliminate, this effect.36
Consequently, the Court has long required that all licensing schemes contain
clear standards that cabin the licensing authority’s discretion.37 As the Court
noted in City of Lakewood, such standards reduce the likelihood of the selfcensorship that occurs when the inability to discern the line between the
permissible and the impermissible leads speakers to restrict themselves to
speech favored by the licensing authority.38 Furthermore, clear standards enhance judicial review by “provid[ing] the guideposts that . . . allow courts
quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against
disfavored speech.”39 Without such guideposts, it is “far too easy” for licensing
officials to justify their actions through “post hoc rationalizations” and “the use
of shifting or illegitimate criteria.”40
Measured against these criteria, the broadcasting regime clearly fails. Commentators have long criticized the basic licensing standard provided by the Communications Act of 1934 (that is, the public interest) as the epitome of analytical
emptiness.41 The FCC could have construed the statute in a manner that

directly aimed at speech, it is subject to First Amendment scrutiny to ensure that the licensor’s
discretion is suitably confined.” (citing City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 755–56)); cf. Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68–71 (1963) (recognizing that a regulatory scheme that permitted an
administrative agency to threaten speakers with post hoc punishment for speech they had already
uttered was tantamount to a system of prior restraint).
35. See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2000). See generally David J. Brennan, Printing in
England and Broadcasting in Australia: A Comparative Study of Regulatory Impulse, 22 ADELAIDE L.
REV. 63 (2000) (comparing the regulation of printing in England from 1484 to 1695 with the regulation
of broadcasting in Australia during the 20th Century, and explaining how special control over each
medium arose).
36. As a result, it is somewhat surprising that the scholarly literature on broadcast regulation has
made only passing reference to the Court’s licensing jurisprudence and has done so largely in terms
supportive of the constitutionality of broadcast licensing. See Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airways:
What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1114–15
(1996); Harry Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 48
(1967); Logan, supra note 26, at 1743; Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction to the Law and Economics
of the V-Chip, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 429, 476 (1997); Weinberg, supra note 26, at 1108, 1113,
1131, 1134.
37. FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225–26 (1990); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769–70;
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
38. 486 U.S. at 757–58.
39. Id. at 758.
40. Id.
41. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12 (1951); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 55 (1962); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 100 (1993); Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1987); Gary Lawson, Delegation and the Constitution, CATO REV. BUS. &
GOVT. REG., No. 2-2, at 29 (1999); Glen O. Robinson, Title I, The Federal Communications Act: An
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provided sufficient standards to constrain its discretion.42 Indeed, the FCC may
be obliged to do so as a matter of administrative law.43 Unfortunately, the FCC
has never applied the public interest standard in a manner that imposed any
meaningful constraints. The ad hoc approach initially followed by the FCC was
denounced by both congressional observers and distinguished commentators for
its arbitrariness and its susceptibility to manipulation for political purposes.44
Later attempts to clarify these standards45 employed a multifactor balancing test
that was far too malleable to foster consistency or predictability in the decision-

Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1934, at 3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Guidelines by finding that Congress had provided the Sentencing Commission with
sufficient guidance to curtail excessive legislative discretion). Commentators recognized this problem
from the start. See Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as
Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (“‘Public interest, convenience or
necessity’ means about as little as any phrase that the drafter of the Act could have used . . . .”). It is true
that the Court has regarded the public interest standard as constituting an “intelligible principle”
sufficient to satisfy the demands of the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226 (1943). Those decisions, however, simply addressed the limitations on the structure of
government embodied in the Constitution and did not consider whether the First Amendment compelled
greater specificity.
42. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403–05 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 575–76 (1941).
43. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55–57, 219–20 (1969);
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 452, 480–81, 484–85 (2002).
44. See AD HOC ADVISORY COMM. ON ALLOCATIONS TO THE SEN. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 85TH CONG., ALLOCATION OF TV CHANNELS, (Comm. Print 1958); COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT [HOOVER COMMISSION], COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, TASK FORCE REPORT app. N, at 40 (1949); FRIENDLY, supra note 41, at 72;
EMMETTE S. REDFORD, PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, THE PRESIDENT
AND THE REGULATORY COMMISSION 27 (1960); Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and the
Chancellor’s Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 689–90, 694 (1959); Louis L. Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing,
HARPER ’S WKLY., Sept. 1957, at 77, 79.
45. Policy Statement on Comparative Broad. Hearings, Public Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
Specifically, the 1965 Policy Statement identified seven criteria to guide its decisionmaking:
1. whether the applicant owned other media properties;
2. whether the license holder would act as station manager;
3. the programming proposed by the applicant;
4. the applicant’s past broadcast record;
5. whether the applicant proposed to operate the station part-time or twenty-four hours a day;
6. the applicant’s character;
7. other factors.
Id. at 394–99. By its own terms, the 1965 Policy Statement applied only to the issuance of new
licenses. Id. at 393 n.1. The FCC later made it the operative standard for license renewals as well.
Seven League Prods., Inc. (WIII), 1 F.C.C.2d 1597, 1598 ¶ 5 (1965) (mem. op. & order); see also
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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making process.46 The FCC’s grant of the vast majority of renewal applications
did not preclude the existence of real harms stemming from the lack of clear
standards. As the Court noted in Thornhill v. Alabama47:
The power of the licensor . . . is pernicious not merely by reason of the
censure of particular comments but by the reason of the threat to censure
comments on matters of public concern. It is not merely the sporadic abuse of
power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.48

Charles Whitehead, who was Director of Telecommunications Policy during
the Nixon Administration, put it even more bluntly when he said, “[t]he main
value of the sword of Damocles is that it hangs, not that it drops.”49
Confronted with such plastic criteria, applicants for broadcast licenses have
had little choice but to tailor their speech to what they perceived to be the FCC’s
preferences.50 The reported cases and academic commentary cite numerous
historical examples of such self-censorship.51 Indeed, it now appears that the
chill caused by the lack of clear standards was far from accidental. In delivering
his celebrated “Vast Wasteland” speech, then-FCC Chairman Newton Minow
46. See Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules to Allow Selection from Among Competing Applicants for
New AM, FM, &Television Stations by Random Selection (Lottery), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4
F.C.C.R. 2256, 2259 ¶¶ 24–28 (1989) [hereinafter Lottery NPRM]; Robert A. Anthony, Towards
Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39
(1971); Henry Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 61 VA. L. REV. 471, 501–02 (1975); Mathew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An
Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 748–51
(1979); see also ROGER NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 112–14 (1973).
Thomas Hazlett recounts two particularly dramatic illustrations of the malleability of the FCC’s
licensing criteria. In one case, the full Commission did not offer any reasons whatsoever for its
licensing decision and simply directed its Office of Opinions and Review to justify its decision post
hoc. In another case, the Office of Opinions and Review drafted a hundred-page opinion supporting a
particular licensing decision, only to redraft it into an equally lengthy opinion justifying the opposite
result after the full Commission abruptly changed its mind. Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing “MustCarry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 177–78 (2000).
47. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
48. Id. at 97.
49. Quoted in Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 605 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
50. See Louis L. Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1693, 1695 (1969).
51. See, e.g., Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting); Cmty.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ill.
Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from
rehearing en banc); Yale Broad., 478 F.2d at 605–06 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting); Inquiry into Section 73.190 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Concerning Alternatives to Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985);
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 175–82 (1987); ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 121–27 (1983); David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 215–16, 235–36, 244–51.
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asked rhetorically “Why should you want to know how close you can come to
the edge of the cliff?” and admonished broadcasters against “playing brinkmanship with the public interest.”52 The entire enterprise has become so disreputable that it has drawn criticism from commentators sympathetic to the Broadcast
Model53 and from the FCC itself.54 After the D.C. Circuit eventually struck
down the entire regime as arbitrary and capricious,55 Congress subsequently
enacted legislation completely eliminating the FCC’s discretion over new licenses56 and severely limiting its discretion with respect to renewals.57 Although the revised renewal process reduced the scope of the FCC’s licensing
discretion, it still requires the FCC to base its renewal decisions on a series of
highly subjective inquiries, including the perpetuation of the requirement that
the FCC find renewal to be in the public interest.58 The FCC has ruled that
existing policy statements and case law will serve as the primary guide to its
public interest analysis.59 As a result, it is hard to regard the FCC’s licensing

52. Newton M. Minow, Address to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961),
reprinted in NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN,
TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 185, 192 (1995).
53. See Hundt & Kornbluh, supra note 28, at 12, 13; Weinberg, supra note 26, at 1115, 1204.
54. See, e.g., Formulation of Policies & Rules Relating to Broad. Renewal Applicants, Third Further
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 6363, 6363–64 ¶ 6 (1989);
Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules to Allow Selection form Among Competing Applicants for New AM,
FM & Television Stations by Random Selection Lottery, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R.
2256, 2259 ¶¶ 24–29 (1989). In fact, the FCC has proposed abolishing the comparative renewal process
altogether. See Formulation of Policies Relating to Broad. Renewal Applicant, Stemming from Comparative Hearing Process, Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 429 ¶ 22 (1977); Formulation of Policies
Relating to Broad. Renewal Applicant, Stemming from Comparative Hearing Process, Notice of
Inquiry, 88 F.C.C.2d 120, 121 n.1 (1981).
55. See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878–86 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Bechtel II]; Flagstaff
Broad. Found. v. FCC, 979 F.2d 1566, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Bechtel I]. The D.C. Circuit’s principal concern was that these standards had
been promulgated through a policy statement that had never been subjected to the rigors of the notice
and comment process. As a result, the FCC had never provided a sufficient administrative justification
for the criteria that it chose.
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(l) (2000). Although the statute only required auctions for applications filed
on or after July 1, 1997, Congress gave the FCC the option of using auctions to resolve the backlog of
disputes that had accrued following the invalidation of the FCC’s previous licensing criteria in Bechtel
II. See id. In addition, the statute specifically exempted noncommercial educational and public
broadcast stations from the auction mandate. As a result, the FCC has continued to rely on comparative
hearings in allocating certain licenses, including those for low power FM radio. Creation of Low Power
Radio Serv., Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2258–59 ¶ 136 (2000).
57. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (2000).
58. Specifically, the statute requires the FCC first to consider: (1) whether the station has served the
public interest, (2) whether the station has committed any serious violations, and (3) whether the
station’s nonserious violations, taken together, constitute a pattern of abuse. Id. § 309(k)(1). Only if the
renewal applicant fails to satisfy these three criteria and the FCC fails to find any mitigating factors that
would justify the imposition of lesser sanctions can the FCC compare the incumbent’s application with
that of other applicants. Id. § 309(k)(3); see also Lili Levi, Not with a Bang but a Whimper: Broadcast
License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 279–80 (1996).
59. Implementation of Sections 204(a) & 204(c) of Telecomms. Act of 1996 (Broad. License
Renewal Procedures), Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 6363, 6364 ¶ 5 (1996).

260

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:245

scheme as providing the type of clear standards needed to withstand conventional First Amendment scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has nonetheless relied on the scarcity doctrine to uphold
the constitutionality of the scheme. As the Court observed in its seminal
decision in NBC v. United States,60 the unique physical characteristics of
broadcasting dictated that only a fixed number of speakers could broadcast at
any particular time, and private ordering had proven ill-suited to apportioning
opportunities to speak.61 As a result, the Court concluded that government
allocation was essential if the spectrum was to be developed as a resource.62
Consistent with the spirit of the day,63 the Court also concluded that the realities
of modern governance made it impossible for such licensing to be governed by
criteria any clearer than the public interest standard. When faced with a “a field
of regulation which was both new and dynamic,” it was inevitable that Congress
would give the FCC powers that were “not niggardly[,] but expansive.”64 As a
result, the Court regarded the public interest standard to be “as concrete as the
complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit.”65
It is only by using the scarcity doctrine to frame the issue as a Hobson’s
choice between allowing broadcasting to flounder in chaos or imposing public
interest licensing that the Court’s decision seem explicable. As the Court later
noted in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,66 “It would be strange if the First
Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the
Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses
to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the
spectrum.”67
B. NEGATIVE CONTENT RESTRICTIONS

The second principal regulatory feature of the Broadcast Model is the prohibition of certain categories of programming. Although the Communications Act
of 1934 specifically prohibits censorship,68 the overall regulatory regime does,

60. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
61. Id. at 212–13.
62. Id. at 226.
63. See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 95–103, 132–40 (1938) (noting that flexible
standards were necessary to facilitate judicial review of administrative adjudications and to preserve the
traditional roles of administrative adjudications as fact-finding proceedings, while according deference
to the lawmaking power of Article III courts).
64. 319 U.S. at 219.
65. Id. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
67. Id. at 389; see also id. at 376–77 (“Without government control, the medium would be of little
use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably
heard. Consequently the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among
competing applicants in a manner responsive to the public ‘convenience, interest, or necessity.’”
(footnote omitted)).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000).
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in fact, authorize some content-based restrictions of speech. The most significant direct restriction is the statute forbidding the broadcast of indecent or
profane speech.69 In addition, the federal licensing authorities have long regulated content indirectly by treating program content as one of their primary
licensing criteria.70 The FRC initially refused to relicense broadcasters who
transmitted speech that it perceived to be of low-value.71 The FCC continued
the practice, primarily focusing on speech that it perceived to be indecent.72
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that content-based restrictions on
speech are presumptively invalid.73 As the Court noted in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Commission,74 “[t]o allow a government the choice of
permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government
control over the search for political truth.”75 Content restrictions based upon the
supposed offensiveness of speech are particularly problematic.76 Rather than

69. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). Other direct content-based restrictions include prohibitions of certain
types of advertising. Id. §§ 1304, 1307.
70. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (“In applying [the public interest]
standard the Commission for 40 years has been choosing licensees based in part on their program
proposals.”); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) (“Since the very inception of federal
regulation by radio, comparative considerations as to the services to be rendered have governed the
application of the standard of ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’”); KFKB Broad. Ass’n v.
FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (“[T]he commission is necessarily called upon to consider the
character and quality of the service to be rendered.”); 3 FRC ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1929) [hereinafter FRC
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT] (“[T]he kind of service rendered by a station must be a means of appraising its
relative standing and must be considered by the commission in making assignments.”); 2 FRC ANNUAL
REPORT 161 (1928) [hereinafter FRC SECOND ANNUAL REPORT] (“[T]he commission believes it is entitled
to consider the program service rendered by the various applicants, to compare them, and to favor those
which render the best service.”).
71. FRC THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 34, 36; FRC SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
70, at 160, 169; Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and
Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1054–57 (1997) (describing the “public interest
limitation on content” required by both the Radio Act of 1927 and Telecommunications Act of 1934,
and providing examples of denials of license renewals subsequent to each Act). For fulsome and
colorful recounts of the most salient cases in this regard, see POWE, supra note 51, at 13–30.
72. See, e.g., Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 758–61 (1978) (discussing George Carlin’s
“Filthy Words” monologue); Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603–04 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (considering songs with drug-oriented lyrics); Infinity
Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (concerning “The Howard Stern Show”);
Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (ruling on a broadcast of a play about two
gay men dying of AIDS). For overviews of the FCC’s actions, see POWE, supra note 51, at 165–90;
THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 104–19
(1994); Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 49,
85–112, 117–19, 132–36 (1992–93).
73. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345–46 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984).
74. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
75. Id. at 538; accord Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”).
76. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
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providing a basis for restricting speech, “the fact that society may find speech
offensive” instead provides “a reason for according it constitutional protection.”77
The prohibition of content-based speech restrictions applies with equal force
in the context of licensing. Even when the state is justified in imposing periodic
licensing, “the Constitution requires that the [licensing authority] establish
neutral criteria to insure that the licensing decision is not based on the content
or viewpoint of the speech being considered.”78 Even if the criteria applied do
not discriminate explicitly on the basis of content, the Court will nonetheless
treat them as content-based if the licensing authority “must necessarily examine
the content of the message that is conveyed” when deciding whether to issue the
license.79
Given the explicitly content-based nature of the direct prohibitions on indecent broadcasts and the FCC’s licensing criteria, the broadcast regulatory
regime appears to contradict conventional First Amendment principles. The
courts and the regulatory authorities initially relied exclusively on the scarcity
doctrine to uphold attempts to restrict low-value speech.80 As the Court noted in
NBC v. United States, because “[t]he facilities of radio are limited and therefore
precious,” the FCC was justified in preventing “wasteful use” of broadcast
frequencies.81 In addition, the public interest standard necessarily required the
FCC to award licenses to the applicant who would provide the best service to
the community. Simply put, the Court could not conceive how the FCC could
identify the best applicant without considering the content of the service to be
transmitted.82
In the 1970s, the FCC began to articulate what it acknowledged was a new

society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
701 (1977) (“At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that
protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.”); Street v. New York, 394,
U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of the hearers.”).
77. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); accord NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1179
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting
rehearing en banc) (“I seem to recall that it is controversial speech and not the right to assert that one’s
speech is not really controversial which should be protected.”).
78. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
79. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
80. See KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931); FRC SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 70, at 161, 170. See generally Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public
Interest” Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 629 (1997) (“Scarcity, of
course, has always been the underlying raison d’être for broadcast regulation. Because one person’s
transmission is another’s interference, Congress concluded that the federal government has the duty
both to select who may and who may not broadcast . . . .”).
81. 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
82. Id. at 216–17 (reasoning that if content were an impermissible basis for awarding licenses, “how
could the Commission choose between two applicants for the same facilities . . . ?”).
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rationale for upholding content-based restrictions of broadcast speech83 that
eventually received the approval of the Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.84 Calling the reasons for the First Amendment distinction between
broadcasting and other media “complex,” the Court argued that a lower degree
of First Amendment protection was justified, in part, because broadcasting was
“uniquely pervasive,” in that it often “confronts the citizen . . . in the privacy of
the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder.”85 In addition, “[b]ecause the broadcast
audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely
protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content.”86 Finally, the
Court relied on the fact that broadcasting is “uniquely accessible to children.”87
Although the Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding,88 the rationale
outlined in Pacifica represented a justification for extending a lower level of
First Amendment protection to broadcasting that was completely independent of
the scarcity doctrine.
Supreme Court acceptance of the pervasiveness and accessibility rationales
prompted a dramatic shift in the manner in which the FCC justified the
constitutionality of the negative content restrictions that it imposed. In time, the
FCC would explicitly abandon any attempt to justify its indecency restrictions
on the scarcity doctrine and would opt instead to rely solely on the rationales
announced in Pacifica.89
C. AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAMMING OBLIGATIONS

Finally, federal regulators have long ruled that licensees are required to do
more than just refrain from uttering certain types of dispreferred speech.
Licensees also bear an affirmative obligation to carry certain types of preferred
speech. Early efforts specified a broad range of programming that the FRC and
FCC expected broadcasters to include.90 In subsequent decisions, the FCC
83. See Pacifica Found. (WBAI-FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96–97 ¶¶ 8–9 (1975) (mem. op. & order), on
reconsideration, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976), rev’d, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d, 438 U.S. 726
(1978); see also Report on Broad. of Violent, Indecent, & Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 419–20,
423 (1975); cf. Sonderling Broad. Corp. (WGLD-FM), 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 782 ¶ 16 (1973) (mem. op. &
order), aff’d sub nom., Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Jack
Straw Mem. Found. (KRAB-FM), 29 F.C.C.2d 334, 336 ¶¶ 5–6 (1971) (initial decision of hearing
examiner); E. Educ. Radio (WUHY-FM), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 410–12 ¶ 8 (1970) (notice of apparent
liability).
84. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
85. Id. at 748.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 749–50.
88. Id. at 750.
89. Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶¶ 10–11 (1987) (mem. op. & order); see also Action for
Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 664–69 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Indus. Guidance on
Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad.
Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8000 ¶ 4 (2001).
90. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946) (emphasizing the importance of public affairs and local programming), reprinted in
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placed particular emphasis on the obligation to provide news, public affairs, and
other nonentertainment programming.91 The most celebrated of these obligations is the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine, which required that broadcasters
cover controversial issues of public importance in a balanced manner.92
The FCC has since abolished the bulk of its affirmative programming requirements.93 Only a handful of affirmative broadcasting obligations remain in force
today. For example, the federal election statute places broadcasters under an
obligation to carry political advertisements for certain candidates for public
office.94 Similarly, the FCC has construed the Children’s Television Act of 1990
(CTA)95 as requiring that all broadcasters provide at least three hours of

DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 151, 198–208 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 2d ed. 1973); FRC THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 34 (requiring broadcasters to provide “a well-rounded program, in
which entertainment, consisting of music both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and
instruction, important public events, discussion of public questions, weather, market reports, and news,
and matters of interest to all members of the family find a place”); En Banc Programming Inquiry,
Report and Statement of Policy, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (identifying fourteen “major elements usually
necessary to meet the public interest”). The fourteen elements listed by the 1960 En Banc Programming
Inquiry were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

opportunity for local self-expression
development and use of local talent
programs for children
religious programs
educational programs
public affairs programs
editorials by licensees

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

political broadcasts
agricultural programs
news programs
weather and market reports
sports programs
service to minority groups
entertainment programs

91. Id. See Formulation of Policies & Rules Relating to Broad. Renewal Applicants, Competing
Applicants, & Other Participants to Comparative Renewal Process and to Prevention of Abuses of
Renewal Process, Second Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 F.C.C.R.
5179, 5191 ¶ 84 (1988); Formulation of Policies & Rules Relating to Broad. Renewal Applicants,
Competing Applicants, & Other Participants to Comparative Renewal Process & to Prevention of
Abuses of Renewal Process, Third Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4
F.C.C.R. 6363, 6368 n.11 (1989) (citing Radio Station WABZ, Inc., 90 F.C.C.2d 818, 840–42 (1982),
aff’d sub nom. Victor Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 722 F.2d 756, 762, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
92. See Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 9, 1964); Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1257–58 (1949).
93. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements & Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076,
1093 ¶ 36, 1095–96 ¶¶ 40–43 (1984), on reconsideration, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), aff’d in part and
remanded in part sub nom. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (repealing the Fairness Doctrine),
aff’d, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Repeal of the Personal Attack and Personal Editorial Rules, Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 20697 (2000) (repealing the rules for both broadcast and cable television operators).
94. Federal law requires broadcasters to carry political advertisements by candidates for federal
office. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000). The statute also strictly limits the amount that the broadcaster can
charge for doing so. Id. § 315(b)(1). Broadcasters may refuse to carry political advertisements by state
and local candidates. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) [hereinafter CBS v.
DNC]. Should broadcasters choose to accept any such advertisements, however, they must do so on a
nondiscriminatory basis. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (2000).
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children’s programming each week.96 The FCC has, however, proposed expanding the affirmative programming obligations demanded of digital broadcasters.
Specifically, it envisions requiring digital broadcasters to provide more local,
issue-oriented programming; a larger number of public service announcements;
additional children’s programming; mandatory rights of reply; and greater
coverage of political campaigns, including free air time for political candidates.97 Moreover, the CTA requirement that the FCC consider whether any
renewal applicant has served the public interest leaves open the possibility that
the FCC may subject broadcasters to additional affirmative programming obligations in the future.98
The Court has traditionally cast a jaundiced eye towards attempts to impose
affirmative speech obligations on other media.99 For example, in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,100 the Court struck down a statute requiring newspapers to provide a right of reply as an impermissible intrusion into their editorial
judgment and control.101 The Court implicitly reaffirmed this principle in
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner I),102 which involved a First
Amendment challenge to a statute requiring local cable operators to carry all
local broadcast stations within their service area (commonly known as “mustcarry”). In upholding the must-carry requirements, the Court suggested that it
would have held otherwise if the statute had attempted to specify the content of
the speech that cable operators were obligated to carry.103
The Court’s decisions in Turner I and Tornillo leave little doubt that applying
these general First Amendment principles to the type of affirmative programming requirements historically imposed on broadcasters would lead to their
invalidation. The Supreme Court has nonetheless relied on the scarcity doctrine to uphold the imposition of affirmative programming obligations with
respect to broadcasting.104 As the Court held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.

96. Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
10660, 10662 ¶ 5, 10718–19 ¶ 120 (1996). A broadcaster could provide less than three hours per week
if they were able to demonstrate a commitment to education and informing children that was the
equivalent of three hours. Id.
97. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 5–10, 16, 24–26; GORE COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 17, at 48, 56–59; Hundt, supra note 36, at 1096; William E. Kennard, “What Does $70 Billion Buy
You Anyway?”: Rethinking Public Interest Requirements at the Dawn of the Digital Age, Remarks at
the Museum of Television and Radio (Oct. 10, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
2000/spwek023.html.
98. Levi, supra note 58, at 278–80.
99. For an excellent discussion of the cognitive and dignitary harms associated with imposing
affirmative content obligations on media, see Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of
Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114–17 (1999).
100. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
101. Id. at 258.
102. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
103. Id. at 655.
104. E.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding a “limited right to ‘reasonable’
access” for declared political candidates in an election); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
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FCC,105 the inherent physical limitations of the spectrum justified requiring
broadcasters to serve as a proxy for other speakers because “as far as the First
Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to
whom licenses are refused.”106 The FCC’s most recent children’s television
decision also invoked Pacifica as a justification for upholding the constitutionality of the requirement that all broadcasters provide three hours of children’s
programming on the ground that the government’s interest in ensuring that
children are exposed to educational programming is at least as significant as its
interest in protecting them from exposure to indecent material.107
Thus, even though each of the key features of the Broadcast Model of
regulation represents an archetypical violation of conventional First Amendment principles, the Court has nonetheless relied on two key rationales to
uphold each feature’s constitutionality: (1) the scarcity doctrine associated with
NBC and Red Lion and (2) the unique pervasiveness and accessibility of
broadcasting associated with Pacifica. As a result, the constitutionality of the
Broadcast Model depends entirely on the continuing viability of these rationales
as justifications for having a technology-specific First Amendment. The next
two Parts will consider each of these rationales in turn, focusing on the manner
in which analytical, technological, and doctrinal developments have systematically called both of them into question.
II. THE RISE AND (IMPLICIT) DEMISE OF THE SCARCITY DOCTRINE
As the foregoing discussion has shown, the scarcity doctrine has represented
the principal justification for extending a lesser degree of First Amendment
protection to broadcasting. This Part will provide my own assessment of the
scarcity doctrine. Section A will provide an analytical critique of scarcity by
analyzing two theoretical problems with the doctrine. The first is the nowstandard economic argument that, to the extent that scarcity is meaningful at all,
it applies with equal force to all media and thus does not serve to differentiate
broadcasting. The second is a novel critique advanced for the first time in this
Article that focuses on the Court’s growing tendency, when assessing the
constitutionality of a particular regulatory provision, to treat all other features of
the regulatory regime as fixed. The problem with doing so is that those other
features are frequently themselves the product of regulation. As a result, treating

394 (1969) (upholding the right to equal access for a public figure who was “personally attacked” over
that same broadcast medium); cf. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980)
(using scarcity to hold Red Lion inapplicable to compelled speech with respect to other media); Pac.
Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 10 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the
mail from broadcast on scarcity grounds and declaring unconstitutional a policy that prohibited utility
companies from including political flyers in monthly billing statements).
105. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
106. Id. at 389.
107. Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10731–32 ¶¶ 155–156 (1996).
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these other regulatory features as part of the constitutional baseline threatens to
allow regulation to serve as the constitutional justification for more regulation.
Section B will offer a technological critique of the scarcity doctrine. Although
commentators have long noted that the development of cable television and
other alternative television technologies eliminated the spectrum as a constraint
on the number of people who can speak, the Court has largely disregarded the
point, opting instead to view broadcasting as a universe unto itself. The impending arrival of a series of new broadcast technologies, including digital transmission, program storage, video-on-demand, spread spectrum, and packet switching,
holds the promise of eliminating spectrum as a physical constraint even if
broadcasting is viewed in isolation from other media. Once the economic
limitations endemic to all markets become more important than the physical
limitations of the spectrum, the scarcity doctrine will collapse as a basis for
distinguishing broadcasting from other media.
In the face of such a withering attack, it is somewhat surprising that the
scarcity doctrine has persisted. Section C chronicles its doctrinal history, beginning with the move towards its abandonment during the 1980s and ending with
the Court’s surprising reaffirmation of the doctrine in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC.108 Since that decision was handed down, the courts have shown
increasing signs of discomfort with the scarcity doctrine. Not only have the
courts consistently refused to extend it to other media, they have even appeared
reluctant to continue to apply the doctrine to broadcasting. It appears that the
scarcity doctrine may well be in the process of dissipating with a whimper,
rather than a bang.
A.

“AN INSIGHT MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN WE CAN USE”109: THE THEORETICAL
CRITIQUE OF SCARCITY

1. The Analytical Emptiness of Scarcity
As noted above, the FCC and the Supreme Court have long relied on the
scarcity doctrine to justify according less First Amendment protection to broadcasting than to other media. The Supreme Court believed that broadcasting was
unique in that the number of available channels was strictly limited. Because of
this limitation, it was essential for the government to become directly involved
in allocating opportunities to speak.
Commentators have long recognized, however, that “there is a devastating—
even embarrassing—deficiency in this analysis,”110 in that the limited nature of
the spectrum as a resource does not serve to distinguish broadcasting from any
other medium of communication.111 As Ronald Coase observed:

108. 497 U.S. 547, 566–67 (1989).
109. Kalven, supra note 36, at 30.
110. BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 89.
111. The leading critiques of scarcity include KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 204–19;
POWE, supra note 51, at 200–08; MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 9–18
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[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the
economic system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited
in amount and scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists. Land,
labor, and capital are all scarce, but this of itself, does not call for government
regulation.112

It is of no consequence that the Court believed that the amount of spectrum
available was absolutely limited. For example, the amount of land and the
number of Rembrandts is fixed and finite; yet, that fact has never been thought
to require the government to decide who should use those resources and for
what purpose. The typical solution to the problems of allocation is the creation
of well-defined property rights in spectrum. Once that is done, the market can
allocate the spectrum through a price mechanism without the need for any
administrative involvement whatsoever.113
Nor does the potential for interference serve to distinguish broadcasting from
other forms of communication. The same problems would arise if more than
one person tried to speak in the same place at the same time. Indeed, interference is a potential problem for all goods. As Ronald Coase has noted, “the use
of a piece of land simultaneously for growing wheat and as a parking lot would
produce similar results.”114 Such problems, moreover, are easily solved without
governmental allocation. The solution is simply to provide owners with a cause
of action to enforce their property rights against trespassers.115
The implications of Coase’s critique were so sweeping that contemporary
commentators and policymakers could not bring themselves to take it seriously.
The reaction of First Amendment scholar and fellow University of Chicago
professor Harry Kalven is fairly representative. Calling Coase’s argument “an

(1986); Coase, supra note 29, at 13–14; Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach
to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221–26 (1982). For a more comprehensive enumeration
of the critiques of the scarcity rationale, see J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 1209, 1231 n.63 (1993) (collecting commentary).
112. Coase, supra note 29, at 14; see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 204 (“‘Scarce
resource’ is a redundant phrase. Every resource is scarce, be it oil, gas, clean water, trees, or iron ore. A
‘nonscarce resource’ is a contradiction in terms.”).
113. Coase, supra note 29, at 14.
114. Id.
115. In the words of Thomas Hazlett:
The interference problem is widely recognized as one of defining separate frequency “properties”; it is logically unconnected to the issue of who is to harvest those frequencies. To confuse
the definition of spectrum rights with the assignment of spectrum rights is to believe that, to
keep intruders out of (private) backyards, the government must own (or allocate) all the
houses. It is a public policy non sequitur . . . .
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON.
133, 138 (1990); see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 207 (“To prevent chaos
(interference) in broadcasting or publishing, . . . requires not a commission, but a system of property
rights. It follows . . . that if one decides to create a commission, it need do no more than define and
protect property rights (that is, allocate spectrum among certain users and define and punish interference).”).
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insight more fundamental than we can use,” Kalven declared it to be “so radical
by today’s views that although I am persuaded of its correctness, I am not clear
how it can be used in public discussion.”116 As a result, Kalven rejected it as a
theoretically interesting nonstarter. Rather than take it seriously, Kalven thought
it would be more constructive to explore policy options within a context that
took the existing broadcast regime as given.117 Kalven was not alone in this
regard. Academics and policymakers alike initially greeted Coase’s argument
with ridicule.118 Even the group of University of Chicago economists who
would become some of Coase’s biggest champions unanimously rejected his
argument at first blush.119 Subsequent scholars have not been so reticent, and
Coase’s critique of the scarcity doctrine has now become the conventional
wisdom. In fact, it is now so broadly accepted that even those scholars who are
sympathetic to the Broadcast Model tend to abjure any reliance on the scarcity
doctrine.120
2. Existing Regulations as a Constitutional Baseline
There is another fundamental conceptual problem associated with using
scarcity to justify holding broadcasting to a lower standard of First Amendment
scrutiny. In concluding that the electromagnetic spectrum was scarce, the Court
took as given the background factors that determined the total amount of
spectrum allocated to broadcasting. The problem with this analysis is that the
amount of spectrum allocated to broadcasting was itself purely a product of
regulation. Without recognizing that it was doing so, the Court in effect allowed
these other regulatory provisions to become part of the constitutional baseline
used to determine whether a particular regulation violated the First Amend-

116. Kalven, supra note 36, at 30.
117. Id. at 32 (“The key task is to explore what policy can be worked out for the independence of
broadcasting if we continue to license commercial broadcasting and do not auction the licenses.”)
(emphasis in original).
118. See R.H. Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 577, 579 (1998); R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]; Thomas
W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and
the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 335, 343 (2001).
119. This group included such future Chicago School mainstays as Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, John McGee, and George Stigler. See The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics
at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 220–21 (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1983).
120. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 87–90; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra
note 23, at 92, 110–12; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and
Children’s Television Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1247 (1996); Logan, supra note 26, at
1701–05; Weinberg, supra note 26, at 1106; Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment
on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1070–77 (1994). The lone exceptions
appear to be former FCC Chairmen Newt Minow and Reed Hundt. See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note
52, at 131 (1995); Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & COMMERCE
527, 542–43 (1996).
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ment.121
The Supreme Court followed this analytical approach in two recent decisions
involving emerging communications media. For example, in Reno v. ACLU,122
the Court based its refusal to allow First Amendment challenges to regulation of
the Internet on the lower level of scrutiny applied to broadcasting and on the
ground that the Internet had never “been subject to the type of government
supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”123 The
implication of this reasoning is clear: Had the Internet, like broadcasting, been
subject to longstanding regulation, that fact alone would have been a consideration supporting the constitutionality of additional regulation.
The existence of other regulations played an even more specific role in the
plurality opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC.124 In that case, the Court struck down a statutory provision
allowing local cable operators to refuse to carry indecent programming on
public access channels while upholding a parallel provision authorizing cable
operators to refuse to carry indecent programming on their leased access
channels.125 The plurality based its distinction between the two provisions in
part on the different regulatory legacies surrounding public and leased access.
That leased access channels had not historically been subject to significant
municipal regulation justified regarding editorial control over those channels as
part of the cable operators’ First Amendment prerogatives. Granting them the
right to refuse to carry indecent programming on those channels thus represented a restoration of their constitutional rights.126 In contrast, public access
channels had historically been subject to much more intrusive regulation.
Because providing cable operators with greater control over their public access
channels “d[id] not restore to cable operators editorial rights that they once had,
. . . the countervailing First Amendment interest is nonexistent, or at least much
diminished.”127 Thus, the plurality’s reasoning justified editorial control over
121. For a related argument, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a
First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 38–45 (2002).
122. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
123. Id. at 868–69.
124. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
125. “Public access channels” are channels that municipalities require cable operators to set aside for
use by the local community. See id. at 734. Perhaps the most celebrated portrayal of public access
programming is the recurring sketch on Saturday Night Live entitled Wayne’s World. “Leased access
channels” are a federal regulatory response to the growth of vertical integration in the cable industry.
The requirement grew out of the concern that if cable operators and large cable networks were under
the same corporate umbrella, those cable operators would have an incentive to exclude unaffiliated
programmers in ways that would harm competition. For example, it is said that Time Warner was able
to forestall NBC’s first attempt to set up a news network in direct competition with CNN simply by
having all of the cable operators under its control refuse to carry the new network. As a result, Congress
enacted legislation requiring all cable systems to offer part of their channel capacity for commercial
lease by unaffiliated networks. See Yoo, supra note 1, at 223–24.
126. 518 U.S. at 761.
127. Id. at 761; see also id. at 766 (arguing that the provision in question “would not significantly
restore editorial rights of cable operators”).
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leased access channels as part of the constitutional baseline because those
channels had not previously been subject to intrusive regulation. Conversely,
the past imposition of successful regulation on cable operators became a
justification for changing the relevant constitutional baseline in ways that
tended to permit additional regulation in the future.
In addition, the plurality also emphasized that cities had generally required
that public access channels be supervised by an “access channel manager,” an
entity that is often a governmental actor and typically overseen by a local
supervisory board. In the plurality’s view, the presence of an access channel
manager indicated that less First Amendment harm would result from striking
down a statute giving cable operators greater editorial control over those
channels.128 This reasoning treated the existence of access channel managers as
part of the relevant baseline for evaluating the extent to which the provision in
question intrudes on the First Amendment. The plurality’s reasoning is tantamount to saying that the presence of a governmental censor obviates the need
for private discretion over public access channels.
This last observation underscores the manner in which the plurality’s analysis
begs an important question. Before it could properly rely on the legacy of public
access regulation as an appropriate constitutional baseline, it should have
considered whether the various elements of that legacy were themselves constitutional. In other words, before the plurality could rely on the presence of an
access channel manager as support for its constitutional position, it should have
evaluated the constitutionality of the use of access channel managers. Courts,
however, are understandably loath to treat a constitutional challenge to one
particular provision as an open invitation to consider the constitutionality of
other aspects of a regulatory scheme. It is far more common for them to assume
the propriety of the other elements not being challenged without formally
resolving the issue.129 Although the Court’s desire to circumscribe the number
of statutory provisions under review is understandable, this approach raises the
serious danger of allowing regulation to become self-reinforcing. Simply put, it
permits regulation, if imposed for a long enough time, to become part of the
relevant constitutional baseline that in turn justifies other forms of regulation.
Such reasoning is valid if and only if the other features of the regulatory regime
that help form the constitutional baseline are themselves constitutional. The
Denver plurality, however, failed to address this question.
This mode of analysis provides another reason to question the analytical
coherence of the scarcity doctrine. In arguing that the number of channels is
strictly limited, the scarcity doctrine accepts as a relevant constitutional baseline
those decisions that determined how many channels are available for broadcasting in the first instance. In so doing, the scarcity doctrine elides the fact that the

128. Id. at 761–62.
129. See id. at 821 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the constitutionality of leased access and public access were not at issue in that case).

272

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:245

amount of spectrum allocated to broadcasting is itself the product of a series of
regulatory decisions concerning: (1) the total amount of spectrum allocated to
television broadcasting, (2) the manner in which stations were allocated to
particular communities, and (3) the manner in which those stations are allocated
to particular licensees. An examination of each of these regulatory decisions
reveals that the FCC resolved these questions in a manner that limited the
supply of and heightened the demand for broadcast channels.130 Scarcity is thus
revealed to be a direct product of FCC regulation. As a result, to rely on scarcity
to uphold the constitutionality of the Broadcast Model is to permit the overriding culture of regulation to become its own constitutional justification.
a. The Amount of Spectrum Allocated to Broadcasting. The manner in which
the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) initially determined the amount of spectrum that would be available for broadcasting provides one of the most telling
examples of how the scarcity of channels is a direct result of regulatory
decisionmaking. In its first significant action concerning broadcasting, the FRC
refused to follow the example set by European nations, which assigned more
spectrum to broadcasting despite having fewer radio stations to accommodate,
and rejected the recommendation of an international conference that had designated additional bands of the spectrum for radio broadcasting.131
The FRC’s stated reason for doing so was to avoid rendering existing radio
sets obsolete.132 Reliance on this concern was, to put it mildly, remarkably
shortsighted. The one-time costs associated with changing receiving equipment
at such a nascent stage in the industry’s development were slight in comparison
to the long-term benefits that would flow from having a greater range of
programming options.133 Furthermore, preserving existing radio sets only served
to heighten the problems of scarcity. Improved receiver technology can serve as
a substitute input for spectrum because better tuners allow stations to be spaced
closer together and to operate at lower power without causing any reduction in
130. The discussion that follows is based in part on several excellent histories of the FCC’s spectrum
allocation decisions. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, NETWORK BROADCASTING,
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1297, at 17–37 (1958) [hereinafter BARROW REPORT]; ALLOCATION OF TV CHANNELS,
REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY COMM. ON ALLOCATIONS TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG. 17–32 (1958) [hereinafter BOWLES REPORT]; ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL.,
THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 176–91 (3d ed. 1982); Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for
Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 707–09 (1975); Hazlett,
supra note 115, at 143–63; Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional
Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 886–981 (1981); Note, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1578–93 (1962).
131. Hazlett, supra note 115, at 155 (citing HARRY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE 20–21 (1971)).
132. 1 FRC ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1927); see also POOL, supra note 51, at 115, 141 (“Use of new,
shorter wave bands would not only have obsoleted existing radio sets but would also have required
more expensive multiband sets and transmitters . . . . The market notion that, when a resource is scarce,
one provides more of it in higher priced ways and thereby restricts the demand, did not fit within a
populist notion of cheap broadcasting.”).
133. Hazlett, supra note 115, at 155–56.
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quality.134 The decision to safeguard existing receiver technology exacerbated
scarcity by keeping in place a large number of low quality, often homemade,
receivers that were difficult to tune accurately and were not properly shielded
against interference.135
Federal regulators repeated these mistakes when apportioning spectrum for
television. When the FCC first allocated spectrum for television broadcasting in
1937, it set aside sufficient spectrum in the VHF band for 19 television
channels.136 The FCC soon recognized that this amount of spectrum was
insufficient to support a competitive national television service. As a result, it
concluded that the best long-range solution was for television to reside entirely
in the UHF band.137 Because technical obstacles to UHF broadcasting remained, the FCC decided in 1945 to permit the deployment of television in the
VHF band on an interim basis, while exhorting the industry to act quickly to
solve the problems associated with UHF.138 Because television’s tenure in VHF
was intended to be temporary, the FCC allowed the number of VHF channels
allocated to be reduced from nineteen to thirteen139 and eventually to twelve.140
When the moment arrived for VHF broadcasters to move into the UHF
spectrum, however, the FCC flinched. Even though the agency continued to
acknowledge that television would best be served if it were shifted entirely into
the UHF band,141 once again the prospect of forcing incumbent broadcasters
and viewers to abandon their investments in existing equipment prevented the
FCC from making spectrum more broadly available.142 Instead, the FCC opted
to overlay UHF assignments on top of the existing VHF assignments without

134. POOL, supra note 51, at 141, 152–53; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 111, at 222 n.70; Sidak,
supra note 111, at 1230.
135. Steven Phipps, “Order Out of Chaos”: A Reexamination of the Historical Basis for the Scarcity
of Channels Concept, 45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 57, 67 (2001).
136. Frequency Allocation to Servs. in Frequency Bands from 30,000 kc to and Including 300,000
kc, Commission Order No. 19, 4 F.C.C. 30 (1939); Frequency Allocation to Servs. in Frequency Bands
from 30,000 kc to and Including 300,000 kc, Report of the Commission, 4 F.C.C. 582 (1939). The FCC
reduced the allocation to eighteen channels in 1941. Broad. Servs. Other than Standard Broad., 6 Fed.
Reg. 2282, 2283 (May 6, 1941).
137. See Allocation of Frequencies to Various Classes of Non-Gov’tal Servs. in Radio Spectrum
from 30 Kilocycles to 30,000,000 Kilocycles, 39 F.C.C. 68, 129–30 (1945) [hereinafter Allocation of
Frequencies]; Public Release, 39 F.C.C. 16, 16 (1939); BARROW REPORT, supra note 130, at 18–19, 21;
Geller, supra note 130, at 707–09; Schuessler, supra note 130, at 888.
138. Allocation of Frequencies, supra note 137, at 130.
139. Id. at 129; Schuessler, supra note 130, at 886 n.41, 887.
140. Amendments to Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Governing Sharing of Television Channels &
Assignment of Frequencies to Television & Non-Govt. Fixed & Mobile Servs., 39 F.C.C. 336 (1948).
See generally BARROW REPORT, supra note 130, at 18–19, 21; Schuessler, supra note 130, at 890.
141. See Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1571, 1577–78 ¶ 18 (1956);
Television Broad. Serv., Third Notice of Further Proposed Rule Making, 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3074
(F.C.C. Apr. 7, 1951).
142. See BOWLES REPORT, supra note 130, at 76 (noting testimony of FCC Commissioner Hyde that
the refusal to reallocate television stations to the UHF band stemmed from “the fact that these stations
were constructed, the investments made, [and] the public accustomed to listening to them”); Schuessler,
supra note 130, at 909–10.
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forcing any station to change frequencies. The problem is that UHF stations
confront several operating disadvantages when compared with VHF stations.143
The decision to intermix UHF and VHF stations inevitably caused UHF to fail
as a service.144
The scarcity created by these initial allocation decisions was perpetuated and
aggravated by the FCC’s disinclination to reallocate spectrum to broadcasting
from other uses, even when those uses had proven unviable145 and despite
dramatic increases in total amount of usable spectrum.146 Other regulatory
decisions compounded scarcity still further. For example, one might have
expected technological innovations to reduce the amount of spectrum required
by each channel until eventually new channels could be introduced. FCC policy
eliminated any incentive for broadcasters to search for such savings by forcing
television and FM broadcasters to adhere to a fixed table of allocations and by
greatly restricting the way in which they could use any spectrum that was
conserved.147 The FCC eventually realized that its regulatory scheme did not
provide any incentive for broadcasters to use spectrum efficiently.148 Although
it eventually liberalized its rules, it did so in a way that channeled any additional
spectrum towards subsidiary communications services, such as paging and data
transmission, rather than towards additional broadcasting options.149
143. These disadvantages included 20 to 25% more electric power consumption by UHF stations
than VHF stations, UHF stations are harder to tune in, and UHF stations are subject to greater
interference from terrain and buildings. In addition, at the time most receivers could not receive UHF
signals. See 1 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION
NETWORKS 69–76 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS]; Note, The Darkened Channels, supra
note 130, at 1580.
144. See Geller, supra note 130, at 708–09; Note, The Darkened Channels, supra note 130, at
1580–93.
145. Sidak, supra note 111, at 1233. Most notably, although such spectrum-based services as
multichannel multipoint distribution services (MMDS) and instructional television fixed services
(ITFS) have proven to be abject failures, the FCC has refused to reallocate that spectrum for other uses.
See Amendment of Part 2 of Comm’n’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed
Servs., First Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 17222, 17333–38 ¶¶ 19–30 (2001) (refusing to reallocate
spectrum devoted to ITFS and MMDS and limiting newly authorized mobile use to incumbent
licensees). In addition, large numbers of assignments for noncommercial, educational television stations
also remain unused. See Deletion of Noncommercial Reservation of Channel *16, 482–88 MHz,
Pittsburgh, Pa., 11 F.C.C.R. 11700, 11708 ¶ 18 (1996) (mem. op. & order) (noting that the FCC had
never eliminated a noncommercial allotment even when vacant for a long period or proven not to be
economically viable).
146. See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
147. As Yochai Benkler has pointed out, the FCC replicated these mistakes when rolling out digital
television. Despite the drastically different characteristics of digital broadcasting, the FCC simply
assigned the same amount of spectrum to digital stations that it had previously assigned to analog
stations. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 98–100 (2001).
148. See Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Concerning Use of Subsidiary Communications Authorizations, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,445, 28,447 ¶ 15 (June 22, 1983); Amendment of Comm’n’s Rules Concerning Use of
Subsidiary Communications Authorizations, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,235, 36,238 ¶ 14 (proposed Aug. 19, 1982).
149. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.106, 73.127, 73.293, 73.665 (2000) (authorizing broadcasters to transmit
subsidiary communications services); id. §§ 73.295(a), 73.667(a) (defining subsidiary communications
services).
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It is not yet clear how much the FCC’s position on spectrum flexibility is
likely to change in the near future. A group of distinguished economists,
including several Nobel laureates, recently filed a statement with the FCC
asking it to permit licensees to reallocate spectrum to different uses.150 A recent
report authored by the FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force has proposed adding
some flexibility to the FCC’s current command-and-control approach to spectrum regulation.151 Thus far, policymakers have yet to allow such spectrum
markets to emerge.
Scarcity is thus partly the result of the manner in which the FCC has
determined how much of the spectrum may be used for broadcasting and its
general reluctance to revisit that determination. As will be discussed in the
succeeding subsections, other regulatory decisions regarding the number of
stations that should be assigned to each community and how those stations
should be assigned to particular individuals had an equally strong influence on
restricting the supply of and increasing the demand for spectrum.
b. The Allocation of Stations to Particular Communities. In addition to setting
the total amount of spectrum dedicated to broadcasting, the FCC also had to
develop some means for assigning particular channels to particular communities
around the country. The FCC followed allocation principles that attempted to
assign at least two television stations to as many communities as possible.152
Although the FCC did so in an attempt to disperse control of television
broadcasting as broadly as possible, the final allocation plan actually exacerbated the problems of scarcity significantly by making it essentially inevitable
that television would be dominated by three large networks.
Understanding why this is the case requires an appreciation of one of the

150. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to Dev. of Secondary
Markets, Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, WT Docket No. 00-230 (F.C.C. 2001), available at
http://www.aei.org/ct/cthazlett010207.pdf.
151. FCC SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT 5–6 (Nov. 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/doc-228542A1.pdf. (recommending expansion of exclusive use and commons models with reservation of command-and-control regulation to situations involving public
interest objectives and treaty obligations).
152. Specifically, the FCC assigned television stations according to the following priorities:
(1) to provide at least one television service to all parts of the United States;
(2) to provide each community with at least one television broadcast station;
(3) to provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United States;
(4) to provide each community with at least two television broadcast stations; and
(5) to assign any channels which remain unassigned under the foregoing priorities to the
various communities depending on the size of the population of each community, the
geographical location of such community, and the number of television services available
to such community from television stations located in other communities.
Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C.
148, 167 ¶ 63 (1952).
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basic economic qualities of television programming.153 Perhaps the most singular economic feature of the broadcast industry is its cost structure, in that the
creation of television programming requires the incurrence of large, upfront,
first-copy costs, whereas the costs of reproducing and distributing additional
copies are relatively minor. This cost structure causes average cost to decline
over all relevant volumes, as the large upfront investment is amortized over an
increasingly large number of viewers. When faced with such a declining cost
structure, efficiency increases with every additional viewer reached. Networks
also possess certain advantages in dealing with advertisers. Using a centralized
purchasing agent makes it easier for the advertiser to reach its goals and
provides the program provider greater flexibility in compensating advertisers if
a particular program does not do as well as expected. In addition, increasing use
of satellites to distribute programming puts a premium on the ability to distribute the same program to a broad geographic area.154
These considerations give programming that is able to reach a national
audience a decisive economic advantage over programming that is only distributed locally. The problem is that by their very nature, individual stations can
only reach limited geographic areas. As a result, the only practical way for them
to gain the benefits associated with national distribution is to affiliate with a
network with a national reach. Two conclusions follow: First, local stations
have a natural tendency to affiliate with networks whenever possible. Second,
the number of independent voices is determined by the number of available
networks rather than the geographic dispersion of television stations.
Because diversity in communication depends on the number of networks, the
problem with the broad dispersion of television stations becomes clear. The
FCC’s allocation plan dictated that a substantial part of the country would be
served by only three commercial television signals. A study conducted by the
FCC in 1980 revealed that although ninety-two percent of U.S. households
could receive at least three commercial television signals, only sixty-four
percent of U.S. households could receive a fourth television channel.155 This
meant that a fourth network would necessarily operate at an extreme disadvantage in terms of national coverage. The problems confronting a fourth network
were exacerbated further because even when a fourth commercial station was
available, it was not infrequently a UHF station, which, as noted earlier, would
face substantial technical disadvantages relative to VHF stations.156 As a result,
a fourth network would only be able to reach thirty-four percent of the country
with a signal that was comparable in quality to those provided by the other three

153. The discussion that follows is based in part on Yoo, supra note 1, at 213–17, 232–37; and
Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television: A Public Goods Analysis
27–35 (Sept. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id⫽333702) (last
visited Feb. 10, 2003).
154. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 53–54 (1992).
155. NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 143, at 68.
156. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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networks.157 Thus, despite evidence that sufficient demand existed to support as
many as six networks,158 the FCC’s system for dispersing television stations
geographically choked off the supply side of the equation by precluding a fourth
network from emerging.159
The FCC’s decision was particularly regrettable because at the time it made
its principal allocation decisions, it had before it proposals that would have
substantially alleviated this problem. For example, an emerging fourth television network founded by the DuMont Corporation proposed that, instead of
attempting to assign two stations to every possible community, the FCC should
focus on assigning four VHF stations to as many major markets as possible. The
DuMont plans would have increased the population receiving four or more
channels to nearly ninety-five percent and increased the percentage of the
population receiving technically comparable signals to ninety-three percent—
levels that would have greatly increased the feasibility of a fourth network.160
Another proposal, backed by CBS as well as DuMont, relied on a policy known
as “deintermixture” to alleviate the problems of scarcity. Deintermixture would
have required every city to be completely devoted to either VHF or UHF
stations. Doing so would have mitigated UHF’s disadvantage vis-à-vis VHF by
obviating the need for UHF stations to compete directly with VHF stations.161
The FCC unfortunately rejected both of these proposals. It did so in part
because adopting either one would have required incumbent broadcasters to
shift to UHF and in so doing abandon their investments in their existing VHF
facilities.162 History has proven the FCC incorrect. The DuMont network folded
three years later163 and UHF deployment was largely a failure.164 Although the
FCC continued to recognize that deintermixture remained the best solution to
this problem, it pursued the policy without much ardor over the next decade,
until it eventually abandoned it in 1962.165
In the end, UHF television did not become viable until the emergence of
cable television in the late 1970s. And even then, the FCC’s initial response was
to adopt policies that had the perverse effect of perpetuating scarcity. The FCC’s
initial reaction to cable television was to attempt to retard its development out

157. NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 143, at 78, 81 tbl.15. Expansion of the analysis to
include stations that were authorized but not operational does not materially affect the analysis. Id. at
78, 81 tbl.14 (noting that even when nonoperational stations are included, a fourth network would reach
only 36% of the nation with comparable signals).
158. See 35 FCC ANNUAL REPORT 135, 137 (1969); NOLL ET AL., supra note 46, at 116–20.
159. Rolla Edward Park, New Television Networks, 6 BELL J. ECON. 607, 607–08, 614–16 (1975).
160. See Schuessler, supra note 130, at 891, 921–26, 929 tbl.10, 938–39 & tbl.16.
161. Id. at 906–13; Note, The Darkened Channels, supra note 130, at 1579–80.
162. Schuessler, supra note 130, at 909–10.
163. Id. at 908 n.180, 926 n.273.
164. Geller, supra note 130, at 708; Note, The Darkened Channels, supra note 130, at 1593.
165. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 130, at 176–82; Schuessler, supra note 130, at 941–67; Note, The
Darkened Channels, supra note 130, at 1583–93.
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of fear that cable would eliminate the UHF stations’ viability.166 Ironically,
cable would ultimately prove to be UHF’s savior rather than its scourge because
cable is what finally allowed UHF stations to achieve technical parity with VHF
stations.167 It was thus no accident that new broadcast networks began to
emerge shortly after cable became well established.168 The FCC thus has a long
history of allocating channels in ways that exacerbated the problems of spectrum scarcity. The unfortunate reality is that the FCC continued to do so even
when the technological means for alleviating the problems of spectrum scarcity
already existed.
c. The Allocation of Individual Stations to Particular Licensees. Not only did
federal regulatory policy exacerbate the problems of scarcity by restricting the
supply of broadcast spectrum, it further compounded the problem by allocating
spectrum to individual license holders in a manner guaranteed to stimulate
excess demand. This is because the federal government has always given away
initial licenses and renewed existing licenses for free.169 It is an economic
truism, however, that demand will outstrip supply whenever any good is given
away for free. The ordinary solution to such shortages is to employ a price
mechanism because any increase in price will simultaneously stimulate additional supply and reduce demand until the two reach equilibrium. Indeed, the
longstanding existence of vibrant markets in which broadcast stations (and their
accompanying licenses) are bought and sold suggests that a price mechanism
would likely be quite effective in balancing demand with supply.170 In light of
this, the shortages associated with scarcity appear to be the direct result of the
government’s commitment to price licenses at zero.
As a result, scarcity emerges as an example of the technique discussed above
with respect to Reno and Denver, in which the Court incorporates the features
of the existing regulatory regime into its constitutional baseline when determining whether a First Amendment violation has occurred.171 The inevitable effect
of this type of reasoning is to allow regulation to become self-reinforcing by
permitting it to serve as a constitutional justification for additional regulation.
The problem is that the Court never considered whether the other regulatory
decisions that formed the baseline for scarcity could not themselves withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Confronting the issue in terms of particular licensing

166. See, e.g., Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern Grant of
Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community
Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 774–77 ¶¶ 123–127, 778 ¶ 130 (1966).
167. Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 96–97; Hazlett, supra note 118, at 419–20.
168. For useful overviews of this era of cable regulation, see Besen & Crandall, supra note 167, at
93–124.
169. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 115, at 136.
170. Id. at 143–47.
171. See POOL, supra note 51, at 141 (“Such licensing was the cause not the consequence of
scarcity.”).
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decisions, however, largely shields courts from any consideration of these
underlying problems.
B.

“SCARCITY IS NOT ENTIRELY A THING OF THE PAST”172: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF SCARCITY

At the same time that academic criticism has undermined the theoretical
underpinnings of the scarcity doctrine, technological change has worked to
erode its empirical foundations. Previous commentary focusing on technological change has raised two core criticisms. First, although the scarcity doctrine
implicitly treats the total amount of available spectrum as fixed and unchanging,
in reality, technological progress has steadily expanded the range of the electromagnetic spectrum available for commercial use. The FCC’s technical staff has
recognized that improvements in engineering have historically caused a steady
increase in the amount of usable spectrum.173 In addition, other developments
have allowed us to make more efficient use of the spectrum already available.
Improvements in channel spacing, the use of lower power, improved receiver
technology, and other management techniques have further loosened the natural
restriction imposed by the radio spectrum.174 As a result, the number of
over-the-air television stations that the average U.S. household can receive has
more than tripled over the last twenty years.175 Indeed, studies indicate that the
average household has more options for broadcast television than for daily
newspapers.176
Second, the scarcity doctrine was further undercut by the arrival of alternative television technologies, such as cable television and direct broadcast satellite systems (DBS), capable of providing large numbers of channels without
being subject to the type of constraints faced by broadcasters. These technolo-

172. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
173. See Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be More Like
Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 238 (1987) (quoting congressional testimony that the amount of
usable spectrum had increased by approximately 20% each year for the last several decades).
174. See id. at 238–39; POOL, supra note 51, at 152–53; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 111, at
222–23; Sidak, supra note 111, at 1230.
175. Compare Review of Rules & Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of Comm’n’s Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
3 F.C.C.R. 5681, 5685 ¶ 17 (1988) (reporting that the average U.S. household could receive 3.9
over-the-air television stations in 1980), with 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of Comm’n’s
Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of Telecomms. Act of 1996,
Biennial Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11058, 11064 ¶ 9 (2000) (reporting that as of 2000 the average
U.S. household could receive thirteen over-the-air television stations).
176. Although the vast majority of U.S. households have a significant number of broadcast television options, over 98% of all U.S. cities have only one daily newspaper. See Eli M. Noam & Robert N.
Freeman, The Media Monopoly and Other Myths, 29 TELEVISION Q. 18, 22 (1997). Compare Broadcast
Station Totals as of September 30, 2001 (F.C.C. Oct. 30, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Mass_Media/News_Releases/2001/nrmm0112.txt (reporting that there are presently 1676 broadcast
television stations in the U.S.), with WORLD ALMANAC 276 (2002) (reporting that there are presently
1480 daily newspapers in the U.S.).
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gies are now essentially universally available.177 In fact, cable, DBS, and the
other multichannel video program distributors (MVPDs) have eclipsed over-theair broadcasting as the nation’s primary source of television programming. The
FCC estimates that approximately eighty percent of U.S. households subscribe
to cable, DBS, or similar MVPD.178 As a result, these alternative technologies
have, in effect, eliminated the scarcity of the spectrum as a constraint to
television-based communications.179
The Supreme Court, however, has a long history of viewing each technology
as a universe unto itself.180 Its broadcasting precedents are no exception, as the
Court has consistently refrained from treating the arrival of alternative television technologies as a basis for revisiting the scarcity doctrine.181 It thus seems
that any attempt to overrule scarcity on empirical grounds is most likely to
succeed if it arises within the context of broadcasting simpliciter without
involving any alternative means of transmission.
It is this limitation that makes the current emergence of new broadcast
technologies so potentially transformative.182 For the first time, the Court will
be forced to entertain an empirical attack to the scarcity doctrine that has
traction even if evaluated entirely from within the confines of broadcasting. The
most sweeping technological development is the advent of digital television.
Although digital television is often associated exclusively with high definition
television (HDTV), what many people do not realize is that digital broadcasters
have another option. Rather than transmitting the higher quality pictures associated with HDTV, digital broadcasters can instead use the greater efficiency of
digital transmission to increase the number of channels transmitted. The FCC
estimates that if the resolution of the television picture is left at its current
levels, digital broadcasters can send five or more standard definition digital
signals in the same amount of spectrum needed to send a single high definition
digital signal.183 The prospect of a fivefold increase in the number of channels
that any household can receive makes it clear that economic limits have
177. Cable is now available in 97% of all U.S. households. Annual Assessment of Status of
Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244,
1330 tbl.B-1 (2002). DBS is available to any home with a clear line of sight to the southern sky. Id. at
1299–1300 ¶ 122.
178. Id. at 1282 ¶ 79, 1338 tbl.C-1. It is arguable that the current level of MVPD penetration
understates the true demand for television because the current availability of free, over-the-air broadcasting relieves many who are willing and able to pay for television programming from having to do so.
179. See Yoo, supra note 1, at 206–08, 228–29.
180. See id. at 285–86 (discussing the Court’s historical tendency to assume that patents confer
monopoly power without inquiring whether substitute technologies exist).
181. See League of Women Voters v. FCC, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). For a more complete discussion of the Court’s reluctance to reconsider
the scarcity doctrine in League of Women Voters notwithstanding the growth of cable television, see
infra note 203 and accompanying text.
182. For an excellent, nontechnical overview of many of these emerging technologies, see BRUCE M.
OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 245–325 (1999).
183. Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact Upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17771, 17772 ¶ 5 (1996), modified, 12 F.C.C.R. 3388 (1997).
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surpassed the physical limits posed by the electromagnetic spectrum as the
relevant constraint.184
Waiting in the wings are a number of other technologies that should further
enhance our ability to use the spectrum. Personal video recorders (PVRs)
employ hard drives and other computer-based technologies to store up to 320
hours of digital programming.185 Although industry leaders TiVo and ReplayTV
have largely abandoned attempts to sell PVRs as freestanding units, this technology is in the process of being incorporated into other devices.186 Widespread
deployment of PVRs promises to allow broadcasters to increase the efficiency
of spectrum use by using a greater proportion of the broadcast day for transmission without incurring the degradation in quality associated with current analog
technologies. The Chairman of the FCC recently expressed his enthusiastic
support for the technology, even going so far as to dub it, “God’s machine.”187
Equally promising are the cluster of emerging “spread spectrum” technologies. Some of these technologies, including a popular one known as ultrawideband (UWB) that serves as the basis for many wireless local area network
(LAN) systems, operate by sending an extremely short duration pulse over a
much broader range of the spectrum than is usual for spectrum-based devices.
The diffusion of the signal allows UWB to transmit at such low power that it is
almost indistinguishable from background noise. As a result, it allows more
users to operate in the same spectrum without causing interference.188 Indeed,
some have claimed that the deployment of such technologies will obviate the
need for spectrum rights altogether.189 I am personally skeptical that such

184. See Yoo, supra note 1, at 213, 227–28. This fact makes it quite ironic that the Gore
Commission and the FCC have used the arrival of digital television as a basis for calling for more
intrusive regulation. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Properly understood, digital television
weakens, rather than strengthens, the traditional grounds for regulatory intervention.
185. See David P. Hamilton, VCRs: Still Standing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2002, at R8.
186. See Anna Wilde Mathews, ReplayTV Will Exit Direct Set-Top Sales, Focus on Licensing
Software to Others, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2000, at B10; Nick Wingfield, Sony Agrees to License
Video-Recording, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at B6. Interestingly, Microsoft recently abandoned its
efforts to market a PVR. See Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Corp. Disbands Division Making UltimateTV, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at B2l.
187. Jim Krane, FCC Chief Is Big Fan of Digital Video Recorders, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 12, 2003, at
E2.
188. See Revision of Part 15 of Comm’n’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Sys.,
First Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, 7439 ¶ 7 (2002) [hereinafter UWB First Report and Order];
Revision of Part 15 of Comm’n’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Sys., Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 12086, 12088 n.13 (2000) [hereinafter UWB NPRM]. The FCC
recently authorized the marketing and operation of UWB devices. In so ruling, it limited communications services based on UWB to indoor activities and peer-to-peer operation. See Revision of Part 15 of
Comm’n’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Sys., First Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R.
7435, 7437 ¶ 5 (2002).
189. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 184 (1999); Tom W. Bell,
The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1766 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Overcoming
Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
287, 325–26, 394–97 (1998). For a discussion of this proposal appearing in the popular press, see
Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Will Technology Make CBS Unconstitutional?, NEW REPUBLIC,
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spread spectrum technologies can support the type of spectrum commons that
these scholars envision. Although the airwaves may seem uncrowded initially,
as the relevant technologies develop, the absence of well-defined property rights
will eventually lead to the overuse and underinvestment associated with any
commons.190 This is particularly true with UWB, because widescale use of low
power emissions would gradually raise the level of background noise that
spectrum users will need to overcome. In addition, such problems are likely to
be extremely hard to solve because interference in the spectrum is cumulative,
and it is likely to be extremely difficult to identify the source of emissions that
are fairly close to the level of background noise. Fortunately, other spread
spectrum technologies exist that do not suffer from these flaws. For example,
the FCC recently authorized the deployment of “software-defined radio”
(SDR),191 which is the first spread spectrum technology to operate as a mass
media.192 Unlike conventional radio, which employs transmitters that are hardwired to transmit and receive on a single frequency, SDR employs computerbased technology to allow transmissions to shift dynamically among
frequencies.193 As a result, the audience can receive seamless service despite the
fact that a particular broadcast may hop among different channels at different
times of the day. The added flexibility provided by SDR promises to improve
efficient use of spectrum in several ways. First, by enabling transmissions to
adapt dynamically to local conditions, SDR makes it possible to maximize use
of the available bandwidth. Second, it enhances incentives for conserving
spectrum by making it easier for any savings to be transferred to alternative
uses. Third, because the key elements of SDR equipment are based in software,
not hardware, the shift to SDR can minimize the problems associated with
nonuniform standards that vary from service to service and from country to
country. Lastly, the software-oriented nature of SDR can also greatly facilitate
the introduction of new, more spectrum-efficient technologies by lowering the
costs of changing over receiving and transmitting equipment.194 Admittedly,
SDR is still in its nascent stages and deployment of SDR technology for

Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 15 (“If spectrum can be shared, does the Constitution permit the state to silence
the many so that CBS can speak?”). For a related proposal that would charge spectrum fees based on
congestion, see Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s
Anachronism, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765 (1998) (advocating a “pay as you go,” license-free spectrum).
190. See Hazlett, supra note 118, at 481–85.
191. See Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, First Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
17373 (2001) [hereinafter SDR First Report & Order]; Hazlett, supra note 118, at 444–46.
192. The FCC has made it clear that UWB does not encompass long-range spread spectrum
technologies. See UWB First Report and Order, supra note 188, at 7437 ¶ 5; UWB NPRM, supra note
188, at 12088 n.13.
193. Because SDR uses specific channels, it is quite different from other spread spectrum technologies that disperse transmissions over a broader range in a nonchannelized fashion, such as UWB.
194. See SDR First Report & Order, supra note 191, at 17374 ¶ 5; Authorization and Use of
Software Defined Radios, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 24442, 24443 ¶¶ 3–4, 24446–48
¶¶ 12–15 (2000); Inquiry Regarding Software Defined Radios, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 5930,
5933–36 ¶¶ 10–17 (2000).
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television broadcasting is years from becoming a reality. Nonetheless, it is
apparent that SDR has the potential to enhance the efficiency with which we can
use the spectrum in some fairly dramatic ways.
And lurking over the entire scene is the impending conversion of broadcasting to packet-switched technologies. Unlike conventional communications media, which typically transmit information in a single, continuous stream, packetswitched networks divide information into smaller aggregations of data known
as “packets.” The packets are then sent to their destination through the most
efficient route and are reassembled. The conversion of broadcasting to packetswitched technologies should improve the efficiency of broadcast transmission
in several ways. First, packet-switched networks can take full advantage of
digital compression and other techniques developed to enhance the efficiency of
computer networks. Dividing information into packets also allows for more
efficient network use because different packets can be routed through whatever
paths are least congested at the time of transmission. The use of packetswitched networks can thus enhance the ability of flexible technologies like
SDR to use the available spectrum in the most efficient manner possible.
But perhaps the most important insight for the purposes of this Article is that
packet-switched networks treat all different forms of communication and all
means of transmission as essentially fungible.195 The technology follows the
same process of breaking digital information down into individual packets
regardless of whether it is conveying a television program, a telephone conversation, or an e-mail message. In addition, it makes no difference in the end if the
packets associated with a particular communication arrived via terrestrial broadcasting, satellite broadcasting, coaxial cable, the traditional twisted pair associated with telephony, or all of the above. As a result, the eventual conversion of
television to packet switched technologies will render any remaining distinctions between the various media technologies meaningless because all of them
will in essence become substitutes for one another.196 Once that day arrives, any
continued effort to draw distinctions among media will clearly become senseless.
C. WITH A WHIMPER, NOT A BANG: THE DOCTRINAL COLLAPSE
OF THE SCARCITY DOCTRINE

Despite these analytical and conceptual problems, policymakers continue to
regard the scarcity doctrine as beyond judicial reproach.197 My own review of

195. See generally Yoo, supra note 1, at 289 (“The impending shift of all networks to packetswitched technology promises to cause all of the distinctions based on the means of conveyance and the
type of speech to collapse entirely.”).
196. In fact, the various technologies may move beyond being substitutes to being complements. For
example, it is easy to envision a combined system that completely devoted the broadcast frequencies to
bringing content into the home while having the telephone line completely devoted to the return path.
197. See GORE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 20 & n.12 (declaring Red Lion “the operative
ruling in this area” and citing cases relying on it); Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television
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the precedents suggests that the courts have not been completely oblivious to
the analytical and empirical shortcomings of the scarcity doctrine and have even
signaled willingness to consider overruling it. The initial push in that direction
was ultimately blunted by an unusual confluence of issues in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.198 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has once again
begun to distance itself from the scarcity doctrine by refusing to extend it to
other media and appearing to avoid relying on it even with respect to broadcasting. These developments suggest that there may be more reason to believe that
the courts may be ready to abandon the doctrine than is commonly acknowledged.
1. A False Start in the Abandonment of Scarcity: From League of Women
Voters to Metro Broadcasting
Even while offering the most celebrated statement of the scarcity doctrine,
the Court’s opinion in Red Lion recognized the possibility that improvements in
technology might undermine its empirical basis. When considering the argument that scientific progress had rendered scarcity obsolete, the Court conceded
that “[a]dvances in technology, such as microwave transmission, have led to
more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum.”199 The Court, however,
saw technological change as a double-edged sword. Although scientific advances tended to improve our ability to employ the spectrum, those advances
simultaneously created additional demand for it. The Court thus saw the obsolescence of scarcity as a question of which of these two effects would dominate in
the long run. The Court declined to resolve the tension between these forces,
concluding that in the absence of a concrete factual record, it was “unwise to
speculate on the future allocation of that space.”200 In postponing a decision on
this issue rather than rejecting it out of hand, the Court implicitly recognized the
possibility that scarcity might one day become a thing of the past.
The Court’s subsequent decisions have been even more explicit in acknowledging the possibility that technology might undercut scarcity as a basis for
upholding the constitutionality of broadcast regulation. For example, in CBS v.
Democratic National Committee,201 a plurality of the Court explicitly acknowledged that “the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change”
and that “solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those
acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.”202 Justice Douglas put
the matter even more directly: “Scarcity may soon be a constraint of the past,
thus obviating the concerns expressed in Red Lion. It has been predicted that it

Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660, 10727–32 ¶¶ 149–151 (1996) (drawing a similar
conclusion).
198. 497 U.S. 547 (1989).
199. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396–97 (1969).
200. Id. at 399.
201. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
202. Id. at 102 (plurality opinion).
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may be possible within 10 years to provide television viewers 400 channels
through the advances of cable television.”203
This line of authority culminated in FCC v. League of Women Voters,204 in
which the Court recognized that “[c]ritics, including the incumbent Chairman of
the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite television technology,
communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity
doctrine is obsolete.”205 Perhaps reluctant to open itself to the political heat that
would accompany invalidating most of the extant regime of broadcast regulation, the Court declined to resolve the issue, holding instead that “[w]e are not
prepared . . . to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from
Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.”206 Thus,
notwithstanding its previous admonition that “[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake,”207
the Court felt the need to defer to the political branches.
Although the propriety of the Court’s decision not to resolve the issue is open
to question, the League of Women Voters footnote nonetheless established a road
map for the repudiation of the scarcity doctrine in the future. In light of the
deregulatory bent of the Reagan Administration in general and the FCC in
particular, the FCC did not wait long to take the Supreme Court up on its
invitation.208 The year after the Court’s decision in League of Women Voters, the
FCC issued a study reviewing the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine.
Known as the 1985 Fairness Report, this study concluded that the increase in
the number of television stations and the emergence of cable television and
other new television technologies had undercut scarcity as a basis for giving
broadcasting a lesser degree of First Amendment protection than other media.209

203. Id. at 158 n.8 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
204. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
205. Id. at 376 n.11 (citing Fowler & Brenner, supra note 111, at 221–26).
206. Id.
207. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); see also Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989):
To the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’ conclusion
about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not ignore it, it is our task
in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution. This is particularly true
where the Legislature has concluded that its product does not violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 129.
208. For a detailed and nuanced overview of the events that followed, see Neal Devins, Congress,
the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1993, at 152–65,
177–78; see also Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine
and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 79 GEO. L.J. 59, 59–62, 66–87 (1987);
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1009–12
(1989).
209. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Concerning Gen. Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 204–17 ¶¶ 97–122 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. The Report also concluded that the Fairness Doctrine was constitu-
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Strong congressional support for the Fairness Doctrine led the FCC to stop short
of repealing it. In light of the Fairness Doctrine’s standing as “a longstanding
administrative policy and central tenet of broadcast regulation” and the existence of “proposals pending before Congress to repeal the doctrine,” the FCC
concluded that it would be inappropriate to repeal the Fairness Doctrine outright. Much as the Supreme Court had avoided deciding the constitutional issue
in League of Women Voters by deferring to the political branches, the FCC
sidestepped the issue as well, opting instead to “afford Congress an opportunity
to review the Fairness Doctrine in light of the evidence adduced in this
proceeding.”210
That the FCC stopped short of reaching the constitutional issue did not stop
many contemporary observers from regarding the 1985 Fairness Report as the
type of signal that would justify the abandonment of the scarcity doctrine.211 In
1987, the FCC removed any remaining doubts about its intentions. In response
to a D.C. Circuit decision ordering it to address the constitutional issues the
FCC had avoided in the 1985 Fairness Report,212 the FCC repealed the Fairness
Doctrine.213 In the course of doing so, the FCC reaffirmed its attack on the
scarcity doctrine, concluding that “the dramatic transformation in the telecommunications marketplace provides a basis for the Court to reconsider its application
of diminished First Amendment protection to the electronic media.”214 Even
more importantly, the FCC explicitly indicated that it intended its action to
represent the type of signal envisioned by the Supreme Court in League of
Women Voters.215 The FCC’s bold action appeared to set the stage for a
landmark renunciation of the scarcity doctrine that would bring the Broadcast
Model to an abrupt end.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court did not overturn the

tionally suspect in that it actually lessened the amount of diverse views available to the public. Faced
with the obligation to provide balanced coverage whenever controversial issues are discussed, the FCC
found that all too often broadcasters avoided the problem altogether simply by declining to address
controversial issues at all. Id. at 159–88 ¶¶ 26–68. The Report further concluded that the Fairness
Doctrine inhibited the expression of unorthodox views and gave the government too much power to
influence the content of broadcast programming. Id. at 188–94 ¶¶ 69–76. In so ruling, the FCC
provided a basis under which a court could reconsider the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine
without calling the broader sweep of broadcast regulation into question. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969) (noting that the Court would reconsider the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine “if experience with the administration of those doctrines indicates that they have the
net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage”); League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 378 n.12 (offering a similar observation).
210. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 209, at 148 ¶ 7; see also id. 227 ¶ 144, 246–47 ¶¶ 174–176.
211. See Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Bloch, supra note 208, at 74 n.56; Spitzer, supra note 208, at 1009.
212. See Meredith Corp., 809 F.2d at 874.
213. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5053–54 ¶¶ 66–72 (1987) (mem. op. & order),
aff’d, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
214. Id. at 5058 ¶ 99.
215. Id. at 5053 ¶ 65.
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scarcity doctrine in its next major broadcasting decision. To the contrary, in its
1990 decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,216 a decision better known
for its equal protection implications, the Court reaffirmed scarcity as a basis for
applying a lower First Amendment standard to broadcasting.217 Although the
decision was closely divided on other issues, the dissent refused to challenge the
majority’s endorsement of the scarcity doctrine and instead accepted the notions
that “First Amendment concerns support limited but inevitable Government
regulation of the peculiarly constrained broadcasting spectrum” and that, as
such, “measures adopted to further the interest in diversity of broadcasting
viewpoints are . . . no[t] contrary to the First Amendment.”218
Coming after the FCC’s attempt to answer the Supreme Court’s request for a
signal that would justify revisiting the scarcity doctrine, this reaffirmance came
as something of a surprise. Even more striking was the Court’s decision to apply
an intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny to the minority preference
programs at issue in Metro Broadcasting, as well as its reliance on a nonremedial governmental interest in sustaining the programs. Just the previous year in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,219 the Court had indicated that it would
likely subject such programs to strict scrutiny and would hold any attempts to
justify race-conscious measures as remedies for past discrimination to a fairly
stringent evidentiary standard. The answer to these puzzles lies with Justice
Byron White, one of two justices to vote with the majority in both Croson and
Metro Broadcasting. Justice Brennan’s papers reveal that White made a reaffirmation of Red Lion the price of his vote in Metro Broadcasting.220
Dominated as it was by the larger battle over affirmative action, the majority
opinion in Metro Broadcasting can hardly be regarded as a ringing endorsement
of Red Lion. Here was a clear case of the equal protection tail wagging the First
Amendment dog. And yet, somewhat ironically, it is the broadcast implications
that have proven more enduring. When the Court later overruled Metro Broadcasting, it left the decision’s endorsement of scarcity intact.221 In so doing, the
Court brought the reexamination of the scarcity doctrine prompted by the
League of Women Voters footnote to an unsatisfying and somewhat indeterminate end. Although there can be little question that the Court reaffirmed the

216. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
217. Id. at 566–67 (“We have long recognized that ‘[b]ecause of the scarcity of [electromagnetic]
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
should be expressed on this unique medium.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969))) (alterations in original).
218. Id. at 616 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (citing
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389–90).
219. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
220. See Devins, supra note 208, at 179.
221. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting
only “[t]o the extent that [it] is inconsistent” with the holding “that all racial classifications . . . must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”).
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scarcity doctrine as a formal matter, it did nothing to resolve the burgeoning
questions about its continuing validity.
2. Scarcity After Metro Broadcasting
The reaffirmation of the scarcity doctrine in Metro Broadcasting blunted the
momentum in favor of its outright abandonment initiated by the League of
Women Voters footnote. Metro Broadcasting did not, however, mark an end to
the judiciary’s struggles with the doctrine’s analytical and technological shortcomings. As the following subsection demonstrates, courts have severely restricted
the doctrine’s scope by consistently rejecting calls to extend it to other media. In
addition, courts have even begun to curtail the scarcity doctrine with respect to
broadcasting. While some lower court judges have continued to call for its
repudiation, the Supreme Court has appeared to respond with avoidance, opting
to rely on other principles to justify applying a lower level of First Amendment
scrutiny even when a simple citation to the scarcity doctrine would have
sufficed. The Supreme Court’s scrupulous refusal to offer any endorsement of
the scarcity doctrine suggests that the Court may be closer to abandoning the
doctrine than is generally recognized.
a. The Refusal to Extend Scarcity to Other Media. The only time that the
Supreme Court has found occasion to mention the scarcity doctrine since Metro
Broadcasting was in the process of rejecting requests to extend it to other
media.222 The Court offered its most extensive discussion of the extent to which
the scarcity doctrine would apply to other electronic media in Turner I. At issue
was a First Amendment challenge to the so-called “must carry” statute, which
required local cable operators to carry for free the signals of all full-power
broadcast stations within their service area. Even though the Court had recognized that cable television was protected speech,223 the First Amendment
standard that would apply to cable television remained an open question.224

222. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
637–39 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]. For earlier refusals to extend the doctrine to other media, see Pac.
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 10 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542–43 (1980); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (overturning a ban on the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements on the ground that “[o]ur decisions have recognized that the special interest of the
Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification
for regulation of other means of communication”).
223. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1986); cf. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,
707 (1979) (noting that cable operators exercise “a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding
what their programming will include”).
224. See Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 495 (declining “to express any more detailed views
on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question”); id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(joining the majority opinion subject to the understanding that “it leaves open the question of the proper
standard for judging First Amendment challenges” to the cable regulations in question).

2003]

THE TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC FIRST AMENDMENT

289

Just as numerous courts of appeals had held earlier,225 the Court flatly
rejected the government’s contention that cable television should be subject to
the lower level of scrutiny that applied to broadcasting. In so holding, the Court
acknowledged the longstanding criticism of the scarcity doctrine leveled by
scholars and courts alike.226 In the end, however, the Court did not regard a case
about cable to be an appropriate occasion to reconsider the application of the
doctrine to broadcasting. “Whatever [scarcity’s] validity”227 in the broadcasting
context, the Court held that it did not apply to cable.228 As the Court explained:
[C]able television does not suffer from inherent limitations that characterize
the broadcast medium. Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and
digital compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on
the number of speakers who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any
danger of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to
share the same channel. In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more
relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion . . . is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation.229

This conclusion commanded overwhelming support on the Court, garnering
the votes of four of the Justices in the majority, as well as all four dissenting
Justices.230 The only member of the Court not to address the issue explicitly
was Justice Stevens, and his separate opinion did not indicate any disagreement

225. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448–50 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d on other
grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127
(7th Cir. 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44–46 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
226. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 63 & n.5 (citing Telecomms. Action & Research Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 508–09 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 87–90; POWE, supra note 51, at 197–209;
SPITZER, supra note 111, at 7–18; Coase, supra note 29, at 12–27; Winer, supra note 173, at 218–40;
Note, The Message in the Medium, supra note 120, at 1072–74.
227. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637 (“[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First
Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not
apply in the context of cable regulation”) (emphasis added).
228. Id. Some commentators have interpreted Turner I’s refusal to question the continuing vitality of
scarcity as representing an implicit reaffirmation of the doctrine with respect to broadcasting. See
Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond?—Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21–22 (1997). The structure and tone of the majority opinion suggest that the Court
reserved the issue as a matter of judicial restraint and not to signal its support for the doctrine.
229. 512 U.S. at 639.
230. See id. at 674–75 (O’Connor, J., joined in relevant part by Scalia, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (“As the Court explains in Parts I, II-A and II-B of its opinion,
which I join, cable programmers and operators stand in the same position under the First Amendment as
do more traditional media.”). The primary disagreement between the majority and the dissent centered
on whether must-carry represented structural rather than content regulation and whether must-carry was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive the appropriate level of scrutiny. See id. at 675–78, 682–85
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). For an excellent review of the reasons for
regarding must-carry as content based, see Winer, supra note 228, at 25–45.
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with the proposition.231
The Court similarly refused to extend the scarcity doctrine to the Internet in
Reno v. ACLU.232 The Court began by recognizing that scarcity was one of the
“special justifications” for upholding more intrusive regulation of broadcasting
than would be permissible with regard to other types of speakers.233 Because
the Internet “provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds,” it “can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.”234 Together, Turner I and Reno v. ACLU appear to close the door on any
possible extensions of the scarcity doctrine. The emergence of a media environment dominated by technological convergence, in which wire-based communications and spectrum-based communications are ready substitutes, it is essentially
impossible that any one communications medium can be regarded sufficiently
scarce so as to justify receiving separate constitutional treatment.235
b. The Tacit Abandonment of Scarcity with Respect to Broadcasting. In addition to precluding the possibility that the scarcity doctrine will be extended to
other media, the courts have also distanced themselves from the doctrine with
respect to broadcasting. A steady stream of separate opinions authored by lower
court judges have continued to call for the doctrine’s abandonment.236 Even
more telling has been the Supreme Court’s apparent reluctance to rely on the
doctrine in its recent broadcasting decisions. When confronted with contentbased restrictions on programming that, in earlier times, most likely would have
been justified in terms of scarcity, the Court has assiduously avoided doing so
and has instead relied on other legal principles to justify subjecting the restriction in question to a form of intermediate scrutiny.
For example, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,237 the Court invoked
231. Turner I, at 669–73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
232. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
233. Id. at 868.
234. Id. at 870.
235. See Yoo, supra note 1, at 285–89. There is another way in which recent cases promise to
prevent the Broadcast Model from expanding to other media. The Reno Court also rejected extending
the Broadcast Model to the Internet in part on the ground that the Internet has never been subject to the
type of government supervision and regulation that has surrounded the broadcast industry. Reno, 521
U.S. at 868–89. This argument is, in effect, the converse of the arguments reviewed in subsection
II.A.2.a. Just as the presence of existing regulation makes other forms of regulation more constitutionally palatable, the absence of regulation has the opposite effect. Because it is difficult to foresee how a
new medium would be subject to regulation for a sufficiently long time to become part of the relevant
baseline, it is possible that this language from Reno will serve to restrict the technology-specific
approach to the First Amendment even further.
236. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,
672–76 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television
Communications Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1431 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (McMillian, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part), rev’d, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d
1430, 1442 n.12 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting the views of Judges Bowman, Beam, and Loken); id.
at 1443 (R. Arnold, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
237. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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the principles of commercial speech to apply a form of intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny to uphold a federal restriction on the broadcast of lottery
advertisements rather than following the more straightforward path taken by the
district court of basing its decision on the scarcity doctrine.238 Similarly, in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,239 the Court invoked
the public forum doctrine rather than the scarcity doctrine to justify applying a
lesser form of First Amendment scrutiny when sustaining a public broadcaster’s
decision to exclude an independent candidate for Congress from a televised
debate. Even more telling was that the Court discussed its broadcasting precedents solely to underscore the importance of preserving the broadcasters’
editorial discretion without acknowledging the aspects of those cases supporting
subjecting broadcasters to more intrusive regulation than other media speakers.240 Indeed, at least one Justice has subsequently construed Forbes as rejecting scarcity as a basis for regulating broadcast content.241
Although it is possible to construe Edge Broadcasting and Forbes as exhibiting some discomfort with the scarcity doctrine, such a conclusion is anything
but foregone. It was sufficient in those cases for the Court to rely solely on one
doctrinal basis for applying a less restrictive First Amendment standard. Given
that the restrictions in question passed the level of scrutiny applied, the Court
was under no obligation to consider whether some alternative basis might also
serve to sustain it. Therefore, as a formal matter, Edge Broadcasting and Forbes
are ultimately ambiguous as to the fate of the scarcity doctrine.
The same cannot be said about the Court’s most recent broadcasting case,
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States,242 in which the
Court applied commercial speech doctrine to invalidate certain federal restrictions on casino advertising. After holding that the restrictions in question did
not satisfy the less restrictive standard imposed by the commercial speech
doctrine, the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by all federal legislation
put the Court under an obligation to consider whether the restriction in question
might be upheld on other grounds. Had the scarcity doctrine retained any
vitality, it would have been appropriate for the Court to apply it to the facts of
this case. Indeed, both the district court and the court of appeals relied in part on
the scarcity doctrine when initially considering the case.243 The Court’s failure
to mention the scarcity doctrine in Greater New Orleans is thus considerably

238. Id.
239. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
240. Id. at 673–75.
241. See Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 615 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Forbes for the proposition that “scarcity of air time does not justify viewpoint-based exclusion”).
242. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
243. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. La. 1994),
aff’d, 69 F.3d 1296, 1302 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 U.S. 801 (1996) (remanding for reconsideration in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)).

292

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:245

more telling than its failure to do so in Edge Broadcasting and Forbes. To the
contrary, the Court’s silence in Greater New Orleans is deafening.
The Court’s apparent reluctance to rely on the scarcity doctrine in these cases
thus raises the distinct possibility that, having stopped short of overruling the
scarcity doctrine outright, the Court is nonetheless distancing itself from it.
Given its conceptual and empirical infirmities, I would certainly welcome any
indication that the doctrine is losing its vitality. That said, although the Supreme
Court can avoid the illogic of the scarcity doctrine simply by ignoring it, lower
courts cannot.244 Even judges who are well aware of the doctrine’s shortcomings acknowledge that they remain bound by it until the Supreme Court
overrules it.245 Until that happens, the lower courts may have no choice but to
apply the scarcity doctrine to all new media that employ the electromagnetic
spectrum as their primary means of transmission. In addition, regulatory authorities remain free to call for the type of intrusive regulation associated with Red
Lion without having to acknowledge the scarcity doctrine’s inherent flaws.246 It
is thus clear that, until the Court finally inters the doctrine, scarcity will
continue to exert an unfortunate distorting effect on lower court and regulatory
decisionmaking.
III. PERVASIVENESS AND ACCESSIBILITY: NEW RATIONALES FROM PACIFICA
Perhaps sensing the growing weakness of the scarcity doctrine, in recent
years, the FCC has increasingly turned to the principles announced in Pacifica
as the primary support for the constitutionality of the Broadcast Model. For
example, the FCC invoked Pacifica as a basis for sustaining the constitutionality of requiring broadcasters to provide three hours of children’s programming
each week.247 Even more telling is the FCC’s abandonment of any attempt to
use the scarcity doctrine to justify its indecency restrictions and its decision to

244. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving this
Court the prerogative of overruling its decisions.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We
do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have,
by implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”).
245. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 161–62, 167–69 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Radio-Television News
Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 877 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Branch v. FCC, 824
F.2d 37, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508–09
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
246. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Adelstein, The Last DJ?: Finding a Voice on Media Ownership, Remarks
at the Future of Music Coalition Policy Summit (Jan. 6, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
Adelstein/2003/spjsa301.html (calling for the preservation and extension of regulations based on Red
Lion).
247. Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10731–32 ¶¶ 155–156 (1996).
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rely solely on the rationales announced in Pacifica.248
The recent upsurge in Pacifica’s importance makes it appropriate to evaluate
the extent to which the rationales announced in that decision can justify
according less than full First Amendment protection to emerging media. This
Part begins by critiquing the reasoning of the Pacifica opinion, both in terms of
logical coherence and consistency with the precedents that existed at the time. It
will then trace subsequent judicial discussions of Pacifica. Finally, this Part will
analyze the impact that technological change has had on Pacifica. In sum, each
of these considerations provides ample reason to question Pacifica’s vitality as a
precedent.
A. THE THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF PACIFICA

Critical analysis of the Court’s Pacifica opinion reveals that its rationales are
deeply flawed. Although the criticism of Pacifica is voluminous,249 for the
purposes of this Article, it suffices to focus on the extent to which the Pacifica
opinion can justify according broadcasting a lesser degree of First Amendment
protection. Unfortunately, the opinion itself provides little guidance in this
regard. Although the tone of Pacifica suggests that the Court was simply relying
on the established justifications for applying a lower First Amendment standard
to broadcasting,250 the rationales upon which the Court relied were actually
quite novel. Unfortunately, the Court did not offer much in the way of articulating or defending these new rationales, and its meager explanations raised more
questions than they answered.
As noted above,251 the Court’s first rationale for upholding the restriction on
indecent speech was that broadcasting is “uniquely pervasive,” in that it acts as
an “intruder” that “confronts the citizen . . . in the privacy of the home.”252 It is

248. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶¶ 10–11 (1987) (mem. op. & order); see also
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 664–69 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Indus.
Guidance on Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding
Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8000 ¶ 4 (2001).
249. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 196–202; POOL, supra note 51, at 134;
POWE, supra note 51, at 209–15; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
80–82 (1990); SPITZER, supra note 111, at 119–30; C. Edwin Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica
Standard Time, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 45, 45 (1996); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A Powe, Jr.,
Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV 1123, 1229
(1978); Levi, supra note 72, at 139–40; Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay
for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 946–51 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 287–96 (1981); Laurence H. Winer, The
Signal Cable Sends, Part II—Interference from the Indecency Cases?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 459,
493–502 (1987).
250. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have long recognized that . . . of all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.”).
251. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
252. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. If anything, the Court’s emphasis on the home in Pacifica seems
singularly misplaced considering that the complainant encountered the program at issue while driving
in his car. See id. at 730.
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hard to see how these considerations distinguish broadcasting from other media.
Other media, such as books and the mail, are similarly pervasive and enter the
home as easily, and yet the Court had previously struck down attempts to ban
offensive speech transmitted over those media.253 In addition, it is far from clear
that broadcasting can properly be regarded as an intruder. Viewers and listeners
must purchase radio and television sets,254 and those sets must, of course, be
turned on for people to be subject to such “intrusion.” As Justice Brennan noted,
“switching on and listening to communications transmitted over the public
airwaves” represents an affirmative decision “to take part . . . in an ongoing
public discourse.”255
The Court also attempted to explain the supposed pervasiveness of broadcasting by arguing that “prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or
viewer from unexpected program content” and reasoning that “[t]o say that one
may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the
first blow.”256 The Court had never previously regarded listeners’ and viewers’
inability to obtain complete protection against exposure to unwanted speech as
constitutionally significant. To the contrary, prior to Pacifica the Court had
consistently held that when viewers encounter material they find offensive, “the
burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’”257 In the words of one lower
federal court that the Supreme Court later cited with approval, the “short,
though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden,

253. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (books); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (mail); see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 220; POWE, supra note 51, at 210;
SPITZER, supra note 111, at 120; Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on
Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1496 (1995).
254. As Thomas Krattenmaker and Scot Powe have noted, “radios and televisions are not forced
upon citizens, but in fact are considered to be among the most valued household purchases. Intruders
they are not.” KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 220. Powe’s initial statement of this criticism
was considerably more sardonic:
Whatever else the Court means, it is not true that the FBI or CIA breaks into millions of
American homes to deposit the latest Sony radios in bedrooms and living areas. To the best of
my knowledge, Americans bring radios and television sets into their homes because they
desire them. . . . If homeowners truly believed that radio or television was an intruder, I would
expect to see sets out on the streets for garbage collection. Instead, when I read my morning
paper I see numbers of full-page ads for these very appliances, suggesting that the merchants
believe, contrary to what the Court might think, that Americans desire radios and televisions.
POWE, supra note 51, at 210; see also SPITZER, supra note 111, at 120 (criticizing the notion that radio is
“uniquely persuasive” because printed publications must also be ordered and purchased before they are
delivered to one’s home).
255. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 764–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 748–49.
257. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (quoting Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
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at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.”258 This reasoning would seem
to apply a fortiori to broadcast speech.259 In upholding limitations on potentially
offensive advertising on streetcars, the Court explicitly distinguished broadcasting on the grounds that unlike “the billboard or street card placard” at issue in
those cases, “[t]he radio can be turned off.”260
This conclusion draws further support from the reasoning of the Court’s
opinion in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.261 In upholding a
statute allowing people to have their names removed from mailing lists of those
sending erotically arousing or sexually provocative materials, the Rowan Court
emphasized the importance of making each “householder the exclusive and final
judge of what will cross his threshold.”262 Consequently, a statute that enhanced
each homeowners’ ability to control what speech entered their homes was no
more problematic than “a radio or television viewer twist[ing] the dial to cut off
an offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his home.”263
The Court limited its holding by emphasizing that cutting off potentially
offensive speech was permissible only to the extent that “the mailer’s right to
communicate is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee
giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from that mailer.”264 The
negative implication from this reasoning is clear: Although the possibility that
some people may find particular speech offensive may justify upholding measures that enhance individuals’ ability to screen out potentially offensive material on a targeted basis, the potential for offensiveness does not justify the total
suppression of the potentially offensive speech, which would also deprive

258. Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d, 386 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1967), quoted with approval by Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983).
259. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent:
Whatever minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program
he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch
stations or flick the “off” button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster’s
right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First
Amendment protection.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the Court of Appeals decision that led to
Pacifica, Chief Judge Bazelon similarly observed that “having elected to receive public air waves, the
scanner who stumbles onto an offensive program is in the same position as the unsuspecting passers-by
in Cohen and Erzoznik; he can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the set.” Pacifica
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), rev’d, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
260. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932); accord Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 481
U.S. 298, 302 (1974); see also Schauer, supra note 249, at 294 (“Turning off a radio is much easier than
averting your eyes from someone who is in the same room. Just try it sometime.”).
261. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
262. Id. at 736. In support of this proposition, the Court quoted language from a previous case
emphasizing the importance of “leaving ‘with the homeowner himself’ the power to decide ‘whether
distributors of literature may lawfully call at a home.’” Id. (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 148 (1943)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 737.
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access to those who wish to view such material.265 As Justice Brennan’s dissent
in Pacifica pointed out, the effect of such a blanket governmental prohibition is
to take the discretion away from homeowners and to place it instead in the
hands of the government.266 In addition, the clear suggestion of the Court’s
reasoning in Rowan is that the proper response of a person encountering
unwanted broadcast speech is simply to “twist the dial to cut off [the] offensive
or boring communication.”267
The other rationale proffered by the Pacifica majority—that broadcasting is
“uniquely accessible to children”268—fares little better.269 It is hard to see how
broadcasting is any more accessible to children than newspapers, books, or the
mail.270 Moreover, the Court had cautioned in Butler v. Michigan271 that in
attempting to protect children, the government could not “reduce the adult
population to reading only what is fit for children.”272 And yet, banning
indecent speech because children might be listening had precisely that effect.273
The Court’s observation that adults interested in hearing such materials could
purchase recordings or go to live performances274 has been criticized as “disingenuous,” in that the alternatives offered by the Court are far from comparable

265. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701–02 (1977) (noting that the possibility
that some people might find mailed contraceptive advertisements offensive and embarrassing “d[id] not
justify the total suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives”). Compare Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (upholding statute barring sale of indecent materials to minors), with
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1957) (overturning blanket ban on indecent materials
affecting adults and children alike). The Court would later confirm this intuition in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71–72 (1983). See infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
266. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9,
27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (distinguishing a statute that enabled a person to require
removal of his name from all future mailing lists of a solicitor because the statute “empower[ed] the
homeowner to determine what mail he will not receive, [and] avoided the constitutional problems
involved in vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a government
official”).
267. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
268. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
269. The facts underlying Pacifica make it a somewhat inapposite case for invoking the accessibility
of broadcast speech to children as a rationale for upholding the regulation. Some parts of the Court’s
opinion leave the impression that the child exposed to Carlin’s monologue was a first grader. See id.
(expressing particular solicitude for “those [children] too young to read”). In fact, the child at issue was
actually fifteen years old. See POWE, supra note 51, at 186; Winer, supra note 249, at 490 n.171. This
was well above the age that the FCC thought at the time merited protection from indecent programming. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1341–42 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 110 & n.32. In addition, the program in question was
broadcast at two o’clock when broadcasters could reasonably expect most children to be in school. See
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729.
270. See POWE, supra note 51, at 209; Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 249, at 1233.
271. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
272. Id. at 383.
273. As Krattenmaker and Powe note, “To hold broadcasting . . . to the level of hypothetical
five-year olds who may be listening is indeed to invite the risk that the adult population may be reduced
in its thinking to ideas fit for a child.” Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 249, at 1280.
274. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
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in terms of affordability or ease of access.275 In addition, such reasoning would
justify upholding the restrictions on the sale of indecent magazines struck down
in Butler, as well as virtually any other technology-specific restriction on
indecent speech.276 In sum, none of Pacifica’s proffered rationales can sensibly
be read as being limited to broadcasting.
The key to unraveling this mystery lies in an earlier portion of the Pacifica
opinion.277 Justice Stevens began the constitutional discussion of his Pacifica
opinion by stating that indecency constituted low-value speech that “surely
lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment concern” and, as a result, was not
worthy of constitutional protection.278 What is most notable about this rationale
for the purposes of this Article is that it turned entirely on the content of the
speech and did not depend in any way on the medium by which the speech was
conveyed.279 Unfortunately for Justice Stevens, two of the five Justices that
comprised his majority refused to join this portion of his opinion.280 Employing
words that echoed Justice Harlan’s famous observation that “it is . . . often true
that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,”281 Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Blackmun, instead concluded that determining the relative value of particular
speech “is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the judges to impose
upon him.”282
It was only after Justice Stevens’s initial attempt to obtain five votes failed
that he turned to the alternative rationales discussed above. As a result, Justice
Stevens’s opinion reads like a non sequitur, first suggesting that indecent speech
should not receive the full protection of the First Amendment regardless of the
medium on which it is conveyed, but then immediately seeming to contradict
itself by grounding the decision on the principle that broadcasting is different.
Given Justice Stevens’s ambivalence about the media-specific nature of his
opinion, it should come as no surprise that the rationales he offered to limit his
holding to broadcasting were somewhat half-hearted. To say that the opinion is
explicable in this manner, however, is not to say that it is justifiable. Read
275. Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 93
(1991).
276. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 249, at 1239.
277. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 198–201.
278. 438 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion). Indeed, Justice Stevens equated indecent speech with
obscene speech when he opined that “[t]hese words offend for the same reasons that obscenity
offends.” Id. at 746.
279. That Justice Stevens first advanced this position in a decision involving adult movie theaters
further underscores the assertion that he did not see it as applying only to broadcasting. See Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
280. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729 (noting that only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined the part of the opinion advancing the view that indecency represented low-value speech); id. at
761–62 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment) (rejecting
Justice Stevens’s low-value speech rationale and relying solely on the “unique characteristics of the
broadcast media”).
281. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
282. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring
in the judgment).

298

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:245

critically, Pacifica falls short of providing an alternative basis for according to
broadcasting a lesser degree of First Amendment protection.
Lastly and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, even if read as
broadly as possible, Pacifica does not justify the full range of regulation
associated with the Broadcast Model. At most, concerns about pervasiveness
and accessibility to children would justify the imposition of a narrow range of
negative content restrictions, likely limited to such areas as indecency and
violence. The Pacifica rationales would not justify broadcast licensing, negative
content restrictions in other areas, and affirmative programming obligations that
constitute the other key features of the Broadcast Model. As a result, it is
conceptually ill-suited to serve as the foundation for applying an alternative
justification for the type of intrusive regulation that characterizes the Broadcast
Model of regulation.
B. THE DOCTRINAL REJECTION OF PACIFICA

1. The Refusal to Extend Pacifica to Other Media
Given the analytical problems with the rationales underlying Pacifica, the
Court has unsurprisingly and repeatedly refused to extend it to other media,
including mailed contraceptive advertisements,283 telephony,284 and the Internet.285 The Court so held even though each of those media appears to be as
pervasive and accessible to children as broadcasting. Instead, these opinions
noted Pacifica’s acknowledgement of the narrowness of its holding and emphasized that, if allowed to stand, the restrictions at issue would limit adults to what
was appropriate for children.286 As Justice Marshall eloquently quipped, “[t]he
level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which
would be suitable for a sandbox.”287 It was more appropriate to expect recipients of unwanted material simply to discard it.288 Thus, as was the case with the
scarcity doctrine, the Court’s reluctance to extend Pacifica to other media
arguably signaled its unease with it.
The single deviation from the Court’s refusal to extend Pacifica to other
media appeared in Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,289 which resolved a First
Amendment challenge to three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 that restricted the transmission of

283. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983).
284. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989).
285. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997).
286. Id. at 870, 875–76; Sable, 492 U.S. at 128; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
287. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
288. Id. at 72; see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542
(1980) (reasoning that recipients of unwanted mailings may “‘effectively avoid further bombardment of
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes’” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971))).
289. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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indecent speech.290 The plurality argued that the Court’s decision to hold the
scarcity doctrine inapplicable to cable in Turner I did not foreclose the possibility that Pacifica might justify holding cable television to a lower standard of
First Amendment protection.291 The plurality proceeded to contradict a long line
of lower court decisions holding Pacifica inapplicable to cable292 and concluded
that all of the considerations that underlay Pacifica—pervasiveness, invasion of
the home, ineffectiveness of warnings, accessibility to children—applied with
equal force to cable television.293 Thus, in applying Pacifica to cable, the
Denver plurality raised questions about the correctness of the statements in
Pacifica emphasizing the narrowness of its holding294 and asserting that it was
limited to broadcasting.295 Indeed, the plurality implied that Pacifica might
apply to all media when it indicated that it regarded the question “whether . . .
Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of review where
indecent speech is at issue” as still being open.296 The plurality, however,
ignored the sharp criticism leveled by five of the Court’s members297 and
refused to resolve which constitutional standard would be applied.298 In doing
so, the Court articulated an assortment of standards, all of which appeared to be

290. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(a)–(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486. Subsection (a) gave cable operators the
discretion to refuse to carry indecent programming on leased access channels. 47 U.S.C. § 531(a)
(2000). Subsection (c) gave cable operators similar authority over public, educational, and governmental access channels. § 10(c), 106 Stat. at 1486. Subsection (b) also required cable operators to segregate
any indecent programming carried on leased access channels on a single channel and to block its
transmission unless the viewer indicates otherwise. § 10(b), 106 Stat. at 1486. The decision holding
subsection (b) unconstitutional was the only part of the Court’s decision that commanded a clear
majority of the Court. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 753–60; id. at 779
(O’Connor, concurring in part & dissenting in part) (joining Part III); id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, & dissenting in part) (same).
291. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 748 (“The Court’s distinction in
Turner [I]. . . between cable and broadcast television, relied on the inapplicability of the spectrum
scarcity problem to cable. While the distinction was relevant in Turner [I] to the justification for
structural regulations at issue there . . . , it has little to do with a case that involves the effects of
television viewing on children.”).
292. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420–21 (11th Cir. 1985); Cmty. Television of Utah, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1109–16 (D. Utah 1985), aff’d sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d
989, 991 (10th Cir. 1986), aff’d mem., 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Cmty. Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City,
555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167–69 (D. Utah 1982); see also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (suggesting in dicta that Pacifica was inapplicable to cable).
293. 518 U.S. at 744–45 (plurality opinion).
294. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
295. Id. at 748; see also id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
296. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996) (plurality
opinion).
297. See id. at 781, 784–87 (Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, & dissenting in part); id. at 817–18 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part & dissenting in part).
298. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e believe it unwise and unnecessary to pick . . . one specific
set of words now”); see also id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding it “unwise to take a categorical
approach to the resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an industry as dynamic as
this”); id. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowledging the plurality’s “unwillingness to announce a
definitive categorical analysis in this case”).
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less stringent than strict scrutiny.299
The Denver plurality’s attempt to revive Pacifica ultimately proved shortlived. The Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.300 appears to have foreclosed the possibility that Pacifica
could serve as a new foundation for according certain media less than full First
Amendment protection. Playboy involved a First Amendment challenge to a
statute requiring cable operators either to “fully scramble or otherwise fully
block” channels that are “primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming” or else to limit their transmission to hours when children were unlikely to
be viewing.301 In sharp contrast to the language in Denver suggesting that some
other standard might apply, the Playboy Court squarely held that all attempts to
regulate indecency on cable television are subject to strict scrutiny.302 In so
holding, the court explicitly abandoned Pacifica’s concern with the ineffectiveness of warnings and returned instead to the view that individuals are expected
to protect themselves from transient exposure to offensive material “‘simply by
averting [our] eyes.’”303 Moreover, because cable and broadcast television are
largely indistinguishable in the extent to which they invade the home and are
accessible to children, the Court’s decision to extend full First Amendment
protection to cable in Playboy can only be regarded as a rejection of the
proposition that either of those considerations justified permitting more intrusive regulation of speech.304
What is perhaps most startling about the Playboy decision is the completeness of the majority’s victory on this point. Writing on behalf of the four
dissenters, Justice Breyer also accepted strict scrutiny as the unquestioned

299. See id. at 733 (stating that regulations must be “appropriately tailored to achieve [a] basic,
legitimate objective”); id. at 741 (noting that regulations must be “address extraordinary problems” and
be “appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction
on speech”); id. at 743 (noting that regulations must “properly address[ ] an extremely important
problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech”); id. (stating that regulations must be a “sufficiently tailored response to an extraordinarily
important problem”). Equally puzzling was the Denver plurality’s willingness to strike down a parallel
provision governing public access channels. For the problems with this portion of the plurality’s
analysis, see supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
300. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
301. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56, 136.
302. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811–14.
303. Id. at 813 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) and citing Erzoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975)).
304. I do not mean to suggest that the Court did not place any emphasis on the extent to which these
two media intruded into the home. In fact, the Court specifically noted that the case turned on the
difference from broadcasting that, “[c]able systems have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a
household-by-household basis.” Id. at 815. Nor do I mean to suggest that accessibility to children
played no part in the Court’s analysis. On the contrary, the Court regarded the feasibility of using
technology to restrict minors’ access to indecent material to be an important consideration. Id. at 814. A
close reading of the opinion reveals, however, that the Court believed that these considerations were
only relevant in evaluating whether the statute in question represented the least restrictive means
available. They played no role in determining the level of First Amendment protection that cable
received.
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standard.305 In the process, Justice Breyer appears to have completely abandoned the language in his Denver plurality indicating that some lower standard
may apply. If anything, Justice Breyer appears to chide the majority for even
suggesting that the applicable standard was at issue.306 It thus seems that,
despite the disagreement in Denver on this very point just five years earlier, the
Court is now unanimous in believing that cable television should receive full
First Amendment protection. Playboy thus seems to foreclose the possibility
that Pacifica will have any applicability to cable television or any other medium
outside of broadcasting.
2. Pacifica’s Questionable Vitality with Respect to Broadcasting
At the same time the Supreme Court was shutting the door on the possibility
that Pacifica might apply to other media, FCC and judicial decisions began to
raise doubts about Pacifica’s vitality with respect to broadcasting as well.
Almost from the time the decision was handed down, the FCC has taken steps
to distance itself from Pacifica.307 Following the announcement of the decision,
the FCC suggested that it was limiting Pacifica to its facts and restricted its
application only to repeated use of the seven expletives at issue in that case.308
As a result, the FCC did not bring any indecency enforcement actions for nearly
a decade.309
Even when FCC interest in indecency enforcement revived in 1987,310 the
305. Id. at 836, 846 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
306. See id. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his case involves the application, not the
elucidation of First Amendment principles” and the application of “established First Amendment law;
. . . [t]he basic, applicable First Amendment principles are not at issue”); id. at 846 (noting that “[t]his
disagreement is not about . . . basic First Amendment principle”).
307. For excellent reviews of the FCC’s early enforcement practices with respect to indecent speech,
see Levi, supra note 72, at 86–112; KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 104–14; Robinson, supra
note 249, at 949–59.
308. See WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254–55 ¶ 10 (1978) (mem. op. & order); see
also Rahall Broad. of Ind., Inc., 94 F.C.C.2d 1162 (1983) (mem. op. & order) (“The Pacifica decision
. . . affords the commission no general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or
identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast.”); Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983) (mem. op. &
order) (“The opinion of the Court [in Pacifica] specifically stated that it was not ruling that ‘an
occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction . . . .’ Applying these principles to the instant case, it
is clear that petitioner failed to make a prima facie case . . . .”); Serv. Broad. Corp., 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 413 (1979) (“While it is true that we may impose sanctions on a licensee who has aired obscene,
indecent, or profane language, we have no factual evidence that this is the case here . . . . [T]he
Commission does not attempt to regulate the rhetorical quality of language spoken on the air.”).
309. See Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 ¶ 4 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (on reconsideration), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT I].
310. In a troika of decisions handed down on the same day, the FCC made three substantive changes
to its indecency standards. First, it made clear that in addition to the repeated use of expletives,
indecency covered other forms of sexually and scatologically oriented speech. See Infinity Broad.
Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2706 ¶ 9 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (ruling that speech can be indecent even in
the absence of expletives if it includes sexual innuendo which, in context, is susceptible of only one
meaning); Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (ruling that speech can
be indecent even in the absence of expletives when it describes or depicts sexual organs or activities);
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agency continued to distance itself from the notion that broadcasting was
subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. Notably, the FCC’s
renewed interest in indecency enforcement coincided with its explicit abandonment of scarcity as a constitutional justification for restricting indecent broadcasts.311 Even more dramatic was the FCC’s rejection of the notion that Pacifica
justified subjecting indecency restrictions on broadcasting to a lower First
Amendment standard than other media.312 Instead, the FCC maintained that the
indecency restrictions that applied to broadcasting were “consistent with the
First Amendment protection applicable to print.”313 After several false starts,314
a series of D.C. Circuit opinions eventually sustained the FCC’s new indecency
initiatives.315 In these cases, however, the court agreed that strict scrutiny
applied to regulations restricting indecency on broadcasting in the same way
that it applied to similar restrictions on other media.316
Since that time, there has been only one judicial challenge to the merits of an
FCC indecency determination,317 and that case held that restrictions on the
broadcast of indecent material are subject to strict scrutiny.318 The FCC settled
that case after the district court denied its motion to summarily dispose of the
constitutional challenge, agreeing as a condition of that settlement to publish
more definitive industry guidance regarding its enforcement policies with re-

Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699–700 ¶ 13 (1987) (mem. op. & order) (ruling that speech
can be indecent in the absence of expletives if it describes or depicts sexual or excretory functions in a
manner patently offensive under contemporary community standards). Second, the FCC signaled a
greater willingness to apply its indecency regulations to programs broadcast after ten p.m. See Pacifica,
2 F.C.C.R. at 2699–700 ¶ 16, 2701 ¶ 25; Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2704 ¶ 6. Third, the
FCC appeared to extend its indecency decision to cover children over the age of twelve. See Pacifica, 2
F.C.C.R. at 2699–700 ¶ 16; Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2704 n.10; Infinity, 2 F.C.C.R. at
2707 n.14.
311. Pacifica, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699 ¶ 11.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (vacating and remanding the FCC’s decision to regulate
indecent programs broadcast after ten p.m.); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504,
1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter ACT II] (vacating and remanding subsequent FCC order implementing statute calling for complete ban on broadcast indecency).
315. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1337–40 (upholding the FCC’s revised definition of indecency); Action for
Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 664–69 (1995) (en banc) [hereinafter ACT III] (upholding
construing indecency as also protecting children aged twelve through seventeen and upholding prohibition of the broadcast of indecent speech between six a.m. and ten p.m.); Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1259–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter ACT IV] (upholding FCC’s
procedure for enforcing the indecency statutes).
316. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1343 n.18; ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509; ACT III, 58 F.3d at 659–60; ACT IV, 59
F.3d at 1252; id. at 1263 (Edwards, C.J., concurring with reservations). But see ACT IV, 59 F.3d at 1262
(noting but declining to rely on the district court’s contention that broadcasting received a lower degree
of First Amendment protection than print).
317. See ACT IV, 59 F.3d at 1254 (noting that United States v. Evergreen Media Corp., 832 F. Supp.
1183 (N.D. Ill. 1983), represented the only judicial challenge to an FCC indecency action); Robert
Corn-Revere, Eye of the Beholder, BROAD. & CABLE, Apr. 16, 2001, at 30 (same).
318. Evergreen, 832 F. Supp. at 1184.
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spect to broadcast indecency.319 When the FCC finally issued industry guidance
seven years later,320 it again recognized that all attempts to restrict broadcast
indecency were subject to strict scrutiny.321 The FCC’s and the courts’ willingness to subject restrictions on broadcast indecency to strict scrutiny cannot
easily be squared with Pacifica’s suggestion that such programming is subject to
a lower First Amendment standard. Instead, it suggests that, although Pacifica
continues to influence the way the applicable legal principles play out in each
particular factual context, it no longer serves as a justification for deviating from
the strict scrutiny standard that applies to all other media.
C. THE TECHNOLOGICAL EVISCERATION OF PACIFICA

In addition to the analytical and doctrinal shortcomings of the Pacifica
opinion discussed above, two technological developments raise further questions about Pacifica’s continuing vitality. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that Pacifica does not apply when viewers are unlikely to encounter
indecent speech by accident and when prior warnings are likely to be effective.322 The Court has also emphasized that prohibitions of indecent speech
cannot stand when alternative means exist that enable individual viewers to
control what they see and hear.323 This is true even if individual viewers must
take affirmative steps to protect themselves and their families from inadvertent
exposure to such speech and if the means of self-protection are not foolproof.324
319. See Indus. Guidance on Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement
Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8016 n.23 (2001) [hereinafter Indus. Guidance].
320. This occurred despite the FCC’s promise to issue such guidance within nine months. See
Corn-Revere, supra note 317, at 30.
321. Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8000 ¶ 3. The FCC’s issuance of this industry guidance
appears to have signaled renewed interest in indecency enforcement, as the FCC issued Notice of
Apparent Liability to radio stations for broadcasting a cleaned-up version of Eminem’s song, “The Real
Slim Shady,” as well as Sarah Jones’s anti-misogynist rap protest, “Your Revolution.” See KBOO
Found., 16 F.C.C.R. 10731 (2001) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture); Bill McConnell, FCC
Hip-Hop Deep in #@!*, BROAD. & CABLE, July 9, 2001, at 28. Those proceedings may provide another
opportunity for judicial confirmation that broadcasting should receive full First Amendment protection.
Although the FCC eventually rescinded its action with respect to Eminem, see Citadel Broad. Co., 17
F.C.C.R. 483, 485–86 ¶¶ 8–9 (2002) (mem. op. & order), its action against Sarah Jones’s work appears
destined to end up in the courts, see Bill McConnell, Rapper Sues FCC, BROAD. & CABLE, Feb. 4, 2002,
at 16.
322. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 823–26 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 867, 869–70 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28
(1989); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
323. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816; Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 756 (1996) (plurality opinion); Sable, 492 U.S. at 128; Rowan, 397 U.S. at
736–37.
324. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824 (“It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a consumer to
take action, or may be inconvenient, or may not go perfectly every time.”); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at
876–77 (noting that, as an alternative to the Child Decency Act, “the District Court found that ‘despite
its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by
which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which
parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available.’” (emphasis in
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Once such means exist, the proper balance of First Amendment interests places
the burden on parents and viewers to take the appropriate steps.
These doctrinal considerations underscore the potential constitutional significance of technologies that increase viewers’ ability to control what appears on
their television sets. The emerging dominance of multichannel video providers,
such as cable television and DBS,325 has greatly enhanced the ability of
audiences to tailor their viewing environment to their personal preferences. The
protection from exposure to unwanted programming is not complete, however,
because filtering by changing the channel still involves some fleeting contact
with unwanted material. Although the weight of Supreme Court authority
suggests that such transient exposure lacks constitutional significance, the issue
is not completely free from doubt.326
Regardless of the final resolution of that debate, the emergence of technologies that allow viewers to screen out unwanted programming promises to offer a
more definitive interment of the rationales in Pacifica for according a lower
degree of First Amendment protection. The most important of these is the
development of the “V-chip,” which if properly programmed can block the
display of programs receiving particular content ratings. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 started in motion the steps necessary to make the V-chip
universal, first by requiring that all television sets over thirteen inches manufactured in January 2000 or later contain a V-chip,327 and second by essentially
requiring the industry to establish a rating system.328 The bulk of the scholar-

original)); Sable, 492 U.S. at 128–29 (refusing to uphold legislation denying adults access to “dial-aporn” when it found credit card, access code, and scrambling rules a “less restrictive means, short of a
total ban, to achieve the government’s interest in protecting minors”).
325. As noted earlier, MVPDs have now captured well over 80% of all U.S. households. See supra
note 178 and accompanying text.
326. Compare supra notes 257–67, 283–88, 303 and accompanying text (noting that Cohen,
Erzoznik, Rowan, Bolger, Sable, Reno, and Playboy did not regard the possibility of transient exposure
as sufficient to justify restrictions on speech), with supra notes 86, 256, 293 and accompanying text
(noting the contrary conclusion drawn by Pacifica and the Denver plurality opinion).
327. 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2000).
328. The statute gave the broadcast industry one year in which to implement a voluntary rating
system. If it failed to do so, the FCC would promulgate one itself. Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(e)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 56, 139–42 (originally codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)).
The major networks subsequently agreed to a rating system. The system initially adopted by the
industry employed six basic ratings based on age: TV-Y for young children, TV-Y7 for children 7 and
younger, TV-G for general audiences, TV-PG to suggest parental guidance, TV-14 for kids 14 and older,
and TV-MA for mature audiences only. The industry later agreed to supplement the basic ratings with a
series of content codes: S for sex, V for violence, L for foul language, D for sexual innuendo, and FV
for fantasy violence in programs for children 7 and older. See Implementation of Section 551 of
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 8232 (1998); Paige Albiniak, Ratings Get
Revamped: Networks, Except for NBC, Agree to Add Content Labels, BROAD. & CABLE, July 14, 1997,
at 4. All of the broadcast networks have agreed to implement the age-based ratings and all except NBC
have agreed to use the content codes. Among cable networks, only Black Entertainment Television,
QVC, and the Home Shopping Network have refused to rate their programs. See Bill McConnell,
Non-Violent TV, BROAD. & CABLE, Feb. 7, 2000, at 40. The scholarly consensus, even among those who
advocate self-regulation by the broadcast industry, concedes that the ratings are properly regarded as
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ship on the V-chip has focused on the constitutionality of Congress’s decision to
mandate its installation and, in effect, to require program ratings.329 What has
largely escaped scholarly attention is that, at least with respect to television,
widescale deployment of the V-chip will render all attempts to restrict the
broadcast of indecent programming unconstitutional. As newer televisions displace older sets, the V-chip should effectively prevent those who do not wish to
be exposed to indecent speech from encountering such speech by accident. In
addition, as the Court held in Playboy, the technological ability to block
unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis “enables the Government to support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment
interests of speakers and willing listeners.”330 As a result, as recognized in the
only portion of the Denver opinion that commanded a majority of the Court, the
V-chip constitutes a less restrictive means sufficient to render any ban on
indecent speech unconstitutional.331
In addition, a new technology known as video-on-demand (VOD) promises
to reduce the danger of unwanted exposure to indecent speech even further.
When fully deployed, VOD will give viewers total control over the programming that enters their homes. As a result, it promises to transform television
from a “push” technology, in which control over what speech will be conveyed
resides with media companies, into—at least in part—a “pull” technology, in
which individuals decide for themselves which programs they would like to see.
Unfortunately, widescale deployment of VOD is not yet feasible. In the meantime, MVPDs are in the process of deploying a related technology known as
near video-on-demand (NVOD) that provides some of the same functionality.
Unlike pure VOD, which is a point-to-point service that allows a content
provider to deliver a particular program to a particular customer on request,
NVOD is a point-to-multipoint service in which customers can select from
among a broad range of viewing choices offered by the content provider.
Providing the same range of options to all viewers allows NVOD to use
bandwidth more efficiently than VOD. It remains an interactive, pull-oriented
service that gives the audience greater control of what is viewed. Current
NVOD options are relatively limited, consisting mainly of a small number of
pay-per-view offerings. The FCC’s most recent annual assessment of the televi-

the product of a state mandate. See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM.
L.J. 711, 755–56 (1999); Spitzer, supra note 36, at 436–54; Denise R. Polivy, Note and Comment,
Virtue by Machine: A First Amendment Analysis of the V-Chip Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1749, 1761–73 (1997).
329. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filers, the V-Chip and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45
DUKE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1996); Edwards & Berman, supra note 253, at 1514–15; Spitzer, supra note 36,
at 454–90; Polivy, supra note 328, at 1773–79.
330. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
331. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 756 (1996) (noting that the
impending arrival of the V-chip suggests that the segregation and blocking requirement imposed by
statute was not sufficiently tailored); see also Edwards & Berman, supra note 253, at 1513–14 (noting
that the V-chip promised to “‘empower’ parents to regulate all aspects of their children’s viewing”).
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sion industry indicates that cable and DBS providers are investing large amounts
of capital in an effort to make available a wider range of NVOD services.332
As the television programming received increasingly becomes the product of
the desires of each individual household, the justifications for governmental
intervention to prevent accidental contact with unwanted speech weaken. In so
arguing, I do not mean to overstate my case. It is quite possible that some
viewers may prefer that television be a predominantly passive experience.333 As
a result, it is not yet possible to determine precisely where along the push-pull
spectrum television will ultimately settle. In time, however, the increase in
viewers’ ability to control what they see will eventually alter the constitutional
analysis by undermining the basic reasons announced in Pacifica for subjecting
broadcasting to a different level of First Amendment scrutiny.
It thus appears that the pervasiveness and accessibility rationales of Pacifica
are in the process of being overrun by technology, as well as by theory and
doctrine in almost precisely the same manner as the scarcity doctrine. As of
today, however, Pacifica remains good law, and regulatory authorities remain
free to advance policies based on it. This danger may be more real than is
generally recognized: Three of the five current FCC Commissioners have
recently issued public calls for greater restrictions on indecent programming.334
It is thus clear that until the Supreme Court formally abandons Pacifica, that
decision is likely to continue to be invoked as a basis for allowing the level of
First Amendment scrutiny to vary technology by technology.
IV. BEYOND SCARCITY AND PACIFICA: THE TURN TO CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
The collapse of the traditional justifications for holding broadcasting to a
lower First Amendment standard has led scholars to search for new constitutional bases for the Broadcast Model. Drawing inspiration from the statement in
Red Lion contending that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount,”335 these scholars have offered a
new basis for holding broadcasting to a lesser level of First Amendment
scrutiny rooted in the needs of democratic self-governance. This Part analyzes
such efforts through the work of Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein, who have
offered the most elaborate theories of this kind.
According to Fiss, the conventional wisdom holding that the First Amendment protects the autonomy of speakers for its own sake is simply wrong.
Rather, he argues, the true central value of the First Amendment is the promo332. Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming,
Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1264–65 ¶¶ 40–41, 1271 ¶ 54, 1286–87 ¶ 92, 1292–93 ¶ 103,
1318–21 ¶¶ 187–90, 1322–23 ¶ 194 (2002).
333. OWEN, supra note 182, at 8, 10–11, 218–20.
334. See Bill McConnell, Critics Are Out for (No) Blood on TV, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 27, 2003, at
1; Siobhan McDonough, Too Much Indecency Allowed on Airwaves, FCC Commissioner Says, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 22, 2002, at A11.
335. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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tion of the robust public debate needed to support democratic decisionmaking.336 As Fiss puts it, “[a]utonomy is protected not because of its intrinsic
value, . . . but rather as a means or instrument of collective self-determination.
We allow people to speak so others can vote.”337 The circumstances that existed
when the First Amendment came of age, however, caused courts and commentators to confuse the true end of the First Amendment with the means used to
promote that end. At that time, access to speech venues was easy and the social
structure relatively decentralized. In such a world, courts could safeguard the
proper functioning of the democratic process simply by protecting the autonomy of speakers, because doing so typically represented the best available
means for fostering robust public debate.338 The identity of these interests
eventually came to be enshrined in the doctrinal rule against content regulation,
which Fiss acknowledges emerged as “the cornerstone of the Free Speech
Tradition.”339
When the focus shifts from the street corner speaker to CBS, Fiss argues, the
opportunities for communication become much more limited. In such a world,
an autonomy-based First Amendment that conceives of free speech as a shield
around the speaker necessarily sanctions the crowding out of other speech.340
Even more problematic in Fiss’s eyes is the growing inequality in the distribution of power that he believes characterizes the social structure of contemporary
society.341 In such a world, protecting autonomy will only induce what Charles
Lindblom called “circularity,” in which both markets and governmental processes tend to reflect and reinforce the existing social structure.342 In such a
world, the congruence between the autonomy principle and the public debate
principle disappears. Quite the contrary, the two principles often become antagonistic because the protection of autonomy may cause the public debate to
become decidedly one-sided and insufficiently robust.343
As a result, Fiss argues that if the First Amendment is truly to promote
democratic self-determination, fundamental jurisprudential changes are required. Because autonomy can no longer serve as a proxy for the promotion of
robust public debate, we as a society must promote public debate more directly.
In addition, the law should recognize that private entities can threaten free
speech values to the same extent as the government. As a result, Fiss argues that
it is appropriate to look to the state not just as an enemy of speech, but rather as
a possible means for mitigating the obstacles to robust public debate created by

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 13–17, 36–38.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12–13, 37–38.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 10, 23, 43.
Id. at 13–14, 19.
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private ordering.344 Fiss does not offer much detail about the circumstances
under which such governmental intervention would be appropriate and the form
that such intervention would take, aside from offering a fairly general endorsement of the existing scheme of broadcast regulation.345 He simply suggests that
the government could regulate speech in a manner similar to a parliamentarian
at a town meeting.346 A more complete definition of what constitutes robust
public debate would be helpful, but is not strictly necessary. Concerns about the
quality of public discourse under the current regime provide enough impetus for
action.347
Sunstein offers a similar critique of the existing autonomy-oriented approach
to the First Amendment. Although Sunstein identifies certain features that cause
broadcast markets to fail,348 he focuses the bulk of his analysis on noneconomic
considerations. Specifically, Sunstein argues that when properly understood, the
First Amendment is designed to ensure that citizens are exposed to the types of
communication they need to participate in a deliberative democracy.349 Indeed,
the history of the First Amendment up until the 1970s can be seen as an ongoing
debate between this vision of free speech and an alternate vision that viewed the
First Amendment as protecting individual autonomy. In the 1980s, however, the
autonomy vision prevailed and freedom of speech has ever since become
increasingly identified with the preservation of free economic markets.350 In
Sunstein’s opinion, the results of this shift have been catastrophic. Television
news has alternately become either overly sensationalized or unduly focused on
such trivial matters as entertainment personalities and “human impact” anecdotes. Coverage of political campaigns has largely been reduced to a monistic
focus on “horse race” issues, and statements by political candidates have
deteriorated into mere “sound bites” rather than a serious discussion of the
issues.351
The reasons for the destitution of the media are clear to Sunstein. A First
Amendment that equates speech with economic markets strives to satisfy what
individuals want. The choices we make as individuals, however, do not necessarily coincide with what we need as citizens actively engaged in a public
discourse.352 In addition, Sunstein argues that, while the economic approach
largely takes individual preferences as exogenous, individual media preferences
are in reality the product of the type of programming that is currently being

344. Id. at 19–20, 39–41.
345. Id. at 149.
346. Id. at 85, 101, 117–19, 153; FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 24, at 21–24.
347. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 16, 26.
348. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 62–71; Sunstein, supra note 23, at
514–17.
349. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at xvi–xix, 18–20.
350. Id. at 3–8.
351. Id. at 58–67.
352. Id. at 18; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 520.
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broadcast.353 Consequently, Sunstein argues that using the media’s ability to
satisfy existing preferences as the measure of current performance is ultimately
somewhat circular, in that it effectively allows the status quo to serve as its own
justification.354 Taking existing preferences as exogenous also suffers from a
different problem, in that it takes existing distribution of wealth as given. As
such, it is analogous to the willingness to regard the current distribution of
common law entitlements as a neutral constitutional baseline that was rejected
during the New Deal.355
Sunstein’s solution to this state of affairs is to return to a “Madisonian” vision
of the First Amendment that focuses not on promoting individual autonomy, but
rather on promoting the broad communication about matters of public concern
needed to facilitate democratic decisionmaking.356 To accomplish this, the
government should be permitted to foster broad and deep attention to public
issues, as well as public exposure to an appropriate diversity of views.357 In
addition, Sunstein argues that his approach would require distinguishing between political speech, which would receive the highest degree of protection,
and nonpolitical speech, which necessarily plays a lesser role in fostering
democratic deliberation.358 Sunstein offers little guidance as to how to deploy
such a program, calling the remedies “obscure” and “far from clear.”359 Instead,
Sunstein advocates a “frankly experimental approach”360 and tentatively proposes a series of possible remedial measures.361 Uncertainty about the precise
steps to be taken should not prevent the government from taking action. When
confronted with a system that is so clearly imperfect, something must be
done.362
A number of common features unite both Fiss’s and Sunstein’s visions of free
speech. Both view speech in largely instrumental terms, valuing it for its
contribution to other, more fundamental principles rather than as an end in and
of itself. In addition, both hold similar views about the fundamental principle
that free speech is supposed to promote. In contrast to other instrumental
theories, such as the one advanced by Holmes and Mill that favors protecting
speech to promote the search for truth,363 Fiss and Sunstein agree that the true
meta-value underlying our commitment to free speech is the proper functioning

353. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 74.
354. Id. at 19, 71–74.
355. Id. at 28–34, 178–79.
356. Id. at xvi–xix.
357. Id. at 20–21.
358. Id. at 9, 122–23, 130–37.
359. Id. at 21.
360. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 221.
361. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 35, 43, 81–88.
362. Id. at 21, 89; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 222.
363. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); JOHN STUART MILL,
On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 5, 26–44 (Richard Wollheim ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859).
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of the democratic process.364 Both generally endorse the existing scheme of
broadcast regulation, possibly augmented by the restoration of mandatory rights
of reply, greater support for public television, additional limitations to campaign
contributions, and improved coverage of political issues, perhaps encompassing
free air time for politicians.365 Both endorse adopting a less hostile attitude
towards governmental interference with private speech. In their view, if an
obstacle to democratic self-governance exists, it makes little difference whether
the obstacle is the result of private ordering rather than state action.366 As a
result, both Fiss and Sunstein call for eliminating the current doctrine’s presumption against content-based restrictions of speech367 and compelled speech.368
Both argue that the unique role that television plays in the public discourse
justifies the application of a different constitutional standard.369 In particular,
their general acceptance of government intervention leads them to find the
licensing of speakers largely unproblematic.370 Finally, although both profess
uncertainty about the specific remedies to be applied, both concur that the
current state of affairs is so dire that something must be done.371
This Part will analyze Fiss’s and Sunstein’s theories and assess their potential
as an alternative basis for upholding the constitutionality of the Broadcast
Model. In particular, I will focus on what I believe to be the three major
shortcomings of their proposals. Section A offers a critique from outside the
civic republican model by evaluating the extent to which Fiss and Sunstein
respond to arguments that view autonomy to be a central free speech value. The
role of individual autonomy and the proper way to reconcile it with collective
decisionmaking have represented one of the dominant theoretical questions in
First Amendment theory over the last half century. My concern is that, upon

364. Fiss’s embrace of the instrumental vision of free speech is open and unqualified. FISS,
LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 36–38. Sunstein is more circumspect, but only on the margin.
Although Sunstein reserves the possibility of other values underlying free speech, SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 129–30, he would accommodate those values only by
adjusting the lower level of protection he would accord to nonpolitical speech rather than by adjusting
the higher level of protection that his approach would extend to political speech. Id. at 129–30, 135–36,
147–48.
365. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 19, 22, 149, 152; FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra
note 24, at 56; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 35, 43, 81–88; SUNSTEIN,
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 221–22; Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2470 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 23, at 525.
366. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 18–23, 38–41; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE
SPEECH, supra note 23, at 34.
367. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 19, 152–53; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH,
supra note 23, at 178–79.
368. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 155–57; FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 24,
at 68, 82–83; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 46–48.
369. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 1217; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 527–31.
370. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 17, 19, 51, 150; FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra
note 24, at 64 (arguing that licensing is irrelevant to the scope of regulatory authority); SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 108–10 (same).
371. See supra notes 347, 362 and accompanying text.
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close analysis, Fiss and Sunstein, for the most part, simply assume away the
conflict between the individual and the collective will. To the extent that they
engage this conflict at all, they do so in terms inconsistent with the values of
democracy they purport to support.
Moving to a critique from inside the civic republican model, section B argues
that even if one accepts the instrumental vision of speech proposed by Fiss and
Sunstein, their proposals are too incompletely articulated to provide much
concrete policy guidance. The result is an approach to regulation that is
essentially ad hoc and all too dependent on direct normative value judgments
that Fiss and Sunstein fail to articulate clearly, let alone defend. Finally, section
C argues that Fiss and Sunstein have failed to come to grips with certain
limitations to their theories imposed by recent technological developments.
Simply put, the increase in the number of available media outlets and the
impending arrival of video-on-demand promise to prevent television from
playing the transformative role that Fiss and Sunstein envision.
A. CRITIQUES FROM OUTSIDE THE MODEL: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY

The central premise of the work of both Fiss and Sunstein is that the First
Amendment exists to serve the democratic process. They view speech as a
means towards promoting this value rather than an end in and of itself. To the
extent that other First Amendment values exist, they are subordinate to this
fundamental commitment. To the extent that autonomy conflicts with the needs
of the democratic process, it simply must give way.372
This is a powerful vision of free speech that traces back to Alexander
Meiklejohn and Harry Kalven.373 It appears to have played a role in such
landmark decisions as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC374 and New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.375 This vision of the First Amendment has also proven to
be quite controversial. Free speech theorists have long disputed the extent to
which promoting the democratic process constitutes the central value of the
First Amendment. A number of powerful theories have emerged that value
speech as an end unto itself rather than as a means for promoting other values.
This section evaluates Fiss’s and Sunstein’s attempts to come to grips with
these alternative, autonomy-based visions of free speech. It begins by describing the major autonomy-based theories, including those theories incorporating
hybrid approaches that attempt to combine both descriptive and ascriptive
visions of free speech. It then analyzes the specific ways in which Fiss and

372. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 146; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra
note 23, at 81; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 220.
373. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191; Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245.
374. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
375. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Sunstein attempt to reconcile their positions with autonomy. Upon close analysis, it becomes clear that their primary analytical gambit is to assume the
problem away by positing that individual choices and the outcome of the
collective decisionmaking processes will tend to converge. As a result, both of
their theories to fail to engage the conflict between the individual and the
collective will that has long represented one of the foremost problems of liberal
political theory.
1. Theories of Autonomy
This subsection presents the major autonomy-based approaches to the First
Amendment. It begins by describing the two major variants of such theories,
which include those that treat autonomy as an indispensable attribute of individual dignity and those that believe autonomy’s status as a free speech value
follows inexorably from our commitment to a democratic form of government.
It then outlines a number of hybrid models that combine autonomy with
descriptive approaches to the First Amendment.
a. Deontological Theories of Autonomy. First and foremost, Fiss and Sunstein
view the First Amendment in terms of whether individuals are able to gain
exposure to the speech needed to participate in democratic self-governance in a
meaningful way. Viewed in this manner, freedom of speech is largely a descriptive concept that refers to an empirical condition that must be achieved. Their
work contrasts directly with scholars who have drawn on the Kantian precept
that all individuals be respected as ends unto themselves376 to construct theories
that view free speech as an irreducible attribute of personal sovereignty. Under
these theories, autonomy is not a condition that is attained, but rather an
entitlement that is ascribed to people based either on moral grounds flowing
from the need to respect each individual as an independent moral agent or on
political grounds resulting from their status as constituent members of the
democratic body politic. The result is an ascriptive vision of the First Amendment that respects autonomy regardless of whether it furthers any particular
instrumental value.377 The most forceful statement of this position appears in
the work of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin rejects views that “treat[ ] free speech as
376. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *428 (James W. Ellington trans.,
Hackett 2d ed. 1983) (1785). For a helpful analysis of Kant’s theory of free speech, see Christina E.
Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997).
377. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE § 40, at 251–57 (1971); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 165–74
(1986); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 225, 233 (1992); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223, 227, 232–34, 240–44 (1985); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204, 213–22 (1972). For general discussions on the distinction between ascriptive and
descriptive visions of liberty and autonomy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46
STAN. L. REV. 875, 877–78 (1994); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake Individual Autonomy and the
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1129–33 (1993).

2003]

THE TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC FIRST AMENDMENT

313

important instrumentally, that is, not because people have any intrinsic moral
right to say what they wish, but because allowing them to do so will produce
good effects for the rest of us.”378 Instead, Dworkin argues in favor of a First
Amendment that values autonomy in general, and speech in particular, because
it is an “essential and ‘constitutive’ feature of a just political society that
government treat all its adult members . . . as responsible moral agents.”379
Dworkin’s dignitary vision of free speech has two aspects. The first aspect
focuses on people’s moral responsibility to “mak[e] up their own minds about
what is good or bad in life or in politics, or what is true and false in matters of
justice or faith.”380 The existence of this obligation implies that “[g]overnment
insults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it decrees that
they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous
or offensive convictions.”381 The second aspect focuses on the more active role
of the individual as speaker. From this perspective, moral responsibility carries
with it “a responsibility not only to form convictions of one’s own, but to
express these to others.”382 A government that “disqualifies some people from
exercising” their responsibility to form and communicate their own convictions
“on the ground that their convictions make them unworthy participants” forfeits
much of its claim to legitimacy.383 The vision of a “liberal society committed to
individual moral responsibility” thus requires that the rejection of “any censorship on grounds of content,” even if it involves speech that we loathe.384
b. Democratic Theories of Autonomy. Other scholars have argued that respect
for autonomy as an independent value is necessarily implicit in our commitment
to democracy. For example, Martin Redish argues that “the concept of democracy itself is ultimately premised on a belief that individuals are capable of
exercising control over decisions that directly affect their lives and morally
deserve to do so.”385 Autonomy would thus seem to go hand in hand with
democracy as a matter of definition because in the absence of a commitment to
autonomy, it is difficult to see why society would adopt a democratic system of

378. RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 199–200 (1996).
379. Id. at 200; see also id. at 7 (arguing that freedom of speech represents an indispensable aspect
of “treat[ing] all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political status”).
380. Id. at 200.
381. Id.; see also id. (arguing that “withholding an opinion from us on the ground that we are not fit
to hear and consider it” thus deprives us of “our dignity, as individuals”).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 205.
385. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19–29 (1984). He has since
published articles using his theory to critique the work of Fiss and Sunstein. See Redish & Kaludis,
supra note 99, at 1107–10, 1119–21; Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and
the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV 267,
284–90 (1991).
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government in the first place.386 Indeed, Redish argues: “Since a belief in
societal self-determination underlies our entire political system and constitutional structure, however, we cannot reject that belief without simultaneously
rejecting the American form of government. Such logic would necessarily
constitute a rejection of the first amendment, rather than an interpretation of
it.”387
Robert Post offers a similar argument that focuses less on the direct relationship between autonomy and democracy and more on the role speech plays in the
democratic process. In Post’s view, speech allows “democracy . . . to reconcile
individual autonomy with collective self-determination” by “instill[ing] in citizens a sense of participation, legitimacy, and identification” sufficient to induce
them to support the substantive outcomes of the political process even when
they disagree with such outcomes.388 This constitutive vision of speech necessarily “presupposes that those participating in public discourse are free and autonomous” because, without such autonomy, it is impossible to see how the public
discourse could possibly mediate between the individual and the collective
will.389 As a result, Post argues that democratically based theories of free speech
entail an ascription of autonomy for its own sake, and all attempts to regulate
speech on the grounds that individuals cannot fully participate in the political
process “contradict the central premise of our democratic enterprise.”390
c. Hybrid Theories of Autonomy. It is particularly telling that even scholars
who, like Fiss and Sunstein, are willing to treat the promotion of healthy
democratic processes as a First Amendment value have generally regarded it as
only one of several competing values.391 For example, Thomas Emerson rejected the notion that freedom of expression amounted to nothing more than “a
386. REDISH, supra note 385, at 21; see also Redish & Kaludis, supra note 99, at 1121 (“Absent
personal intellectual autonomy, the individual members of society cannot make truly free choices.
Absent the individual citizens’ ability to make such free choices, the concept of a democratic society is
rendered incoherent.”).
387. Redish & Lippman, supra note 385, at 276; see also id. at 273–74 (arguing that “baseline free
speech principles are so centrally intertwined with the values that underlie our political structure—
popular sovereignty and self–determination—that abandoning the former would be impossible without
weakening or abandoning the latter”).
388. Post, supra note 377, at 1115.
389. Id. at 1128.
390. Id. at 1132.
391. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 35–46, 60–72, 85–86 (1982)
(critiquing free speech arguments based on democracy and individuality and finding it unnecessary to
accord primacy to either one); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away
from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (reviewing and
rejecting First Amendment theories based on promoting democratic processes and individual autonomy
in favor of an eclectic approach to the First Amendment); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171 (1993) (advocating a theory of free speech that combines concern for
autonomy with an instrumental distrust of government intervention); see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987) (reviewing the
work of Baker and Redish and advocating the rejection of foundation theories in favor of resolving
First Amendment disputes through practical reason).

2003]

THE TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC FIRST AMENDMENT

315

technique for arriving at better social judgments through democratic procedures,”392 arguing instead that freedom of expression at the same time encompassed the value of self-fulfillment.393 Similarly, after offering a powerful
synthesis of the existing descriptive and ascriptive visions of free speech,
Richard Fallon argues that each is simultaneously fundamental, yet irreconcilable and irreducible to a common metric. As a result, Fallon calls for a
balancing approach.394 In so arguing, Fallon explicitly rejects Fiss’s and Sunstein’s attempts to reject autonomy as a value. As Fallon notes, despite their best
efforts, Fiss and Sunstein “cannot sensibly advocate enlightened democracy at
the expense of autonomy; to do so would get the order of values backwards.”395
C. Edwin Baker advances the most multifaceted and nuanced hybrid argument. For individuals, Baker views free speech in largely deontological terms.
Like Dworkin, Baker argues that “the key ethical postulate” underlying the First
Amendment is that “respect for individual integrity and autonomy requires the
recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to
influence or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values.”396
As a result, Baker rejects as inherently illegitimate any collective practice that is
inconsistent with treating each person as morally independent.397
At the same time, Baker augments his dignitary vision of individual autonomy with arguments based in the democratic process that are reminiscent of
Redish’s and Post’s. Under this view, “[d]emocratic decision making gives each
person the same potential say in results, a say that properly would represent the
person’s autonomous choice or commitment.”398 Thus, the “normally accepted
account of our constitutionalism” necessarily “treats certain values—human
dignity, respect for individuals[’] equality and autonomy—as fundamental and
directs that democracy must operate within the constraint of respect for these
values.”399 The very existence of a democratic system of government, therefore,
presupposes certain “fundamental constitutional restraints on democratic choice”
that are based in autonomy.400
392. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (1966).
393. Id. at 4–7, 8–11, 14–15 (acknowledging both individual self-fulfillment and participation in
decisionmaking as free speech values while declining to settle on a single foundation value).
394. Fallon, supra note 377, at 899–901.
395. Id. at 884.
396. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989). Baker elaborates as
follows: “Respect for people as autonomous agents implies that people should be viewed as responsible
for, and given maximal liberty in, choosing how to use their bodies to develop and express themselves;
and should be given an equal right to try to influence the nature of their collective worlds.” Id. at 58–59.
397. Id. at 48–49.
398. Id. at 49.
399. Id. at 50; see also id. at 49 (reasoning that “the practices of democratic decision making . . . can
often be understood as properly implementing equal respect for persons as autonomous agents”); C.
Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (1998) (arguing that
“popular participation or, at least, real opportunity for participation is crucial . . . to maintain a popular
sense of government . . . . [This] legitimizing practice must include participatory democracy—only this
process recognizes both people’s right to choose [autonomy] and people’s equality as to this fight”).
400. BAKER, supra note 396, at 50.
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Although Baker views individual speech in largely ascriptive terms, he
refuses to extend this view to corporate speech on the grounds that liberty is a
personal attribute that does not apply to collective institutions.401 However,
Baker does make an exception for media corporations, in light of the unique
role envisioned for the Fourth Estate by the Press Clause.402 With respect to the
press, Baker argues that the government should promote what he calls “Complex Democracy,” which is an intermediate position that attempts to capture the
best elements of what he calls “Liberal Pluralist Democracy,” which treats
values as exogenous to politics and looks to the democratic process to mediate
among the varying conceptions of the good, and what he terms “Republican
Democracy” of the type advocated by Fiss and Sunstein.403
As the existence of these alternative theories demonstrates, the vision of free
speech upon which Fiss and Sunstein rely is far from self-evident. Many
theorists would object to their attempt to place democratic decisionmaking at
the center of the First Amendment, and many of those who would not object
would nonetheless repudiate the instrumental, descriptive vision of free speech
that they propose. Equally telling is that most of those theorists who do not
reflexively object to governmental attempts to regulate speech in ways that
promote collective self-determination still recognize that the needs of the
democratic process must be balanced against the needs of individual autonomy.
The attractiveness of Fiss’s and Sunstein’s theories thus turns largely on their
ability to come to grips with these autonomy-based visions of free speech. The
balance of this section will examine Fiss’s and Sunstein’s attempts to do so.
2. Fiss on Autonomy
It should now be clear that the democratically oriented vision of free speech
upon which Fiss relies represents one of the most highly contested issues in free
speech theory. Unfortunately, Fiss fails to offer much in the way of theoretical
justification for it. For the most part, Fiss simply posits his vision of free speech,
at some points categorically averring that it represents the dominant perspective404 and at other points calling it “almost axiomatic.”405 To the extent that
Fiss engages autonomy-based arguments at all, he discards them in a somewhat
conclusory manner. He simply declares that autonomy is “protected not because
of its intrinsic value, . . . but rather as a means or instrument of collective
self-determination.”406 Fiss later makes explicit what this argument already
clearly implied: “In fact autonomy adds nothing, and if need be, might have to
be sacrificed, to make certain that public debate is sufficiently rich to permit

401. Id. at 200–31; C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 66–72.
402. See BAKER, supra note 396, at 225–49; Baker, supra note 401, at 80–81.
403. Baker, supra note 399, at 327–40.
404. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 13, 36–37.
405. Id. at 114.
406. Id. at 13.
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true collective self-determination.”407 To the extent that the speech people
choose fails to reflect democratic values, little is lost by failing to respect that
choice.408
Autonomy thus falls away as an independent value not by virtue of any
sustained analysis, but rather as a byproduct of the central value that Fiss simply
declares to be at the heart of the First Amendment. It seems quite problematic to
dispose of one of the central questions of free speech theory through the use of a
simple ipse dixit.409 Fiss’s refusal to engage the larger debate surrounding the
role of autonomy in the First Amendment is made more troubling by his central
commitment to democracy. As noted earlier, many scholars who have begun
from the same starting point have found autonomy to be a necessary concomitant rather than a potential obstacle to democracy.
Equally debatable is the particular vision of democracy embedded in Fiss’s
work. By Fiss’s own admission, his vision of the way speech interacts with the
political process is entirely listener-based, perhaps best captured in the pithy
statement, “[w]e allow people to speak so others can vote.”410 As Robert Post
has pointed out, this “offers a strikingly passive image of the democratic
citizen”411 that does not take democracy’s participatory dimensions into account. The omission is important because “[i]ndividual citizens can identify
with the creation of a collective will only if they believe that collective
decisionmaking is in some way connected to their own individual selfdetermination.”412 Active participation thus provides the means through which
people reconcile themselves with collective decisions with which they personally disagree.413
In fact, Fiss’s summary rejection of autonomy is part of a far more fundamental desire to reorder the basic constitutional relationship between the individual
and the state. Fiss claims not to disturb the sharp dichotomy between state and
citizen presupposed by classical liberalism.414 Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that this disclaimer cannot be taken at face value. Under the classic
conception of liberalism, liberty is equated with freedom from governmental
interference. Fiss’s vision of free speech demands more. He claims that the state
bears an obligation to provide each individual with the means to exercise that
liberty in a meaningful way.415
As a result, it is possible to construe Fiss’s argument as another strand of the

407. Id. at 15.
408. Id. at 146.
409. Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1517, 1525 (1997) (arguing that Fiss “cannot simply rule out a priori the independent constitutional
value of individual autonomy”).
410. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 13.
411. Post, supra note 409, at 1526.
412. Id. at 1524.
413. Id. at 1527; see also Post, supra note 377, at 1115–16.
414. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 17–18.
415. Id. at 19–22.
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broader constitutional debates surrounding the vision of due process inspired by
Charles Reich’s seminal article The New Property416 and the clash between
formal and substantive equality. Indeed, at times, Fiss explicitly frames his
work in precisely this manner.417 It thus seems apt to describe Fiss’s proposal as
calling for a shift from what might be termed formal liberty to substantive
liberty. That he would find such a vision of free speech attractive is unsurprising. He is an admirer of Goldberg v. Kelly,418 and he has also argued against
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause simply as a limit against governmental
interference.419 Situating his work in this manner only underscores its weakness, however. As Fiss himself recognizes, the Court’s equal protection and due
process jurisprudence has already rejected the vision of the relationship between
the individual and the state that he proposes.420 Although it remains open for
Fiss to propose some basis for a different outcome with respect to free speech,
at this point he has not done so.421
3. Sunstein on Autonomy
Sunstein offers a somewhat more elaborate justification for rejecting autonomy as a free speech value. His argument in favor of a First Amendment
focused on promoting democratic processes is quite complex, invoking the
intellectual precepts of history, communitarianism, and practical reason.422 In
addition, he criticizes the coherence of the willingness of autonomy-based
visions of free speech to regard individual preferences as pre-political.423 In this
section, I will critically assess each of these arguments. A close analysis reveals
that Sunstein’s historical arguments lack a substantial foundation. Even more
problematic is his invocation of communitarianism and practical reason because
the manner in which he applies each theory has the effect of simply assuming
away the conflict between autonomy and democracy. Most troubling is his
attempt to undermine preferences, which I find to be fundamentally inconsistent

416. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
417. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 35–36, 99–102. For a discussion about Sunstein’s
attempt to raise a similar argument, see infra notes 660–61 and accompanying text.
418. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (suggesting that the Due Process Clause might recognize an inherent
right to a basic subsistence level of governmental support); see also Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its
Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 792, 804 (1990) (lauding Goldberg v. Kelly as a “triumph of . . .
substantive rationality,” “a magnificent achievement,” and “a monument to our own little enlightenment”); Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1699, 1720 (1987) (remarks of Owen Fiss) (calling
Goldberg v. Kelly “the culmination of the Golden Age of American Law” and “bemoaning its demise”).
419. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 99; Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 23 (1979); Panel Presentation: Equality in Education, 74 F.R.D. 269, 276–81 (1977)
(remarks of Owen Fiss).
420. On equal protection, see FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 99. On due process, see
Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1123 (1991); Tributes to Robert M. Cover, supra
note 418, at 1720.
421. See also infra subsection IV.B.1.c (discussing Fiss’s views on the state action doctrine).
422. See infra notes 424–27, 439–41, 445–47 and accompanying text.
423. See infra notes 450–52 and accompanying text.
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with most democratic forms of government. None of these approaches offers a
satisfactory reconciliation of the conflict between the individual and the collective will, which represents perhaps the central problem lying at the heart of
liberal and democratic theory.
a. The Role of History. Sunstein initially attempts to rebut theories that view
the First Amendment as a bulwark that protects individual autonomy by invoking history. He argues that viewing the First Amendment in terms of promoting
collective self-determination follows from James Madison’s recognition of the
need for people to “freely examine public characters and measures” if they are
to exercise their democratic obligations in a meaningful manner.424 He finds
further support in such notable opinions as Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in
Whitney v. California425 as well as the opinions of the Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC426 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.427
A review of the historical record reveals that this so-called “Madisonian”
vision of the First Amendment, which Sunstein uses as a trope throughout his
work, is more Sunstein’s creation than Madison’s. Sunstein’s historical discussion consists of a single quotation from Madison, without any discussion of
Madison’s broader writings.428 An examination of the scholarship studying
Madison’s views on free speech reveals that Sunstein’s claim is quite controversial. Although some share Sunstein’s vision,429 others have interpreted Madison’s views on free speech as fitting better with the deontological approach to
free speech discussed above.430 In addition, another burgeoning branch of the
commentary argues that Madison espoused a view of free speech closely related
to the Lockean theory of property rights.431 In either case, the result is a view
that is much more attuned with the protection of speech as an individual or
natural right than it is with the instrumental promotion of democracy. The
invocation of a single line of Madison’s writings is thus insufficient to establish
the principle that Sunstein seeks.432
424. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at xvii (quoting 17 JAMES MADISON,
Report of 1800, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 341 (David Mattern et al., 1991).
425. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), discussed in SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 26–28.
426. 395 U.S. 367 (1969), discussed in SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at
48–49.
427. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed in SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at
38–41.
428. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at xvii.
429. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 378, at 200.
430. See David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and the
Politics of Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 796–800 (1999).
431. See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996); John O. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1751, 1760–62 (1994).
432. As Jack Balkin has famously quipped, “Sunstein’s ‘Madisonian’ theory of the First Amendment
is about as Madisonian as Madison, Wisconsin: It is a tribute to a great man and his achievements, but
bears only a limited connection to his views.” J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitu-
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Nor does the series of landmark decisions cited by Sunstein enhance the
historical pedigree of his theory. As an initial matter, his reliance on precedent is
somewhat curious in light of his recognition that the judicial consensus generally supports an autonomy-oriented vision of the First Amendment.433 In any
event, when read closely, the opinions that Sunstein cites fall short of establishing the primacy of deliberative democracy as a First Amendment value. Although there are clearly strains of Sunstein’s vision in Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney, the opinion’s emphasis on the “belie[f] that the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties” and that the
Founders “valued liberty both as an end and as a means”434 is far more
suggestive of a hybrid approach that seeks to balance the interests of autonomy
and democracy than accord primacy to the latter.435 The Court’s opinion in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan suffers from similar limitations. Although the opinion
has been both lauded and criticized for adopting the type of democracyenhancing instrumental approach that Sunstein favors,436 other commentators
have disagreed, noting that the opinion depended as much on an analogy to
seditious libel and concerns about a possible “chilling effect.”437 In the end, the
only authority that clearly stands in Sunstein’s corner is Red Lion, and even Fiss
has conceded that that decision represents “something of a freak” that has never
grown to cover other media.438
b. The Turn to Communitarianism. Sunstein also attempts to resolve the
conflict between autonomy and the needs of the democratic process by turning

tional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1955 (1995) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH,
supra note 23).
433. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 3–5.
434. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
435. See DWORKIN, supra note 378, at 201; see also Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the
Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653,
684–85 (1988) (offering an alternative reading of Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney).
436. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 378, at 202–09 (criticizing Justice Brennan’s “almost exclusive
[reliance] on the instrumental justification in his opinion” because it limited First Amendment protection to “cases involving libel of ‘public officials’ rather than extending protection to all libel defendants”), with Kalven, supra note 373, at 209 (praising the New York Times Court for “returning to the
essence of the First Amendment . . . found in its limitations on seditious libel” and being “carried along
by a momentum of insight about the democratic necessities of free speech”); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 14–16 (1965).
437. Farber & Frickey, supra note 391, at 1634–35.
438. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 20; see also FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note
24, at 72 (characterizing Red Lion as a “stray”). In his later work, Fiss finds an endorsement of Red
Lion in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment in Turner II, as well as general support for his
approach in the plurality opinion in Denver and Justice Stevens’s dissent in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). Fiss, supra note 24, at 1220–26, 1229–31,
1234–35. It should be noted that none of the opinions that Fiss cites commanded a majority of the
Court. A close reading of those opinions, moreover, reveals that they are more consistent with the
hybrid approach discussed above, which accords weight to both autonomy and instrumental concerns,
than it is with the purely instrumental approach that Fiss advocates.
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to communitarian principles. He posits that when political processes are functioning properly, the interests of the collective and the individual will tend to be the
same. Indeed, Sunstein suggests that so long as the machinery of democracy is
in good working order, it may be appropriate to define the outcome of the
deliberative process as “political truth.”439 Sunstein’s earlier writings provide a
more fulsome elaboration of this theme:
The republican commitment to universalism amounts to a belief in the
possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue. The process of mediation is designed to produce substantively correct outcomes,
understood as such through the ultimate criterion of agreement among political equals.440

Thus, in Sunstein’s perfect polity, there is no conflict between autonomy and
the needs of the democratic process because, in a properly constructed deliberative democracy, these interests tend to converge.441
The communitarian aspects of Sunstein’s argument thus propose to solve the
conflict between his theory and autonomy simply by positing the convergence
of the individual and the collective will. On a theoretical level, Sunstein
assumes away the conflict with autonomy in much the same way as does Fiss.
On a more empirical level, the heterogeneity of modern society provides ample
reason to doubt that the consensus that Sunstein envisions will in fact emerge.442
It is not even clear, moreover, that such consensus would be normatively
desirable. This is because “consensus is not generally the condition of autonomy; rather, autonomy is more typically exhibited in divergence of substantive . . . views” in which different people “affirm very different conceptions of
the public and private good.”443 Under this view, dissensus “is the goal and
characteristic symptom of a genuinely free society” rather than “a problem in
need of . . . regulation.”444

439. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 19. It should be emphasized that
Sunstein regards the deliberative process as an integral part of the means by which substantive values
are selected. The implication is that one cannot bypass the democratic process and derive moral truth
directly. The difference in emphasis is critical. As Martin Redish and Gary Lippman have pointed out,
“[i]f one believes in the imposition of externally derived moral truth through governmental decisionmaking, the concept of democracy is rendered at best a nuisance and at worst a serious social harm.” Redish
& Lippman, supra note 385, at 278.
440. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550, 1554 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
441. See Baker, supra note 399, at 334; Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the
Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 385 (1993).
442. See Post, supra note 377, at 1115 (calling any postulated fusion of the individual and collective
wills “unconvincing under modern conditions of heterogeneity”).
443. Gardbaum, supra note 441, at 386–87.
444. Id. at 387.
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c. The Appeal to Practical Reason. Sunstein further seeks to support his
democratically oriented view of the First Amendment by invoking the methodology of practical reason. Sunstein describes his methodology as similar to the
notion of reflective equilibrium developed by John Rawls,445 in which “theory
[is] adjusted to conform to [considered] judgments, and vice versa, until we
reach a state of equilibrium.”446 He employs this approach to reject a number of
countervailing theories, including autonomy, as inconsistent with certain considered judgments that he regards as unquestionably correct.447
Although Sunstein’s statement of the methodology of practical reason is
satisfactory, his application of it leaves much to be desired. Adherents of
practical reason would doubtless find the level of abstraction at which Sunstein
speaks and his resort to first principles quite troublesome. There is, moreover,
little reflection of the Rawlsian reflective equilibrium in Sunstein’s application.
Rather than oscillating back and forth between the general and the specific until
fusion is achieved, Sunstein’s approach treats certain preferred case outcomes as
fixed and uses them to support or invalidate particular theories.448 Such an
approach is hardly faithful to the notions of pragmatism, which rely on sensitivity to complex webs of values and a search for the best legal answer in light of
both history and context.449 In addition, his methodology makes his substantive
results little more than a product of which case outcomes he chooses to hold
constant and which case outcomes he chooses to critique. It would be as easy to
hold the Court’s well-established hostility towards content-based regulation
constant and use that insight to invalidate Sunstein’s theory. As a result,
Sunstein’s turn to pragmatism amounts to little more than the assumption of the
results that his theory is trying to prove.
d. The Assault on Preferences. Finally, Sunstein attempts to refute the importance of autonomy by attacking the notion that individual preferences are
pre-political. Instead, Sunstein argues that individual preferences are the product of the existing set of social and legal rules. Because preferences are largely
the product of the speech that already exists and the social structure that created
it, Sunstein argues that any attempt to justify current outcomes in terms of those
preferences is ultimately circular, in that it simply tends to validate the status
quo.450 True autonomy lies in the realization of those preferences that individuals would have held had they been exposed to higher quality programming that
incorporated a broader range of viewpoints. Consequently, it is not necessarily a
violation of autonomy to deviate from current preferences because “the inclu-

445.
377).
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY

AND

FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 298 n.13 (citing RAWLS, supra note

Id. at 133.
Id. at 133, 141, 142–43, 148, 175–76.
Id.
See Farber & Frickey, supra note 391, at 1641–43.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 19–20, 73–74.
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sion of better options . . . does not displace a freely produced desire.”451 On the
contrary, “[i]f more and better choices are made available, the outcome may
well be to promote autonomy, rightly understood.”452
This argument touches on an issue that has long pervaded liberal political
theory. It inheres in the work of John Rawls, who turns to idealized choices
made behind a “veil of ignorance” to justify the imposition of outcomes
consistent with the collective good without violating the central tenets of
democracy and liberalism.453 The work of John Stuart Mill exhibits a deep
ambivalence over the choice between actual and idealized preferences. At times,
Mill seems to define liberty as the realization of the desires that a person would
hold if exposed to a more complete range of experiences.454 At other times, Mill
strongly criticized this perspective, arguing that it essentially treated the laboring classes as children or savages unfit for the privileges of freedom. As a result,
Mill contended that such an approach was inconsistent with the principles of
freedom and democracy.455
That said, the attack on preferences strikes me as profoundly antidemocratic.
If one regards an individual’s personality as a social construct subject to
improvement by the state, there would seem to be little reason for the state to
accord any particular respect to the outcomes of the democratic process.456
Indeed, there is a disturbingly illiberal overtone to Sunstein’s critique of preferences. As Isaiah Berlin has argued, acknowledging a distinction between what
people actually want and what they ought to want risks justifying coercion in
the name of the “true” or “real” interests of the person being coerced.457 It also
opens the door to the imposition of an eruditiocracy, in which the preferences of
the elite classes are simply imposed on others. This danger does not appear to
trouble Sunstein. He notes, “Of course it is possible or even likely that the
well-educated will disproportionately enjoy high-quality broadcasting. But this
is precisely because they have been educated to do so, and high-quality education is not something to be disparaged.”458 It is this aspect that has led some

451. Id. at 74.
452. Id.
453. RAWLS, supra note 377, at 136–42.
454. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8–17 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1979) (1861).
See generally Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision,
46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 689–90 (1985).
455. MILL, On Liberty, supra note 363, at 124, quoted in Post, supra note 377, at 1131 n.90.
456. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
267, 284 (1991) (arguing that “the state undermines the raison d’être of its own enterprise to the extent
that it itself coercively forms the ‘autonomous wills’ that democracy seeks to reconcile into public
opinion”); see also Post, supra note 377, at 1133 (“[O]ne cannot but be struck by the sharp anomaly of
regulating democratic elections on the premise that voters are not autonomous and free.”).
457. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131–34 (1969), cited
in Fallon, supra note 377, at 886 n.65.
458. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 91.
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critics to condemn Sunstein’s proposal as “indefensible.”459
This dilemma can be illustrated by the following thought experiment.460
Suppose that a group of voters cast their votes in a racially discriminatory
manner and that this group is sufficiently large to control the outcome of an
election. Suppose further that their racist views result directly from the narrowness of the viewpoints to which they have been exposed. It is hard to imagine
that any democratic system would sanction disregarding the actual votes cast
and entering results that more accurately reflect the voters’ “true” or idealized
preferences. This is so even though the normative value at issue—the elimination of racial discrimination—represents perhaps the most morally attractive
and strongest justification for intervention. If democratic theory will not allow
us to overturn outcomes of elections in the name of promoting idealized
preferences over actual preferences, the close connection between speech and
votes makes it hard to see why such intervention would be permitted with
respect to speech. Even when addressed at the level of speech rather than
outcomes, this type of intervention still smacks of the Rousseauean notion of
being forced to be free.461
Lastly, any theory that seeks to promote idealized preferences will confront
severe implementation problems. It must offer some basis for identifying those
preferences with sufficient confidence to justify subjecting individuals to such
coercion. It is the difficulties surrounding any attempt to articulate such a theory
that is the focus of the next section of this Article.
B. CRITIQUES FROM INSIDE THE MODEL: TURNING THEORY INTO PRACTICE

To this point, I have focused on a theoretical critique that is largely external
to what Fiss and Sunstein propose. This Section, in contrast, takes Fiss’s and
Sunstein’s theoretical assumptions as given in an attempt to offer an internal
critique of their work. It begins by exploring a number of typical constitutional
questions that would naturally arise out of an attempt to extend the Broadcast
Model to another medium of communication. I conclude that the framework
that Fiss and Sunstein have proffered is too incompletely articulated to support
a principled theory of free speech. The primary problem is that their theories
fail to offer any basis for making the types of decisions and tradeoffs necessarily required by their democratically oriented vision of free speech.
This section then considers three institutional models that Fiss and Sunstein
suggest can provide some guidance as to the type of communications environment needed to promote collective self-determination: the New England town
meeting, Jeffersonian democracy, and the history of broadcast regulation by the
459. See Burt Neuborne, Blues for the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein’s Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 443 (1995).
460. I borrow the outlines of this hypothetical example from Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the
Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94
MICH. L. REV. 302, 323 n.109 (1995).
461. See Fallon, supra note 377, at 885.
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FCC. Upon close analysis, it becomes clear that none of them provide much
assistance in determining the needs of a properly functioning democratic process.
1. Implementation of the Fiss-Sunstein Approach
As noted earlier, Fiss and Sunstein offer only minimal guidance as to the
substance of their idealized vision of the democratic process.462 Fiss invokes the
concept of “robust public debate” as if the concept were self-explanatory.
Simply put, the validity of government intervention turns on “whether the
intervention in fact enriches rather than impoverishes the debate.”463 His failure
to offer much elaboration on what such a concept requires does not trouble him.
He flatly states that a benchmark definition specifying what robust public debate
requires would be helpful but is not strictly necessary.464 Fiss recognizes that
fashioning particular remedies will present “no easy question.”465 This is particularly so because of the omnipresent danger that regulation designed to enrich
public debate may in fact impoverish it.466 As a result, the problems of
balancing the various interests are likely to be “excruciating.”467 Still, Fiss
ultimately places his faith in “the deliberate and incremental methods of the
law” and takes comfort in “the old notion that it is easier to identify an injustice
than to explain what is justice.”468
For his part, Sunstein offers a bit more guidance as to what his idealized
vision of the democratic process requires. Although in a perfect world Sunstein
would insist on a more complete set of preconditions,469 in the end he identifies
two minimum requirements for a deliberative democracy to function properly:
(1) a broad and deep attention to public issues and (2) public exposure to an
appropriate diversity of views.470 In addition, Sunstein argues that the commitment to deliberative democracy requires extending a greater degree of protection to political speech than to nonpolitical speech.471
Although such guidance is helpful, Sunstein recognizes that it leaves many
questions unanswered and that the particular remedies to be applied “remain[ ]
obscure.”472 As a result, Sunstein calls for the government to be “frankly
462. See supra notes 345, 359–61 and accompanying text.
463. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 26.
464. Id. at 16.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 23–24.
467. Id. at 25.
468. Id. at 26.
469. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 20 (asserting that conditions for a
properly functioning deliberative democracy include “adequate information; a norm of political equality . . . ; an absence of strategic manipulation of information, perspectives, processes, or outcomes; and
a broad public orientation toward reaching right answers rather than serving self-interest”).
470. Id. at 20–21.
471. Id. at 123, 130–37.
472. Id. at 21; see also id. (noting that the appropriate remedy for the public’s failure to pay
sufficient attention to public affairs “is far from clear”).
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experimental” in working out the details.473 While the remedies may be unclear,
what is clear to Sunstein is that “the current system is worse than imperfect; it
creates extremely serious obstacles to a well-functioning system of free expression.”474 As a result, if a particular reading of the First Amendment bars such
experimentation, then it is the First Amendment that must give way.475
The problem with such ad hoc approaches is that they fail to provide much
guidance as to how to implement the systems that they envision. As Richard
Fallon has pointed out, when speech is viewed in purely instrumental terms,
“[c]laims of positive liberty are often at stake on both sides of debates about
regulating speech.”476 As a result, any such theory “would need to specify how
competing claims to positive liberty ought to be weighed.”477 The need for
some articulation of this vision is further underscored by the use of the same
analytical starting point as Fiss and Sunstein by scholars as diverse as Harry
Kalven, Robert Bork, Vincent Blasi, and Lillian BeVier to develop radically
different visions of free speech.478 A brief review of three constitutional issues
likely to be raised by any attempt to extend the Broadcast Model to another
medium should help illustrate just how difficult these implementation issues
will be.
a. Affirmative Programming Obligations. One of the centerpieces of Fiss’s
and Sunstein’s proposals is the continuation and expansion of affirmative
programming obligations. As noted earlier, both tentatively propose a regulatory
system that includes requiring greater and more appropriate coverage of political campaigns, greater support for children’s television, and the reinstitution of
compulsory rights of reply.479 The difficulty is that in the absence of a clear
articulation of what the democratic process requires, we lack a benchmark for
determining whether and how much of any particular type of programming is
needed.
Consider, for example, the call for greater support for children’s television.
473. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 221.
474. Id. at 222; see also SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 89.
475. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 81 (arguing that “the First
Amendment should not operate as a talismanic or reflexive obstacle to our efforts to experiment with
different strategies for achieving free speech goals”); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
220 (asking rhetorically why the Constitution should “bar a democratic decision to experiment with
new methods for achieving their Madisonian goals”).
476. Fallon, supra note 377, at 884.
477. Id. at 885; see also Post, supra note 377, at 1112 (asking, without “a standard by which the
quality of the thinking process of the community can be assessed[,] [h]ow . . . could it be known
whether public discourse is actually meeting the common needs of all the members of the body
politic?”); Redish & Kaludis, supra note 99, at 1109 (arguing that Fiss and Sunstein “must establish
some workable standard by which . . . redistributive decisions are to be made”).
478. See generally Kalven, supra note 373; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523; Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
479. See supra notes 345, 351, 365–68 and accompanying text.
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Sunstein denigrates the current system as “clearly unsuccessful in terms of both
quality and quantity” and avers that a “strong case” exists for requiring broadcasters to do more.480 The long tradition of decrying the quality of television
programming gives this assertion a certain surface credibility.481 But a more
critical examination reveals that Sunstein’s claim may not be as plausible as it
first seems.482 Many observers insist that the quantity and quality of educational
programming available to children has never been better.483 The Corporation for
Public Broadcasting has increasingly redirected its resources towards children’s
television. As a result, PBS has been able to augment its offerings with a
growing cadre of new shows, including such hits as “Between the Lions” and
“Zoboomafoo.” In addition, channels available on cable and other MVPDs,
such as Nickelodeon, the Disney Channel, the ABC Family Channel, and new
cable offerings such as Noggin, which is a joint venture between Nickelodeon
and the Children’s Television Workshop, are providing an increasing variety of
high-quality educational programming targeted at children, including such critically acclaimed shows as “Blue’s Clues,” “Bear in the Big Blue House,” and
“Dora the Explorer.”484 In fact, Nickelodeon’s success in developing these
programs has led CBS to give Nickelodeon control of its entire Saturday
morning schedule, the day part that has long been the central focus for children’s programming. ABC has similarly delegated control of its Saturday
morning programming to Disney and NBC has leased three hours of its Saturday morning lineup to the Discovery Channel.485 These educational options are
augmented still further by the growing array of channels, such as the Discovery
Channel, Animal Planet, and CNN, that offer news and documentary features
targeted towards children.486 The increasing diffusion of video cassette recorders (VCRs) has expanded parents’ educational programming options even further because roughly ninety percent of U.S. households own a VCR487 and

480. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 84; see also SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 221 (“There is a strong case for public promotion of high-quality
programming for children or for incentives, imposed by government on broadcasters, to provide such
programming.”).
481. See Newton M. Minow, Address to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961)
(commonly known as the “Vast Wasteland” speech), reprinted in MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 52, at
185–96.
482. For a skeptical evaluation of Sunstein’s dismal assessment of contemporary news coverage, see
infra note 493 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., Tim Goodman, Glory Days for Kids’ TV, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 23, 2001, at E1 (observing
that children’s television has become “one of the most competitive arenas in the industry” characterized
by “a remarkable raising of standards and a mind-boggling array of options”).
484. Id.
485. Frank Ahrens, That’s All Folks; Saturday Morning Tradition Fades as Networks Bow Out on
Kids’ Shows, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A3.
486. Goodman, supra note 483, at E1.
487. See Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming,
Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1288 ¶ 96 (2002) (estimating VCR ownership at 90%); 2002
INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION & VIDEO ALMANAC 14 (47th ed., Tracy Stevens ed., 2002) (estimating VCR
ownership at 86%); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 573

328

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:245

educational video cassettes are available through local video rental outlets and
public libraries. All of these outlets have the added benefit of being less
susceptible to the types of advertising pressure that can lead to the systematic
underprovision of children’s programming in the first place.488
And even those who agree with Sunstein’s point about the inadequacy of
children’s television must confront the issue of how much additional programming is required. Current law makes it easier for stations to obtain renewal if
they provide at least three hours of “core” children’s programming each week.489
The level of detail with which Sunstein has articulated his theory provides little
basis for determining whether three hours is in fact enough and how much
more, if any, would be required.490
Similar problems surround Sunstein’s call for free air time for political
candidates. Any such scheme would immediately raise a host of practical
questions. How much free air time and at what point in the campaign? Should
the mandate apply to presidential elections, all federal elections, or state and
local office as well?491 Indeed, one could easily argue that state and local
candidates present the more compelling case for such support. Presumably, each
of these decisions would be made with respect to the particular demands of an
idealized democratic process. But the lack of definition in Sunstein’s proposal
makes it impossible to determine how these issues should be resolved.

tbl.915 (1998) (estimating VCR ownership at 82%); TV DIMENSIONS 2000, at 137–38, 140 (Ed Papazian
ed., 2000) (estimating VCR ownership at 91%).
488. The FCC’s most recent assessment of the sufficiency of the current level of children’s television
focuses solely on the amount of children’s programming provided by commercial television stations.
See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
10660, 10676–79 ¶¶ 37–41 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Children’s Television Order]. As a result, it
ignores the significant contributions to the children’s television environment being offered by PBS,
cable, and other nonbroadcast outlets. The FCC’s reasons for doing so result primarily from the
legislative intent expressed in enacting the Children’s Television Act of 1990. Id. at 10680–81 ¶ 43;
Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 2111,
2116 ¶ 30 (1991). As a policy and constitutional matter, however, it does not seem sensible to ignore the
contribution to the educational and information needs of children provided by alternative sources of
programming. See Children’s Television Programming & Advertising Practices, Report and Order, 96
F.C.C.2d 634, 645–46 ¶¶ 29–30 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Children’s Television Order]. It is true that
less affluent households may not be able to afford cable programming. As I discuss in a later portion of
this Article, this problem can be redressed more effectively through other means. See infra section V.E.
489. 1996 Children’s Television Order, supra note 488, at 10718–19 ¶ 120.
490. There are other, equally thorny definitional issues lurking within the children’s television issue.
The FCC limits its definition to shows that have “serving the educational and informational needs of
children aged 16 and under as a significant purpose.” Id. at ¶ 84. Presumably, Sunstein’s theory would
have to justify ignoring programming oriented towards the entire family despite the contribution of that
programming to the education of children. See 1983 Children’s Television Order, supra note 488, at
646–47 ¶ 31. In addition, the FCC chose not to limit its definition to programming that furthers
children’s “cognitive and intellectual development,” opting instead to include programs that promote
children’s “social and emotional development” as well. 1996 Children’s Television Order, supra note
488, at 10701 ¶ 87. Such a distinction runs the simultaneous risk of being unmanageable and being
susceptible to manipulation.
491. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000) (guaranteeing equal access to all candidates), with id. 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000) (limiting reasonable access to federal candidates).
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In addition, Sunstein seems to envision a particular format for this speech,
suggesting that it should be used for substantial speeches on substantive issues
and should not be used for “sound bites” or “infotainment.”492 The source of
these particular limitations is far from clear. Indeed, the preference for particular
formats threatens to skew the debate in substantive ways. As the original
Kennedy-Nixon debates and the subsequent wrangling over debate formats
during every presidential election since has demonstrated, the choice of format
will typically favor particular candidates. It is equally hard to understand
precisely what to make of Sunstein’s infotainment criticism.493 Two of the most
significant media events of the 1992 presidential campaign—Ross Perot’s appearance on “The Larry King Show” and Bill Clinton’s stint as a saxophone player
on “The Arsenio Hall Show”—appear to fall outside of the type of speech that
Sunstein seeks to promote. Yet both cases underscore the extent to which the
format can play an integral role in shaping democratic outcomes.
In addition, the existence of multiple affirmative programming obligations
inevitably raises the prospect that policymakers will have to trade off two forms
of high-value speech against each other. The omnipresent reality of limited
resources as well as the mandates of administrative law will inevitably force the
regulatory authorities to offer a more reasoned explanation of how to resolve
these competing claims in a rational manner. The demands of Sunstein’s vision
of the First Amendment will be no less insistent. Sunstein’s failure to provide
any basis for resolving such questions is particularly surprising in light of his
frequent dismissal of competing theories as too ad hoc.494 Such criticism would
seem to apply with equal force to his own work.
b. The Distinction Between Political and Nonpolitical Speech. Both Fiss and
Sunstein place the greatest importance on speech that promotes collective
self-determination. As a result, any implementation of their theories raises two
questions. First, precisely what types of speech merit greater solicitude under
the First Amendment? Second, what degree of protection does that greater
solicitude entail? I will consider each question in turn.
Neither Fiss nor Sunstein offer a satisfactory description of what types of
speech warrant the highest degree of First Amendment protection. Fiss is quite
vague on this point. Although he constantly emphasizes the importance of
promoting robust public debate, he never offers much in the way of explanation
of what types of speech fall within its scope. As a result, we are left to infer his
position from the examples that he provides. Unfortunately, even these examples are not easily synthesized. Apparently the photographs of Robert Map-

492. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 60–61, 82, 85; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 221; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 553–54.
493. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 527 (denigrating MSNBC as “soft news”).
494. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 141, 146, 150; see also id. at 178
(criticizing free speech theories based on the marketplace of ideas on the ground that the proponents are
unable to describe what a properly functioning marketplace of ideas would look like).
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plethorpe, which unabashedly offer vivid depictions of the sexual practices of
the gay community, qualify as a contribution to robust public debate,495 while
the cross burning banned by the ordinance at issue in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul496 does not.497 Fiss’s discussions of these particular examples only serve to
confuse the issue further. On the one hand, Fiss argues that the political content
of the Mapplethorpe exhibit stemmed from the fact that it represented an “angry
protest” by the gay community and that the shocking nature of some of the
pictures represented an intrinsic part of that protest.498 On the other hand, with
respect to R.A.V., Fiss regards the shocking nature of the speech as a justification for its regulation rather than its protection.499 Although it is undoubtedly
possible to reconcile these positions, Fiss does not offer any means for doing so.
Anyone attempting to turn his theory into a coherent scheme of regulation is left
guessing about what speech should be regarded as worthy of the highest levels
of First Amendment concern.
Sunstein offers a little more guidance in identifying the types of speech that
will obtain the most protection under his theory. Sunstein would reserve the
highest degree of First Amendment protection for “political speech,”500 which
he defines as speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue.”501 As a result, his definition would encompass
“all art and literature that have the characteristics of social commentary,”
including Ulysses, Bleak House, and the Mapplethorpe exhibit.502 The key to
keeping this distinction from losing all meaning is to eschew focusing on
whether particular speech has political consequences.503 This argument necessarily suggests that it is the intent, rather than the reception, that gives his
definition analytical traction.
Even as an exercise in pure line drawing, the distinction proffered by
Sunstein is somewhat questionable. Indeed, it bears a striking similarity to the
test announced in Spence v. Washington504 for distinguishing between expressive and nonexpressive conduct that has been criticized as indeterminate.505 A

495. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 91–94.
496. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
497. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 111–20.
498. Id. at 94.
499. Id. at 116–17. Equally curious is that at one point Fiss finds political content in “The Love
Boat” because it projects a particular view of the world. And yet, immediately thereafter he calls the
choice between “The Love Boat” and “Fantasy Island” trivial. Compare id. at 15, with id. at 17.
500. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 9–11, 121–22.
501. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 236.
502. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 152–53.
503. Id. at 131, 154.
504. 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (holding that conduct falls within the ambit of the First
Amendment if “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it”).
505. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3.6.1, at 868 (1997); R. Polk Wagner, Note,
The Medium Is the Mistake: The Law of Software for the First Amendment, 51 STAN. L. REV. 387, 394
(1999).
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more fundamental problem is that Sunstein’s test appears to bear little relation
to his theory of free speech. When viewed from the perspective of promoting
collective self-determination, Sunstein’s admonition against focusing on the
effects of particular speech appears quite strange. On the contrary, one might
think that his desire to promote the democratic process might lead him to focus
solely on the impact of the speech and to ignore individual motivation altogether.
With respect to the second question, even after it is determined that particular
speech merits the greatest degree of First Amendment protection, it is hard to
determine precisely what this additional solicitude would entail. Again, it is
Sunstein who provides the more complete articulation. In his view, attempts to
regulate political speech carry the strongest presumption of unconstitutionality
and require a showing of likely, immediate, and grave harm.506 Although this
statement accords well enough with conventional doctrine, it is hard to reconcile with the specific policy measures that Sunstein proposes. For example, one
of the reforms that Sunstein advocates is the improvement of news coverage,
particularly with respect to elections.507 Sunstein’s clear endorsement of governmental interference with such a core political process raises seemingly intractable questions about what it means to treat regulations of political speech as
presumptively unconstitutional. Indeed, his willingness to do so is ironic considering that one of his primary arguments for protecting political speech is the
greater likelihood of government partiality.508
c. State Action Doctrine. In calling for governmental intervention to redress
distortions caused by private speech choices, Fiss and Sunstein must also
confront the state action doctrine. Although a number of free speech theorists
have called for an end to the public-private distinction,509 Fiss and Sunstein
claim to be more circumspect and eschew any desire to abandon the doctrine
altogether.510 Their reasons for doing so are understandable. The state action
doctrine has long been central to the relationship between the individual and the
state in classic liberal thought511 and has played a critical role in mediating

506. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 9, 122–23.
507. Id. at 59–62, 81–82, 85.
508. Id. at 134.
509. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 394–414. See generally Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass
Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 689–91 (1994) (collecting commentary).
510. Fiss disclaims any intent “to deny altogether the distinction between state and citizen presupposed by classical liberalism.” FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 18. Sunstein is even more
lavish in his praise for the doctrine, arguing that “[i]n fact there should be enthusiastic agreement that
the First Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that private conduct raises no
constitutional question.” SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 204; see also id. at 71, 160;
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 36 (“The constitutional text aims at
‘Congress,’ not at the owners of newspapers and radio stations.”).
511. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 87–89 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690); BERLIN, supra note 457, at 124.
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between the individual and the collective will by “preserv[ing] an area of
individual freedom.”512 Fiss’s and Sunstein’s stated commitment to limiting the
First Amendment to state action insinuates that they will provide a theory that
will allow courts to distinguish private action from state action based on the
needs of the democratic process. A review of their proposals reveals that no
such principled distinction emerges.
Fiss argues that the affairs of broadcasters and the state are sufficiently
intertwined to justify regarding the former as state actors. Broadcasters receive
the benefits of the state’s general laws of contract, property, corporations, and
taxation. In addition, broadcasters depend upon the licenses they receive from
the federal government that give them the exclusive right to use a portion of the
spectrum, and public broadcasters in particular depend upon federal subsidies.
Most importantly, Fiss argues that broadcasting serves the important public
function of educating the citizenry. As a result, broadcasters are properly
regarded as a hybrid of the public and private.513
The problem is that none of the criteria proposed by Fiss provides a principled basis for distinguishing between state and private action. Consider, for
example, his argument that reliance on background principles of private law is
sufficient to support a finding of state action. Any such rule would swallow the
doctrine whole because it would in effect bring everything within the ambit of
state action.514 Equally expansive is Fiss’s suggestion that because broadcasters
512. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); accord Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1988).
513. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 18; Fiss, supra note 24, at 1223, 1236.
514. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999) (“We have never held that
the mere availability of a remedy for wrongful conduct, even when the private use of that remedy
serves important public interests, so significantly encourages the private activity as to make the State
responsible for it.”); Tulsa Prof. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (“Private use
of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state action.”); San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1987) (noting
that the fact that “[a]ll corporations act under charters granted by a government” does not deprive them
of “their essentially private character”); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978) (“It
would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous cases, the notion of state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State,
whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to ‘state action’ even though no process or state
officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.”). Other decisions have spurned the notion
that the receipt of benefits conferred by the government such as licenses or subsidies was sufficient to
turn a private actor into a state actor. See San Francisco, 483 U.S. at 544; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1005, 1011 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); CBS v. DNC,
412 U.S. 94, 114–21 (1973) (plurality opinion); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175, 177
(1972).
As an aside, such an interpretation of the state action doctrine would represent a historical anomaly.
As noted earlier, the text of the First Amendment is directed only at Congress. The First Amendment
was not construed as applying to the states until the Court incorporated it by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Prior to Gitlow, it would have been
nonsensical to argue that background principles of contract, property, or corporations law were
sufficient to support state action because at that time the First Amendment was construed as a limit on
the federal government. The incorporation of the First Amendment effected by Gitlow was intended to
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perform a public function, they are state actors for First Amendment purposes.
It is doubtful that such a rule can preserve the bastion of individual freedom
envisioned by liberalism. As Fiss himself concedes, this principle would encompass the print media as well as “all corporations, unions, universities, and
political organizations.”515 In addition, any attempt to identify entities that serve
public functions would be tantamount to a return to the Lochner era’s now
discredited attempt to allow governmental greater regulation of industries “affected with a public interest.”516
Sunstein’s attempts to reconcile his theory with the state action doctrine are
similarly unsuccessful. At some points, Sunstein appears to echo Fiss’s suggestion that because broadcasters benefit from the protection conferred by property
law and hold licenses issued by the government, they are state actors.517 At
other points, Sunstein candidly concedes that allowing the role of the government in enforcing property, contract, and tort law to render private action into
state action would render the doctrine a nullity.518 The “real question” for
Sunstein is whether the action in question “violates . . . any . . . constitutional
provision. . . . It is a question about the meaning of the Constitution, not about
state action.”519 Thus, in a First Amendment case, Sunstein argues that whether
an action taken by a private entity constituted state action would turn largely on
whether the restriction in question was content-neutral or content-based.520 The
effect of this proposal is to collapse the state action inquiry into the merits of the
underlying constitutional claim, thereby eliminating it as an independent element of jurisprudence. In short, neither Fiss nor Sunstein are able to reconcile
their theories with the separation between state and individual envisioned by
classical liberalism and embodied in the distinction between state and private
action. Their claims of fealty to the state action doctrine notwithstanding, the
positions that they advocate would swallow the doctrine whole.
Indeed, an analysis of the role that broadcasters and other media entities play
in the democratic process reveals the inherent contradiction in regarding them
as state actors. What is perhaps most striking is that the Court has underscored
the importance of editorial independence521 even when the broadcaster in
enlarge the jurisdictional reach of the First Amendment; it was not intended to expand its substantive
scope. Thus, to the extent that general background principles of state private law were insufficient to
justify finding state action prior to Gitlow, it should similarly be insufficient even after the Court
construed the First Amendment as applying against the states.
515. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 18.
516. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352–54 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934)).
517. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 44–45.
518. Id. at 36–37; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 72, 209.
519. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 160.
520. Id. at 205.
521. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 116–21 (1973) (plurality
opinion); cf. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broad., 31 F.C.C.2d 377, 379 ¶ 7
(1971) (mem. op. & order); En Banc Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 44 F.C.C.
2303, 2308–09 (1960); FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 2, at 65–66.
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question was itself a state agency.522 Without such independence, it is impossible for the media to serve as the check against governmental abuse envisioned
by their role as the Fourth Estate.523 The implication is that the media have an
adversarial relationship with the government that is analogous to the role of
public defenders, who are not regarded as state actors, although they are in fact
government employees.524 As a result, it comes as no surprise that courts have
almost invariably concluded that broadcasters are not state actors.525
2. Institutional Guideposts
In the face of such profound implementation problems, the ad hoc, directional
advice offered by Fiss and Sunstein appears insufficient. Rather than provide
more concrete substantive guidance, both Fiss and Sunstein turn to certain
institutional structures to help give content to the mandate to promote robust
public debate. First, Fiss suggests that one can draw inspiration from the role of
the parliamentarian at a New England town meeting. Second, Fiss suggests that
one can gain insights into the needs of the democratic process by comparing the
current state of the world to the speech environment of the Jeffersonian era.
Lastly, both Fiss and Sunstein suggest that certain features of the federal
government provide greater reason to be confident in the government’s ability to
manage the uncertainties of this process. I will discuss each in turn.
a. Democratic Process as Artifact: The Metaphor of the Town Meeting. Fiss
draws on the work of Alexander Meiklejohn526 to suggest that the state may
522. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998); see also FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984).
523. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 460–62,
488–93, 524, 533–34 (1983); Blasi, supra note 478, at 541–42; Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975).
524. See Polk v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324–25 (1981) (holding that a public defender did not act
under “color of state law”).
525. See, e.g., DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506–09 (4th Cir. 1999); Belluso v. Turner
Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 398–400 (5th Cir. 1980); Kuzco v. W. Conn. Broad. Co., 566
F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1977); Mass. Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497,
501 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curiam); McIntire v. William Penn Broad. Co., 151 F.2d 597, 601 (3rd Cir.
1945); Mehdi v. Boyce, 931 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d mem., 125 F.3d 844 (2d Cir.
1997); Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 827 F. Supp. 674, 682 (N.D. Okla. 1993); Rokus v. ABC, Inc.,
616 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Levitch v. CBS, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 655–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Cent. N.Y. Right to Life Fed’n v. Radio Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. 8, 11 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Moro v.
Telemundo Incorporato, 387 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.P.R. 1974); Smothers v. CBS, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622,
627 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp 799, 803–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). A four-to-two plurality
of the Supreme Court took the same position in CBS v. DNC. Compare 412 U.S. at 115 n.14, 116,
120–21 (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ.) (concluding that broadcasters were not state actors), id. at 139–40 (Stewart, J., concurring) (same), and id. at 150 (Douglas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (same), with id. at 174–81 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)
(concluding that broadcasters were state actors). Three other Justices reserved the question, thus
depriving the Court of a majority opinion on this issue. Id. at 147 (White, J., concurring in part); id. at
148 (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in part).
526. E.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 373, at 22–27; MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM,
supra note 373, at 24–27; Meiklejohn, supra note 373, at 259–61; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The
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play the role of the parliamentarian in a classic New England town meeting by
simply ordering the agenda and metering the extent to which people participate
in the dialogue.527 Fiss believes that this agenda will evolve “organically” in a
manner external to the public debate itself.528 He further suggests that in its role
as parliamentarian, the government would do more than just apply a neutral
procedural principle, like temporal priority. This role requires the state be
“sensitive to the excesses of advocacy and the impact of such excesses on the
fullness of debate.”529 As a result, Fiss envisions the state guarding against
repetitious speech by saying, in effect, “We have heard that point several times
now,” or “Let’s hear from the other side.”530 In addition, Fiss argues that the
state can limit “[u]gly, hateful speech” that may silence others.531 Thus, the
state as parliamentarian will have to exercise content-based judgments in setting
its agenda. The First Amendment, in Fiss’s view, only bars the government from
making content-based judgments that are intended to affect substantive outcomes; it does not extend to content-based judgments made to “protect the
integrity of the deliberative process.”532
There is reason to doubt the validity of the rigid division between agenda
setting and substantive outcomes upon which Fiss’s theory depends. Agenda
setting and procedure are as much part of self-determination as is the substance
of the debate. In other words, “Just what is a political issue is itself a political
issue.”533 Consider what Fiss regards as the easiest example: repetitious speech.
What is strange about this position is that Fiss himself recognizes that mainstream entertainment-oriented speech is highly political, in that it shapes political values by reinforcing messages.534 It thus follows that orthodox and repetitive
speech can be as much a part of a robust public discourse as dissident speech.535
Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23–25 (emphasizing the distinction between
parliamentary rules and rules governing content and arguing that “concessions on [the parliamentary]
front should not be taken as relevant to . . . questions of control of content”).
527. FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 24, at 21–24; FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at
85, 101, 118–19, 153.
528. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 118.
529. Id. at 118.
530. Id. at 153; see also id. at 85 (arguing that a parliamentarian may “requir[e] some to shut up so
others can speak” without engaging in censorship).
531. Id. at 118.
532. Id. at 153.
533. Post, supra note 409, at 1539 (internal quotation marks omitted).
534. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that even such shows as “The Love
Boat” project “a view of the world . . . which in turn tends to define and order our options and
choices”).
535. As Kenneth Karst has noted, “even the repetition of speech conveys the distinctive message
that an opinion is widely shared,” which is of “great importance in an ‘other-directed society’ where
opinion polls are self-fulfilling prophecies.” As a result, it is impossible for the state to know when
“‘everything worth saying’ has been said.” Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975); see also Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 182–83
(arguing that “mass media plays an essential role in inculcating, or perhaps reinforcing, basic political
values through sheer repetition of the message that the basic American political institutions are flawless
and ideal”).
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Even more troubling is the problem of “ugly, hateful speech.” As noted
earlier, the Court has repeatedly disparaged its usefulness as a constitutional
category.536 For example, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,537 the Court expressed doubt as to the existence of a “principled standard” to distinguish
between speech that enhances the public discourse and “outrageous” speech that
does not.538 Similarly, as the Court observed in Cohen v. California,539 true
political speech “may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance.”540 Indeed, some degree of “verbal cacophony” is a “necessary side effect[ ]” of “a society as diverse and populous as ours” and “is, in this
sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.”541 In fact, as the Court noted in
Texas v. Johnson,542 “a principal ‘function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger.’”543 That is why Holmes warned that “we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death.”544
b. Jeffersonian Democracy as a Baseline. Fiss further suggests that the Jeffersonian era can provide an appropriate benchmark for measuring the quality of
the current level of public discourse. His assumption is that “[i]n a Jeffersonian
democracy, . . . where the dominant social unit is the individual and power is
distributed equally, autonomy might well enhance public debate and thus
promote collective self-determination.”545 If true, the diffuse nature of Jeffersonian society can provide a basis for evaluating the efficacy of the current speech
environment. The farther the present deviates from that baseline, the more
justifiable is greater government control over speech.
The problem is that the baseline that Fiss invokes does not support the type of
speech universe that he apparently envisions. Fiss’s ideal is a balanced exploration of the issues. The public discourse in Jefferson’s era was anything but.
Fairness and responsibility did not emerge as journalistic values until well into
twentieth century. In Jefferson’s day, the printers placed the greatest import on
passionate commitment to ideological debate. As a result, the press was highly
536. See supra notes 76–77, 265 and accompanying text.
537. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
538. Id. at 55.
539. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
540. Id. at 24–25.
541. Id. at 25.
542. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
543. Id. at 408–09 (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
544. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 76–77, 265 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that the fact that speech often excites
anger is typically a reason to protect it, not restrict it).
545. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 37–38; see also id. at 12–14, 18, 49–50 (noting the
shift in paradigmatic speaker envisioned by the First Amendment from the street corner speaker to
CBS).
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partisan and highly dependent on political patronage for their economic survival.546 To the extent that the sober reflection commonly associated with the
Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers existed at all, it was a
product of the homogeneity of the Founders’ backgrounds as well as the
disenfranchisement of blacks, women, and landless males.547 It thus seems far
from clear that Jeffersonian democracy represents a normatively attractive
baseline for measuring the quality of current speech.
It is also possible to dispute Fiss’s dismal assessment of the current environment. A review of the television listings reveals that more news and information
programming is available than ever before. Not only are CNN and a growing
cohort of competitors providing news programming around the clock, news
magazines such as “Dateline” and “20/20” dot the primetime lineups of the
major broadcast networks as well. Documentaries on a wide variety of subjects
are available twenty-four hours a day on cable television, and cable is spawning
a growing number of local news channels. The radio dial crackles with political
speech, as talk radio has come to dominate the AM band. Indeed, the experience
with talk radio provides some evidence that attempts to promote balanced
reporting may in fact be inconsistent with the quest for robust political speech.
An empirical study by Thomas Hazlett and David Sosa suggests that the repeal
of the Fairness Doctrine was the trigger that led to the talk radio explosion.548
The Jeffersonian world that Fiss would use as his baseline thus has more in
common with the modern, discordant world of talk radio and sound bites than it
does with the world of balanced reporting that he envisions. In addition, it is
hard to see how those dissatisfied with the current speech environment can base
their complaints on the total quantity of political speech being uttered. More
qualitative complaints ultimately must be based on a more fine-tuned assessment of what constitutes good and bad political speech. As the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, the mere invocation of Jeffersonian democracy cannot
substitute for Fiss’s failure to articulate a basis for drawing such a distinction.
c. Institutional Faith in the FCC. Finally, both Fiss and Sunstein draw comfort from the past history of broadcast regulation. Fiss acknowledges that the
same social forces that are controlling private media entities will exert a similar
influence over the government as well. If so, government intervention may be
more likely to reinforce the existing distortions to the public discourse than to
ameliorate them.549 Nonetheless, Fiss chooses to be optimistic, arguing that

546. See David L. Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1973–1974).
547. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 183 (1987).
548. Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”?
Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997).
549. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 23–26, 43; see also Fiss, supra note 24, at 1218
(describing Richard Nixon’s attempt to use the broadcast licensing process to suppress criticism of his
Administration).
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“our historical experience with the activist state in the sixties” justifies “believ[ing] that the elements of independence possessed by the state are real and
substantial.”550 In addition, institutional arrangements, such as the use of independent agencies like the FCC, should help ensure that government intervention is
not the product of political manipulation.551 Fiss finds that the FCC has avoided
these pitfalls for the most part, noting that “[a]lthough regulators have looked at
the content of programs when awarding broadcast licenses, they have only done
so to make certain that there is sufficient coverage of public issues and to
enforce well-defined boundaries regarding depictions of sexuality.”552 And on
those occasions when the FCC fails to promote robust public debate, the courts
act as the ultimate guarantor of constitutional rights.553
Sunstein similarly acknowledges that “a central principle of American constitutionalism is that the most serious risks to liberty come from government.”554
At the same time, “a sensible view of government’s incentives” suggests that
there is no reason to be “especially suspicious of government regulation of
nonpolitical speech.”555 And even with respect to political speech, Sunstein
similarly suggests that the success of past regulatory efforts makes it “plausible
to think that government decisions can be made in a relatively nonpartisan
way.”556 In particular, he joins Fiss in lauding the government’s role in fostering
the creation of local news, children’s television, and public television,557 although he parts company with Fiss in questioning the propriety of involving the
federal courts in this enterprise.558 In light of this track record, Sunstein
suggests that “[w]e have no basis for doubting that much larger improvements
could be brought about in the future.”559
What is missing from these observations is anything more than a token
appearance of the First Amendment’s traditional suspicion of governmental
interference with speech. Such suspicion is deeply rooted in the history of the
Founding and has been buttressed by the struggles with communist and anti-war
speech that led to many of the seminal decisions in the First Amendment
canon.560 As noted earlier, there is also an equally substantial body of scholarship that regards the institutional press as a “Fourth Estate” charged with

550. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 43.
551. Id. at 153.
552. Fiss, supra note 24, at 1223.
553. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 25–26, 44.
554. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 36.
555. Id. at 134–35, 146.
556. Id. at 89.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 92, 104–05.
559. Id. at 89; see also SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 222 (same).
560. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 391, at 81; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 51–66,
179–99 (1983); Blasi, supra note 478, at 527–44; Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking:
Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1426–27
(1987); Redish & Kaludis, supra note 99, at 1110–11; Stone, supra note 391, at 1173–75.
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checking the excesses of the government.561 The existence of these alternative
traditions indicates that any instrumental vision of speech cannot simply assert
the benevolence of the state a priori. Such an approach begs the equally
important question “[w]hether government intervention would make the unfair
market better or worse than it already is.”562
The ambiguity as to whether governmental intervention will promote or
hinder democracy is well illustrated by the work of Vincent Blasi. A comparison
of his approach with the approach taken by Fiss and Sunstein reveals many
similarities. Blasi accepts viewing speech almost entirely in instrumental terms
and concurs that the primary value to be promoted is the proper functioning of
the democratic process.563 He nonetheless provides a powerful theoretical
argument opposing the type of remedies that Fiss and Sunstein propose. Specifically, Blasi argues that state power is not simply one of many forces shaping
speech, but rather that it poses a more serious threat to speech than the abuse of
private power.564 Drawing on themes advanced by Holmes,565 Blasi argues that
the state is unique in its intrusive investigatory powers, its monopoly over
legitimized violence, and the ease with which its resources can be mobilized.566
In addition, official power carries with it a moral and symbolic significance that
makes it more menacing than private power.567 As a result, Blasi argues that
exercises of state power raise particularly significant reasons for concern.568
The reality of this threat causes Blasi to search for a competing institution that
can serve as a counterweight to the Leviathan. And the private actor that he sees
best situated to offset the power of the government is the “well-organized,
well-financed, professional critics” in the institutional press.569 Allowing the
government to curb what it perceives as the excesses of the private media,
however, would compromise the latter’s ability to serve as this institutional
check.
Blasi’s work demonstrates the ease with which one can draw different
conclusions from the same premises advanced by Fiss and Sunstein. In particular, Blasi’s analysis underscores the danger of simply assuming a priori that
governmental intervention will be an improvement. Fiss and Sunstein present

561. See supra note 523 and accompanying text.
562. Shiffrin, supra note 509, at 714; see also Neuborne, supra note 459, at 439 (claiming that
“although Prof. Sunstein vests the government with powerful discretionary tools to regulate speech, he
cannot assure that those tools would be any less subject to the harmful influences that he claims
currently distort the laissez-faire speech market”). Shiffrin appears to have distanced himself from this
conclusion in his more recent work. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA 115–20 (1999).
563. Blasi, supra note 478, at 558.
564. Id. at 538.
565. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
566. Blasi, supra note 478, at 538–39.
567. Id. at 540.
568. Id. at 538–41.
569. Id. at 541–42.
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little analytical justification for their faith in the innocuousness of governmental
action. For the most part, they are content to draw comfort from what they
perceive as the success of past regulatory efforts.570 Their enthusiasm for the
past is hard to reconcile with the actual performance of the FCC, however. The
works of Louis Jaffe, Bernard Schwartz, Henry Friendly, Glen Robinson, Ithiel
de Sola Pool, Scot Powe, Matthew Spitzer, and Thomas Hazlett, among others,
have documented countless examples of political abuse in the regulatory process.571 Although contrary voices have occasionally arisen,572 the weight of the
empirical record underscores the constitutional hazards surrounding Fiss’s and
Sunstein’s positions.
Consider the Fairness Doctrine,573 which has talismanic significance for both
Fiss and Sunstein. The historical evidence now suggests that the Fairness
Doctrine has been widely manipulated for political ends.574 Perhaps most ironic
are the revelations about the circumstances giving rise to Red Lion, which
sustained the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine and represents perhaps
the central precedent supporting Fiss’s and Sunstein’s positions. It is now
acknowledged that Red Lion arose out of a campaign orchestrated by the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to use the Fairness Doctrine to suppress
political criticism from the right.575 Thus, the prime example of the type of
regulatory measures that Fiss and Sunstein support demonstrates the political
corruption that can occur when the government interferes with private speech.
Indeed, there is something quite puzzling about Fiss’s and Sunstein’s willingness to rely on the FCC. Both have candidly recognized the imperfections of the
administrative process.576 Sunstein’s faith in the FCC is even more ironic when
he defends his two-tiered vision of the First Amendment because “the premise
of distrust of government is strongest when politics is at issue.”577 In light of
this recognition, it is difficult to see how he can rely on the FCC as an
appropriate mechanism for effecting the increases in the amount and quality of

570. See supra notes 549–61 and accompanying text.
571. See FRIENDLY, supra note 41, at 72; POOL, supra note 51, at 119–28, 135; POWE, supra note 51,
at 69–74, 83–84, 112–16, 121–29, 131–41; Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and
the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 933–34 (1997); Jaffe, supra note 44, at 79; Robinson,
supra note 46, at 238; Schwartz, supra note 44, at 694; Spitzer, supra note 208, at 1048–52.
572. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 115 (“[O]ne of the more interesting features of the broadcast
regulation experience has been the absence of egregious abuses by the FCC. The commission has, on
the whole, been extraordinarily circumspect in the exercise of its powers.”).
573. See supra notes 92, 209–14 and accompanying text (describing the Fairness Doctrine and its
repeal).
574. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 72, at 248–49; Hazlett, supra note 115, at 168–69.
575. See FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–34 (1975);
POWE, supra note 51, at 112–16; Hazlett, supra note 571, at 933–34; Jaffe, supra note 50, at 1700;
Spitzer, supra note 208, at 1051–52.
576. See FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 44; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985).
577. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 134.

2003]

THE TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC FIRST AMENDMENT

341

information regarding political campaigns that represent one of the central
elements of his program for reform.
There thus seems to be little theoretical or historical reason to draw comfort
from the federal government’s ability to regulate the broadcast industry. In the
end, Fiss embraces government intervention simply because he sees no other
alternative. Fiss turns to the state “because it is the only hope, the only means to
correct the distorting influence of social structure on public debate.”578 Although Fiss acknowledges the risk of serious governmental misconduct, “[t]he
hope against hope is that in the final analysis we will be better off than under a
regime of autonomy.”579 Sunstein similarly defends his theory simply by arguing that the current state of affairs is so unacceptable that something must be
done. According to Sunstein, the remedies he proposes are justified simply
because “the current system is worse than imperfect; it creates extremely
serious obstacles to a well-functioning system of free expression.”580 If the
Constitution bars such experimentation, then it seems clear to Sunstein that
something is wrong with the Constitution: “[W]hy should the Constitution bar a
democratic decision to experiment with new methods for achieving their Madisonian goals?”581 The question suggests an approach in which the exigencies of
the democratic process provide their own constitutional justification. Such a
vision turns the First Amendment into simply the residuum after the basic
regulatory questions are answered and would eliminate it as an independent
check on the government.
In sum, Fiss and Sunstein have no substantive answer to concerns about
governmental abuse. Their proposals are driven entirely by an acute sense of the
existing problems. The narrowness of their focus leads them to stop short of
offering any serious analysis of whether the solutions that they propose will in
fact redress the problems that they perceive. In the absence of a more principled
justification for believing why state intervention may create a better state of
affairs, placing speech within governmental control is little better than a “riverboat gamble.”582 Indeed, the concerns about governmental abuse that underlie
the creation and development of the First Amendment and the demonstrated
track record of the FCC and Congress in broadcast regulation suggest that as
gambles go, Fiss’s and Sunstein’s face particularly long odds.

578. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 25.
579. Id.
580. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 222; see also SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 89 (“The absence of continuous government supervision should not
obscure the point. With respect to attention to public issues, the present system badly disserves
Madisonian goals.”).
581. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 220; see also SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 81 (“The most important point is that the First Amendment should not
operate as a talismanic or reflexive obstacle to our efforts to experiment with different strategies for
achieving free speech goals.”).
582. Shiffrin, supra note 509, at 717.
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C. CRITIQUES OF FISS’S AND SUNSTEIN’S EMPIRICAL
AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Even if the theoretical and practical objections detailed above were somehow
overcome, Fiss and Sunstein must address certain empirical and technological
obstacles that stand in the way of the outcome that they seek. Specifically, they
do not provide an adequate foundation for their empirical assumptions about the
role that television plays in democratic self-governance or explain how their
theories can accommodate the convergent technological environment that characterizes modern communications.
1. Empirical Assumptions About Television’s Role in Democracy
Fiss and Sunstein argue that the unique role that television plays in the public
discourse justifies regulations designed to ensure that all households continue to
have access to free, over-the-air programming.583 Concluding that television
currently represents the communications medium with the greatest influence on
democratic self-governance as a descriptive matter, however, says nothing about
whether that state of affairs is normatively desirable. Indeed, there appears to be
good reason to be skeptical of claims that television is the medium best suited to
fostering democratic discourse because television by its nature does not lend
itself to deep and penetrating attention to public issues.584 Some would even
argue that efforts to encourage greater availability of programming that enhances democratic deliberation are fundamentally misguided and that the best
way to promote self-governance would be for viewers to turn their televisions
off.585 Indeed, Sunstein’s willingness to take as given the public’s existing
preference for television as a medium stands in stark contrast to his refusal to
respect individual preferences for particular types of programming. If Sunstein
were correct that preferences for particular types of programs are simply
socially constructed misperceptions, it is hard to see how preferences for the
medium as a whole would be entitled to any greater respect.
In fact, there is a danger that the policy outcomes that Fiss and Sunstein
promote will reify television’s role in the political process and give it unjustified
permanence. For example, the central role that broadcast television currently

583. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 20; Fiss, supra note 24, at
1217–18.
584. Sunstein does raise the question whether the democratic process may be better enhanced by
policies affecting the print media, but ultimately calls it an as yet unanswerable empirical question.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 112–13.
585. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1727 (1999); Rev. Jesse Jackson, Reclaiming Our Youth from Violence,
36 B.C. L. REV. 913, 921 (1995); James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 439, 469 (1996). As one congressional candidate put it, “[T]he single most important step we
need to take right now is to turn off the darn television . . . a device that spews meaningless garbage.
We have a generation that has been trained not to think critically about the information that bombards
them.” Quoted in Daniel M. Warner, To Hell on the Railroads: Why Our Technology and Law
Encourage a Degrading Culture, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 361, 409 n.145 (1999).
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plays in the political process leads both Fiss and Sunstein to offer their support
for the longstanding policy known as “must-carry,” which requires all local
cable operators to include all full-power local broadcast stations in their basic
cable packages.586 Thus, although other cable programmers must typically pay
for carriage, must-carry allows broadcasters to receive carriage for free. Mustcarry essentially represents a large cross-subsidy from the cable industry to the
broadcasting industry. In such a situation, it is difficult to determine whether the
privileged position that broadcasters enjoy is the cause or the consequence of
must-carry. In other words, positing that free, over-the-air television occupies a
special place in the political process in turn justifies regulations that cement the
role of broadcasting. At the same time, must-carry stifles the development of
alternative media by placing a drag on the revenues earned by broadcasting’s
primary competitors.
This same dynamic is currently being replayed with respect to direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems. One would think that policymakers would welcome DBS as the solution to a range of policy problems. The natural monopoly
characteristics of local cable service have long been a major focus of Congress
and the FCC. Other technologies had vied with cable in the market for multichannel video program distribution, but all of them came up short.587 DBS thus
represents the first technology capable of breaking local cable monopolies. In
addition, DBS represents the first video technology with a national footprint. As
a result, it is in a better position than any other technology to exploit the cost
efficiencies that accompany national distribution.588 Rather than embrace DBS,
however, policymakers have opted to regulate it to preserve free, over-the-air
broadcasting.589 As of the beginning of 2002, DBS companies that wish to carry
programming from the major networks are subject to the must-carry requirements that are quite similar to those imposed on local cable operators.590 This
result not only frustrates DBS’s ability to realize the efficiencies associated with
national distribution, but it also further entrenches broadcasting’s role in our
society.
The deployment of digital television appears to have fallen into the same
pattern.591 Concerns about the need to preserve free, over-the-air television have
led Congress and the FCC to deploy digital television by doubling the amount
of spectrum given to each incumbent broadcast station.592 This has the inevi-

586. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 260–71; Fiss, supra note 24, at
1228–31.
587. For a review of these alternative technologies, see Annual Assessment of Status of Competition
in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1277–82 ¶¶
68–77, 1291–92 ¶¶ 99–102 (2002).
588. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
589. See Yoo, supra note 153, at 18–21, 48, 102–03, 113–14.
590. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (2000).
591. See Yoo, supra note 153, at 22–27, 49–50, 103, 115–20.
592. See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact Upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12811–12 ¶ 5, 12820–21 ¶¶ 27–29 (1997).
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table effect of further cementing in place the role that broadcasting plays in the
democratic process.
In the long run, Fiss’s and Sunstein’s position on promoting access to
television may be tautological. Positing the role that free, over-the-air television
plays in the democratic process justifies certain regulatory steps to preserve the
broadcast industry, and those regulations in turn become the primary means by
which the role that broadcasting plays is created and preserved. Although
answering why television represents the best medium for fostering democratic
discourse may render such a result defensible, Fiss and Sunstein leave this
question unaddressed.
2. Technological Change and the Limits of Civic Republicanism
Fiss and Sunstein recognize that it is not enough for broadcasters simply to
provide greater quantities of the types of programming that they believe promote good citizenship. To promote the deliberative process in the manner Fiss
and Sunstein envision, people actually have to watch that programming. In
Sunstein’s words: “It is also important to ensure not merely that diversity is
available, but also that a significant part of the citizenry is actually exposed to
diverse views about public issues.”593 Fiss is even more succinct: “The issue is
not market failure but market reach.”594 In Fiss’s view, an unwatched program
is no better than an unread book buried in a library.595 In other words, Fiss and
Sunstein’s real concern is audience failure, not market failure. The problem is
not that viewers cannot get what they want, but rather that they do not want the
right things. Their policy prescription thus goes far beyond ensuring that better
programming options are available. Steps must be taken to ensure that individuals actually avail themselves of those options.
In the end, however, even this concern may not be able to withstand the
mounting tide of technological change. Notwithstanding Fiss’s and Sunstein’s
stated belief that television will retain its unique social role for the foreseeable
future,596 a recent study suggests that more than thirty percent of U.S. citizens
no longer regard television as their primary source of news and information.597
In fact, this possibility has forced Sunstein to revise his views by adding a new
593. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 22; see also id. at 20 (“Indeed, mere
availability of [serious coverage of public issues] may not be enough if few citizens take advantage of
it, and if most viewers and readers are content with programming and news accounts that do not deal
well or in depth with public issues.”).
594. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 24, at 40.
595. Id. at 151. Fiss also notes that this explains why cable public access channels are an insufficient
response to the needs of robust public debate. Id.
596. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 1217; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 527–31. But see Owen Fiss, In
Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613, 1614–15 (1995) (acknowledging that his televisionbased paradigm may already be obsolete).
597. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, INTERNET SAPPING BROADCAST NEWS
AUDIENCE, 1, 5–6, 12–13 (2000) (reporting a 50% drop in consumption of broadcast network news and
a corresponding growth in importance of the internet as a source of news between 1993 and 2000). The
most recent Biennial News Consumption Survey indicates that these trends have begun to level off.
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section to the paperback version of his book republic.com acknowledging that
the emergence of the Internet and its accompanying ability to allow individuals
to tailor their information environment may in fact be promoting rather than
impeding democracy.598
In addition, Fiss and Sunstein do not adequately confront the growth of cable
television and other alternative means of delivering television programming. As
noted earlier, the average U.S. household receives thirteen over-the-air channels, and approximately eighty percent of all U.S. households subscribe to cable
television or some other MVPD.599 Although this increase in channel capacity
(rendered all the more accessible by the ubiquitous presence of the remote
control600) has unquestionably increased the diversity of the programming
available, it has simultaneously reduced television’s ability to play the transformative role that Fiss and Sunstein envision.
Sunstein responds to this possibility with abject horror. The possibility that an
individual could “design his own communications universe” in which that
person “could see those things that he wanted to see, and only those things” and
could “screen out ideas, facts, or accounts that [that person] find[s] disturbing”601 could lead to the “elimination of a shared civic culture, which contemplates a degree of commonality among the citizenry.”602 His reaction underscores
the “complex, indeed, ambivalent, attitude towards diversity of opinions” reflected in most civic republican and communitarian conceptions of politics.603
He loathes the homogenizing effects of large media institutions, and yet his
theory depends on large, centralized conduits through which to reach the
market. Indeed, it is this ambivalence that underlies the regulatory outcry
surrounding the initial decision by NBC and Fox not to air the first presidential
debate during the 2000 election cycle.604 One might think that in an era of
supposed scarcity and limited diversity, it would be anathema to dedicate one of
the few major networks to programming that was completely duplicative of
what was on the other major networks.605 And yet that is precisely what the
FCC pressured NBC and Fox to do.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, PUBLIC’S NEWS HABITS LITTLE CHANGED BY SEPT.
11, at 2–3, 6–7 (2002).
598. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 203–12 (paperback ed. 2002).
599. See supra notes 175, 178 and accompanying text.
600. For a humorous (but accurate) description of channel surfing, see Balkin, supra note 432, at
1935–42.
601. Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1786 (1995).
602. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 76; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
598, at 3–22 (criticizing growth of “daily me,” in which people receive customized news via Internet).
603. Gardbaum, supra note 441, at 383–84.
604. See Kennard, Remarks at the Museum of Television and Radio, supra note 97; Press Release, FCC,
FCC Commissioner Susan Ness Decries Decisions of NBC and Fox Networks Not to Air the First Presidential
Debate (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/ Ness/States/2000/stsn032.html.
605. Press Release, FCC, Furchtgott-Roth Seeks to Clarify and Separate Big Government’s Interest
from the Public Interest in the Debate Over the Debates, at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Speechs/Furchtgott_Roth/
Statements/2000/sthfr057.doc (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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Sunstein concedes that people cannot be compelled to watch public affairs
programming,606 but suggests that “careful judgments at the level of implementation” can prevent unwilling viewers from turning off their televisions.607 He
hopes some members of the general public will become accidentally exposed to
higher-quality programming and thereby acquire a greater taste for it.608 Given
the ease with which channels can be changed, it is hard to see how any degree
of care in implementation could ensure that audiences receive sufficient exposure to the type of programming that Fiss and Sunstein believe is essential. The
impending arrival of video-on-demand promises to exacerbate the problem by
giving individuals still greater control over their viewing environment.609 Nothing prevents unwilling viewers from switching to alternative programming or
simply tuning out altogether.610 Thus, even if Fiss and Sunstein were able to
convince Congress, the FCC, and the courts to sanction their proposals, technological developments will likely make it impossible for television to serve Fiss’s
and Sunstein’s purposes.
V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PERSISTENCE
OF BROADCAST-STYLE REGULATION
The collapse of the traditional bases for according a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny to broadcasting and the inability of civic republican
theories to offer a revisionist justification for doing so raises the question why
the current jurisprudential state of affairs has persisted. In this Part, I will sketch
out some possible explanations.
A. THE NASCENT STATE OF FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

One possible explanation for the rise of the technology-specific First Amendment is the embryonic state of First Amendment doctrine at the time NBC v.

606. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 22, 70.
607. Id. at 76–77.
608. Id. at 89–90.
609. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
610. Sunstein contradictorily notes that to the extent that the programming is of low quality and does
not promote democratic values, little would be lost if viewers simply tuned out. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 89; see also id. at 77 (suggesting it “would not necessarily be bad”
if attempts to promote democratically-oriented programming caused people to turn off their televisions). This observation conflicts with Sunstein’s acknowledgement that, for his system to work, there
must be some means for generating a shared civic culture. It is also vulnerable to charges of elitism and
paternalism, aptly captured in Burt Neuborne’s rendering of Sunstein’s argument:
So what if the less-educated members of the public don’t want to view the highbrow material?
It will be an uplifting, educational experience. They might even learn to like it. After all, mass
taste is just a matter of socialized preference. And, if the less educated turn off the set, that’s
OK, too. Perhaps they watch too much TV anyway.
Neuborne, supra note 459, at 440.
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United States and the other seminal broadcasting decisions were issued.611
During the 1930s and early 1940s, neither the FRC nor the courts believed that
commercially oriented entertainment merited any First Amendment protection.
For example, the Supreme Court in 1915 held that film fell outside the ambit of
the First Amendment on the ground that “the exhibition of moving pictures is a
business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country or as organs
of public opinion.”612 The FRC sounded a similar theme in declaring that
“[e]ntertainment such as music is not ‘speech’ in the sense in which it is used in
the [F]irst [A]mendment to the Federal Constitution.”613 Indeed, the FRC
denigrated all forms of direct advertising as “usually offensive to the listening
public.”614 Formal recognition that motion pictures fell within the ambit of the
First Amendment did not occur until 1948.615 Commercial speech did not
receive recognition until 1976.616
In addition, the courts’ appreciation for the particular dangers of licensing
was not fully formed during the 1930s and 1940s. Although the Supreme Court
had recognized the dangers of licensing when it acted as a prior restraint,617 it
had only begun to acknowledge the manner in which subsequent punishment
can also suppress speech.618 Indeed, it is telling that in a decision roughly
contemporaneous with the Court’s landmark decision in Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FRC’s decision to refuse to renew a
license on the grounds that the First Amendment represented nothing more than
a prohibition of prior restraints and did not prevent the FRC from exercising its
“undoubted right to take note of appellant’s past conduct” when deciding
whether to renew a license.619 And the content distinction and compelled speech

611. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
612. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
613. FRC SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 161; see also id. at 168 (criticizing playing of
phonograph records over the air in part because practice was driven solely by business motive of
facilitating advertising); Hazlett, supra note 115, at 152 (quoting Herbert Hoover’s statement at the
Fourth National Radio Conference in 1925 as saying that “no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than naked commercial selfishness in
his purpose”).
614. FRC SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 168.
615. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (“We have no doubt
that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502–03 (1952)
(formally overruling Mutual Film).
616. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
617. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
319, 325, 328 n.* (1788).
618. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–16 (1931); Weinberg, supra note 26, at
1137.
619. KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931); accord Trinity Methodist
Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 851, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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did not emerge as major First Amendment concerns until much later in the
century.620
Although it is plausible that these early courts failed to appreciate the First
Amendment dangers posed by the broadcast approach to regulation, such an
argument faces its share of problems. Contemporaneous commentators were
quick to point out the obvious dangers of the courts’ decisions.621 The Supreme
Court’s opinion in NBC signaled its recognition of the problem when it acknowledged that First Amendment concerns might arise if the FCC were “to choose
among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or
upon any other capricious basis.”622 In any event, even assuming that the
courts’ failure to appreciate the dangers to free speech imposed by the broadcast
regime was justified in the 1930s and 1940s, there is little justification for
continuing that ignorance into the present day. Regardless whether the early
judicial decisions were justified when they were rendered, it should be clear that
the state of the doctrine at that time can no longer justify adhering to them now.
B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Another possibility is that Congress thought that it had no choice but to adopt
the type of administrative licensing scheme associated with broadcast regulation. Indeed, many scholars have suggested that Congress’s decision to adopt
the Broadcast Model followed from its belief that administrative licensing
represented the only viable alternative to abandoning the spectrum as a resource.623
In many ways, the claim seems plausible. Coase’s seminal work on the ability
of a property rights regime to resolve many matters that were previously
thought to require regulation and Garret Hardin’s pathbreaking article, The
Tragedy of the Commons, did not appear until several decades after these basic
principles had been established.624 The skeptical reaction that greeted Coase’s
proposal confirms its perceived novelty at the time.625 It would arguably be
somewhat anachronistic therefore to expect regulatory authorities that were
taking the first steps to regulate broadcasting to have appreciated the possibility
of nonadministrative allocation. At the same time, there are those who would

620. See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 123–25 (1981); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L.
REV. 203, 218–27 (1982).
621. See Note, Indirect Censorship of Radio Programs, 40 YALE L.J. 967, 968 (1931) (noting that
“the power to revoke or refuse the renewal of a license is in many cases so effective a means of
censorship as to make unconvincing any legalistic distinction between ‘previous restraint’ and a refusal
to renew a license because of the character of past program”).
622. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
623. See, e.g., id. at 216–17; BRUCE M. OWEN, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 139 (1975); POOL, supra note
51, at 142, 146; POWE, supra note 51, at 201;
624. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 118; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
625. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
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disagree with this assessment. Thomas Hazlett’s careful history of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 suggests that
Congress was well aware of the possibility that a system of property rights
could obviate the need for governmental allocation and that just such a regime
was in fact in the process of evolving.626
Subsequent developments have rendered this debate moot. The FCC’s recent
success with auctions and the longstanding existence of a robust market for
broadcast stations has since validated the idea that spectrum licenses can be
allocated effectively through nonadministrative means. No matter how the
debate over the state of economic thinking at the time of the enactment of the
Communications Act of 1934 is resolved, continued adherence to the technologyspecific approach to the First Amendment can no longer be defended based on
the lack of alternatives to administrative licensing.
C. PROGRESSIVE FAITH IN AGENCY EXPERTISE

The New Deal era’s faith in administrative discretion provides another possible explanation for the courts’ willingness to condone broadcast-style regulation. Contemporary faith in technocracy is perhaps best reflected in the Supreme
Court’s decision in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,627 which was authored
by Landis protègé and former New Dealer Felix Frankfurter. According to
Frankfurter, modern administrative agencies like the FCC are “a response to the
felt need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise.”628 The dynamism of modern industrial society left both Congress and the courts poorly
situated to undertake such a task.629 As a result, rather than being subject to
stringent legal constraints, agencies should be given broad mandates like the
public interest standard, which Frankfurter regarded “as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit.”630 It
provided “a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy.”631
Frankfurter offered similar arguments in his landmark opinion in NBC.632
When faced with “a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic,”
Congress found it best to give the FCC “not niggardly but expansive powers” to
promote radio communications.633 As Congress had learned in areas “far less
fluid and dynamic than radio,” the best course was “to define broad areas for
regulation and to establish standards for judgment adequately related in their

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.

Hazlett, supra note 115, at 143–45, 149–52, 160, 162–63.
309 U.S. 134 (1940).
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id.
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
Id. at 219.
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application to the problems to be solved.”634 Although Congress did not give
the FCC “unfettered discretion,” it also did not attempt to offer an itemized
catalogue of statutory directions. Instead, Congress left it to the FCC to design
the appropriate measures.635 When the FCC’s decision was submitted for
review, the Court declined to second-guess the FCC’s determinations so long as
the agency acted within its statutory authority and supported its findings with
evidence.636 To the extent that litigants wished to challenge the policy of a
particular regulation, the Court declared that it had “neither technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by
the Commission.”637 Any such arguments were more properly directed to the
FCC itself.638
Such a conclusion may be unsurprising as a matter of contemporary administrative law, but what is more surprising is the Court’s willingness to incorporate
such administrative deference into constitutional law. In a brief passage near the
end of the opinion, the NBC Court equated satisfaction of the public interest
standard with First Amendment compliance. The Court stated, “The standard
[the Communications Act of 1934] provided for the licensing of stations was the
‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’ Denial of a station license on that
ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.”639 The implication
is clear: Proof of compliance with the statutory mandate by definition necessarily constituted proof of constitutionality. In effect, the First Amendment disappeared as an independent source of judicial review.640
Coming during the highpoint of jurisprudential faith in administrative expertise, this holding reflects its time. Such administrative control of speech was
once quite common.641 To modern commentators, however, it should seem
inappropriate for a court to regard compliance with the requirements of administrative law as necessarily constituting compliance with the mandates of the First
Amendment. Experience with the administrative process and growing concerns
about agency capture have shattered faith in technocracy that characterized the
Progressive era.642 In addition, although the Court has continued to defer to the

634. Id. at 219–20.
635. Id. at 219.
636. Id. at 224.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 224.
639. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
640. See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (arguing that, although stopping short of true deference, “in evaluating the First Amendment
claims of respondents, we must afford great weight to . . . the experience of the Commission”).
641. Schiller, supra note 35, at 2–3, 21–51.
642. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039 (1997); Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the
Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975); Keith Werhan, The
Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567 (1992).
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FCC’s judgments about how best to promote the public interest,643 courts now
recognize the impropriety of deferring to agencies on matters of constitutional
law.644
D. STARE DECISIS

Another possible justification for the courts’ continued willingness to uphold
the constitutionality of the Broadcast Model is stare decisis. Although not an
“inexorable command,”645 stare decisis “is the preferred course because it
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”646 As a result, the Court has
stated that “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special
justification.”647 In addition, the Court has recognized that stare decisis is
particularly strong when a precedent has “engendered substantial reliance and
has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry.”648 In light of
these considerations, it is understandable why the Court would be loath to
disturb its prior holdings in this area. Not only would overruling cases detract
from the integrity of the rule of law, it would also disrupt a sizable industry
erected in reliance on the Court’s prior decisions.
At the same time, other considerations diminish stare decisis as a justification
for the Court’s refusal to overrule its broadcast precedents. For example, the
Court has recognized that stare decisis is at its “weakest” in matters of constitutional law because only constitutional amendment can correct interpretive
errors.649 In addition, the Court has found it appropriate to overrule cases when
643. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978).
644. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (declining to defer when agency interpretation of statute raised serious First Amendment concerns); see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74
(2001) (5-4 decision) (declining to defer when agency interpretation of a statute raised serious
constitutional questions).
645. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
646. Id. at 827.
647. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); accord Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 443 (2000); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989); Welch v.
Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987).
648. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992); accord Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director,
Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 785–86 (1992); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991); United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399–400 (1971); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,
265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995) (dicta) (“Stare
decisis has special force when legislators or citizens ‘have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for
in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an
extensive legislative response.’” (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).
649. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
63 (1996); Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18
(1980) (plurality opinion); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 671 (1974); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
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the “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.”650 The constitutional
basis of the precedents in question, combined with the dramatic technological
transformation the broadcast industry, thus leaves the Court’s key broadcasting
decisions open to reconsideration. Thus, concerns about stare decisis are not
likely to be the reason preventing the Court from revisiting these precedents.
Even if stare decisis did explain the persistence of the current broadcasting
regime, it would not justify extending such an erroneous regime to other media.
E. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

Perhaps the most persuasive explanation for the Broadcast Model’s persistence has its roots in public choice theory. A growing body of scholarship has
argued that the current structure of broadcast regulation is the product of rent
seeking.651 Unlike other users of spectrum-based technologies, broadcasters
receive their licenses for free. In addition, as noted earlier, the FCC has adopted
policies that have restricted entry in a manner that has enhanced the value of
those licenses still further.652 By creating such rents, Congress was able to
protect politicians against any adverse impact that television might have over
elections. This scheme also allowed policymakers to manipulate the regulatory
process to distribute benefits to favored constituencies. The tremendous benefits
that broadcasters receive from this arrangement led them not to challenge the
imposition of such regulations in most cases. Broadcasters are all too aware that
the elimination of such public interest obligations would destroy any justification for continuing to receive such benefits.653
The events surrounding the allocation of additional spectrum for digital
television demonstrates the rent-seeking behavior surrounding broadcast regulation. During the early 1990s, the broadcast industry engaged in an extensive
lobbying campaign to persuade policymakers to implement the transition to
digital broadcasting by giving a second free channel to all existing television
stations. This arrangement was placed in jeopardy when a bipartisan coalition of
senators, led by then-Majority Leader Bob Dole, condemned the “license
giveaway” as “corporate welfare” and held up passage of the Telecommunica-

665 & n.10 (1944); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 93 (1936) (Stone and
Cardozo, JJ., concurring in result); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–10 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
650. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing Burnet, 285 U.S. at 412
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (recognizing propriety
of overruling cases in light of newly ascertained facts and experience).
651. See generally Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker’s Road Not Taken: The Political Economy
of Broadcasting in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 353, 370–71 (1996); Hazlett,
supra note 571, at 941–42; Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 235–36 (1996); Robinson, supra note
249, at 919.
652. See supra notes 136–49 and accompanying text.
653. Rubin, supra note 28, at 691–97.
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tions Act of 1996 until it was agreed that the FCC would not issue any digital
television licenses before Congress enacted spectrum reform.654 In the words of
one FCC official, broadcasters then began “tripping all over themselves to give
up their First Amendment rights.”655 In exchange for the cancellation of the
Dole agreement, the broadcast industry immediately capitulated on two issues
that it had long resisted: the imposition of quantitative guidelines for children’s
television and the creation of a rating system.656 Since then, governmental
actors have continued to pressure broadcasters to offer free air time to political
candidates and to adopt a “voluntary” code of conduct reinforcing their commitment to public interest broadcasting.657 Indeed, both Reed Hundt and William
Kennard were quite outspoken during their tenures as Chairmen of the FCC in
demanding a greater commitment to the public interest in return for the spectrum given away in the 1996 Act.658 Responding to such pressure, two of the
major networks and many local broadcasters provided candidates with free
airtime during the last election.659
To say that public choice theory can explain the persistence of the Broadcast
Model is not to say that it can justify it. Simply put, the decision to give a
second television channel to all incumbent broadcasters was a public policy
disaster. The traditional justification for doing so is to preserve the benefits of
free, over-the-air television to those households that cannot afford to pay for
television. Sunstein offers a particularly strident version of this argument when
he ridicules systems that base the ability to speak on people’s willingness to pay
as “a bizarre parody of democratic aspirations” and “the stuff of science fiction
rather than self-government.”660 Although the rhetoric of Sunstein’s declaration
is alluring, the issue is not as simple as he suggests. In fact, it is quite common
for our society to allocate any number of goods that are essential to democratic
citizenship, including other media such as newspapers, employment, shelter,

654. See Hazlett, supra note 571, at 939–40.
655. Quoted in id. at 942 (internal quotation marks omitted).
656. See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10718–23 ¶¶ 120–29 (1996); Christopher Stern, TV Makes History at the White House,
BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 4, 1996, at 5.
657. See GORE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 46–47, 56–59; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
18, at 24–26.
658. See Kennard, Remarks at the Museum of Television and Radio, supra note 97; Hundt, supra
note 36, at 1096 (calling for strengthening broadcasters obligations to provide children’s programming
and free air time for political candidates as well as additional restrictions on indecent and violent
programming).
659. See Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21633,
21648 ¶ 35 (1999); Kennard, Remarks at the Museum of Television and Radio, supra note 97; see also
Statement by FCC Chairman William Kennard on EchoStar Announcement of Political Candidate
Airtime (F.C.C. Oct. 2, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/2000/
stwek079.html.
660. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 58; see also SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 215 (same).
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and even basic sustenance, through a price mechanism.661
Even if one were to accept that all households should have access to
television, the untargeted nature of the particular subsidy chosen renders it
singularly cost ineffective. The basic problem is that giving away broadcast
spectrum for free effectively subsidizes all viewers, not just those who need the
subsidy to obtain access. Such untargeted programs are thus unnecessarily
wasteful. By way of comparison, the FCC has addressed similar concerns with
respect to telephone service through direct subsidy programs.662 A recent
empirical study of these programs concluded that targeted subsidies are up to
five times more effective than untargeted subsidies in increasing household
access.663 Indeed, given the comparability in cost of local telephone service and
cable service, the telephone subsidy programs provide a useful benchmark for
estimating the cost of an analogous subsidy for television. Even under conservative assumptions, the cost of a similarly targeted program for television would
be considerably less than the costs associated with giving spectrum away to
digital broadcasters.664
In addition, the use of untargeted subsidies unnecessarily distorts secondary
markets. On the supply side, the decision to give away broadcast spectrum for
free inevitably raises the cost of spectrum for other uses. In short, there is
nothing “free” about free over-the-air television. The public bears the costs by
paying higher fees for cellular telephony, 3G wireless, and other spectrumbased technologies.665 On the demand side, altering the relative prices of the
various spectrum-based services makes broadcasting artificially appealing from
an economic standpoint. Because these prices do not reflect the true costs of
these goods, these differences will inevitably cause consumers to deviate from
661. Indeed, Sunstein’s sweeping statement can be appropriately regarded as calling for the same
reordering of the relationship between the individual and the state sought by Fiss, in which the state is
seen as having an affirmative obligation to provide all individuals with the minimum requirements of
personhood. See supra notes 415–21 and accompanying text. Although Sunstein recognizes the
problem, SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH, supra note 23, at 269–70, aside from the ipse dixit
quoted above, he fails to offer an explanation as to why this issue should be resolved any differently
with respect to free speech than it was with respect to equal protection and due process.
662. The Lifeline program subsidizes individual households’ ability to pay for their monthly
telephone bills. The Link-Up program helps defray the one-time costs associated with obtaining initial
phone service. See Ross C. Ericksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from
Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41 J.L. & ECON. 477, 481–82 (1998).
663. Id. at 498.
664. See Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of
DTV Legislation, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 533 (1997) (reporting estimates placing value of spectrum
given away for digital broadcasting as being between $11 billion and $70 billion as well as placing
estimates of value of analog channels projected to be returned as being between $20 billion and $132
billion). By way of comparison, the high-cost and low-income support programs for telephony cost
approximately $3.2 billion in 2001. FEDERAL-STATE JOINT BOARD ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE, UNIVERSAL
SERVICE MONITORING REPORT 1-38 tbl. 1.11 (2002) available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Monitor/mrs02-0.pdf. Applying the risk-free discount rate of roughly
5%, the net present value of such a program is approximately $67 billion, which compares favorably
with the $31–$202 billion in spectrum currently given to the broadcast industry for free.
665. See Yoo, supra note 153, at 72–76.
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the most efficient product mix.666 This effect is exacerbated by other regulatory
features, such as must-carry, that are designed to promote free, over-the-air
television at the expense of cable and other forms of pay television. By reducing
the revenue generated by cable systems, must-carry causes the price of cable
access to rise. The untargeted nature of the cross subsidy implicit in must-carry
thus has the counterproductive effect of thwarting the very desire to increase
access to television that underlies the subsidy program’s origins.667
Finally, giving away spectrum is also singularly ineffective as a means for
promoting particular types of programming. It would have been more cost
effective for the government to auction the spectrum and use the revenue
gathered to purchase a major television network and devote its entire output to
children’s television and high-quality political speech.668 To make matters
worse, by giving licenses only to incumbent licensees, the government doubled
the amount of spectrum dedicated to television without increasing the level of
competition in the industry or diversifying the ownership base of broadcast
stations.669 Thus, although public choice theory may explain why such an
arrangement represents a good deal for broadcasters, it fails to provide a reason
for courts or policymakers to maintain the existing system of regulation.
CONCLUSION
The same forces collapsing the technological distinctions embodied in current
media policy are achieving the same effect on the technology-specific approach
to the First Amendment. Not only do we now have a better understanding of the
conceptual shortcomings of the rationales traditionally cited as supporting the
constitutionality of the Broadcast Model, we must also candidly acknowledge
the potentially transformative impact of technological innovations such as
digital television, the V-chip, PVRs, spread spectrum, and video-on-demand.
Furthermore, technological convergence is making it increasingly possible to
convey virtually any type of communication through virtually any means of
transmission. Indeed, once television networks complete the conversion to data
packet switching, a single communication may be transmitted through several
media simultaneously. As a result, the collapse of the technology-driven approach to the First Amendment appears inevitable. The Supreme Court’s appar666. See Ericksson et al., supra note 662, at 478 (summarizing basic criticisms of untargeted
subsidies).
667. See id. at 499. Cross subsidies that penalize one subsector of an industry to benefit another are
also somewhat problematic from the standpoint of fairness, in that rarely is the penalized subsector
responsible for creating the problem being redressed. Doing so makes about as much as sense as taxing
cable operators to pay for the construction of new public schools. To the extent that general concerns of
public welfare form the basis for the subsidy program, those subsidies should be financed out of general
revenues.
668. Robinson, supra note 249, at 922 & n.83 (noting that in 1995 CBS was sold for $5.4 billion and
in 1996 Turner Broadcasting was sold for $6.7 billion).
669. Spitzer, supra note 651, at 365–66; Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of
1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 163–64 (1996).
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ent reluctance to rely on the traditional rationales for applying a lower First
Amendment standard to broadcasting may well signal their growing appreciation of this reality.
The attempts by Fiss and Sunstein to employ civic republican theory to
provide revisionist rationales for the Broadcast Model in the end fail to justify
upholding its constitutionality. Not only do they fail to come to grips with the
First Amendment’s traditional respect for individual autonomy and traditional
suspicion of government intervention, they also fail to offer a sufficient articulation of how their theories will work in practice or how they will overcome the
technological realities surrounding television. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to see how their theories would lead to the world that they envision.
The Broadcast Model is a regulatory scheme in search of its own justification.
As such, it can properly be regarded as an example of the tendency for
regulation to persist long after the reasons underlying its creation have since
fallen away.670 I do not mean to suggest, however, that theoretical inelegance
represents the only problem with the technology-specific approach to the First
Amendment. On the contrary, as the decades-long ordeal to settle the First
Amendment standard to govern cable television and the current uncertainty
surrounding the constitutional framework that will be applied to digital television demonstrate, the problems resulting from the uncertainty created by the
technology-specific First Amendment are real.
Even more sinister than the costs associated with this uncertainty is the novel
way that I have identified in which regulation can serve as a constitutional
justification for additional regulation.671 Thus, the persistence of the Broadcast
Model creates more than just transitional ambiguity; it also threatens to fundamentally alter constitutional outcomes in ways that tend to reinforce an overriding culture of regulation for its own sake. There would thus appear to be no
valid basis for continuing to adhere to the technology-specific vision of the First
Amendment inspired by the Broadcast Model. On the contrary, the analysis
contained in this Article suggests that little would be lost and much would be
gained from abandoning it.

670. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286–87 (1982); 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 126–27 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21
STAN. L. REV. 548, 611–15 (1969).
671. See supra subsection I.A.2.

